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Abstract 
 
This study explores the phenomenon of the social construction of IS investment evaluation 
in the financial services industry. The extensive literature on information systems (IS) 
evaluation stretches back more than thirty years and it is widely agreed that IS evaluation is 
an important and complex issue. Constructivist evaluation, which serves to develop the 
interpretivist strand of the literature, concentrates on the notion that evaluations are the 
outcomes of an interaction and argumentation process between various interested parties.  
 
The purpose of this research is to shed further light on the IS investment evaluation area. 
Explaining the practice of IS evaluation within the dynamic and technologically 
sophisticated financial services industry would benefit academics and financial services 
firms alike. This context is relatively neglected in the existing literature. 
 
The chosen case study reflects the demands in the financial services industry to upgrade 
their infrastructure in order to manage an ever increasing number of transactions, as well as 
increased regulation. The fieldwork produced extensive data concerning traditional trading, 
brokerage, high frequency algorithmic trading and transaction clearing. The rapid rise of 
derivative transactions during the last few years caused problems in terms of clearing and 
managing the transactions. At the same time, hedge funds‘ growing demand for low latency 
execution services and changes in regulations increased, pressuring firms in the industry to 
invest heavily.  
 
Actor-network theory (ANT) is used in order to describe and explain the formation of 
networks between human and non-human actors. The theory‘s specific vocabulary allows 
IS evaluation to be seen in a new light and the study uses ANT analysis to produce insight 
into the longstanding problem of IS evaluation, human and non-human interactions and 
roles within the context if IT investment appraisal. Building on ANT, this thesis is an in-
depth case study of the employment process of an IT evaluation method at a global 
financial services company. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Angell and Straub (1999, p. 179) asked ―whether computerisation has become the neurosis 
of our age‖. By comparing the application of IT methodologies with ritual behaviour within 
human social institutions, they proposed that the so-called rationality of management 
science, with its tidy benchmarking, auditing, categorization and performance measurement 
etc., is actually a pseudo-science. They showed that from the position of Nietzschean 
epistemology, this rationality is merely a false claim to the instrumental efficacy of data 
modelling that is indistinguishable from the rain-dancing of primitive tribes.  
 
Twelve years later, from 7
th
 June until 9
th
 June 2011, a High Frequency Trading (HFT) 
World conference will take place in Amsterdam. The following topics will be discussed 
according to the organiser Terrapin: Assessing the viability of proposed regulatory change 
and its effects on HFT practitioners. Identifying the latest development in data feeds, 
connectivity and co-location. Assessing whether traders can cope with increasing volume 
and scale in their models. Securing the right minds for your organisation: the rise of 
celebrity culture. Updating your chip technology to improve execution and monitoring. 
Understanding how to balance latency, data access and energy costs in your trading models. 
Can exchanges really keep up and for how long? Are trading venues set-up to cope with 
large volume spikes? What technologies can trading venues offer beyond data and 
transactions? Impact of machine-readable news. 
 
According to Nick Garrow, Global Head of Electronic Trading at Newedge Group (in a 
presentation on 1
st
 March 2011), the financial services industry is witnessing the following 
challenges: 
 Data consistency and transportation 
 Lack of consistency in the way exchanges provide real-time drop copy reporting 
 Big data normalisation challenge (3000+ traded instruments) 
 Architecture design needs to deliver data with lowest possible latency 
 Huge quantities of data to be processed and stored (millions of orders per day) 
 Implementing low latency pre-trade controls 
 No single supplier providing ultra-low latency controls for all asset classes 
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 Adding pre-trade controls adds latency. Commercial considerations. 
 Impact on the clients‘ set-up 
 Regulatory conformance  
 Need to deliver different solutions in different regions to ensure local regulatory 
conformance  
 Need consistency in rules moving forward 
 Costs Estimate for Newedge is at $4 Million set up costs and $4 Million to $6 
Million per year to run 
 Take 12 to 14 months to fully implement; initial focus on conformance with SEC 
July 20111 requirements  
 Need to invest in people / skills / training with costs running around $1 Million per 
year. 
 
On 3
rd
 March 2011, the Futures Industry Association announced:  
―The importance of pre-trade risk controls was one of the main topics discussed at a 
March 1, 2011 meeting of the CFTC‘s Technology Advisory Committee (TAC). 
They discussed a series of recommendations. ―Speed and coordination dominated 
the first two TAC meetings as we explored computerised trade strategies and their 
role in the events of May 6, 2010,‖ said Scott O‘Malia, the CFTC commissioner 
who chairs the advisory committee. ―Today, we are going to take our first shot at 
tying all of this together in the interest of preparing for the new regulatory world, 
which is a world dominated by high speed and demands a coordinated approach‖ 
(announcement from the Futures Industry Association, 3
rd
 March 2011).   
 
A good example is the way computers are able to read economic news automatically now.  
―Algo news feed provides macroeconomic data to algorithmic computers. The feed 
was jointly developed by Deutsche Börse, Need to Know News and Market News 
International to deliver macroeconomic data from the U.S., Canada and Europe 
immediately upon release. The design enables trading algorithms to react within 
milliseconds. Low latency direct data feed technology was launched in summer 
2010.‖ (Vice President, Market Data and Analytics, Deutsche Börse AG). 
 
The purpose of this research is to shed further light on the Information Technology (IT) 
investment evaluation area in the financial services industry, more specifically in the 
electronic trading space. Highlighting how IT evaluation methods have been broadly 
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employed would benefit financial services firms (FSFs) such as investment banks and 
brokers across the globe. Certain evaluation methodologies would benefit the industry 
according to some academics, industry professionals and politicians. This thesis aims to 
investigate and understand the employment of IT evaluation methods in a selected FSF. 
Building on actor-network theory (ANT) this thesis is an in-depth case study of the 
employment of an IT evaluation method at a global financial services company. IS 
evaluation is important but difficult to perform. FSFs are very sophisticated IT users and 
depend on IS. It is important to see what FSFs are doing regarding IS evaluation. 
 
In the 1980s the IS evaluation literature tended to be positivistic, although it changed to a 
more interpretative approach in the 1990s. However, today‘s practice does not follow this 
apparent trend witnessed in the literature. This may be due to the nature of IS evaluation 
being socially constructed. The proposal poses the following research question: ―How is IS 
evaluation socially constructed?‖ This research, which focuses on evaluation in terms of IT 
investment appraisal, contributes to the interpretivist stream of IS evaluation research.  
 
In order to conduct an in-depth study, a case study of the social construction of IS 
evaluation was conducted of a financial services company. The theoretical framework that 
underpins the study is ANT, which enables the researcher to shed light on the way 
decisions are made and evaluation practices are used within the financial services industry. 
It highlights that during a process of ‗mutual translation‘ both the evaluation method and 
also its surrounding actors enter into a dynamic negotiation mutually translating each other. 
These actors capitalise on weaknesses in the method‘s inscriptions and try to leverage those 
weaknesses. The surrounding actors may continue with their ordinary day-to-day activities.  
 
The financial services industry is in a period of rapid change brought about by information 
technology and deregulation. The most important trend in the financial markets today is the 
growth of electronic trading. According to Valdez (2000, p. 354) ―by mid-1999, various 
sources were estimating the number of Internet users worldwide at 150 million‖. In 2011, 
28.7%, or in other words more than 1.9 billion people, use the internet (Internet World 
Statistic, 2011). At the same time, the use of electronic trading is growing rapidly and 
providing new distributions channels and shifting the balance of power to the consumers 
according to Valdez (2000).  
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Valdez continues:  
―For the user, the effect will be a cheaper and more efficient service. For the 
supplier, it will bring exposure to new competition and redundancy to large ranks of 
sales staff, brokers and administrative personnel generally. The effects will be felt 
in all our financial markets-banking, bonds, equities, foreign exchange, derivatives 
and insurance. There is a dramatic effect on back office and front office costs‖ 
(Valdez, 2000, p. 354). 
 
Evaluation methodologies are used in various ways by the industry. The main case study, 
of a company called Refco, shows that financial services organisations can collapse if a 
sound evaluation methodology is not implemented. The role of the IT investment evaluator 
needs to be seen within a specific context. Problems like wrong position account bookings 
appeared in Refco‘s clearing department regularly. These problems highlight that finding 
solutions is important. However, a certain minimum investment is required to obtain higher 
quality operation and clearing infrastructure. IT investment is crucial for any financial 
services company; especially for companies focusing on derivative brokerage, derivatives 
trading and related areas. Financial services firms affect many of us directly or indirectly. 
Therefore, conducting a study is highly worthwhile.  
 
Without effective IT evaluation, firms can face systemic risks and can cause risks to the 
entire financial services industry. National economies depend on these FSFs. Many 
investment banks such as Barclays, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, UBS and Deutsche Bank 
have a handful of main core business areas and IT investment varies from department to 
department. Departments with a lot of constant flow business have to rely on IS.  
 
The main business area of Refco was trading and brokerage of derivatives. Traditional 
investment banks however have various other business areas such as underlying cash 
trading of bonds and shares, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) with the aim to generate 
more income. The third and fourth main income stream for traditional investment banks is 
generated by consumer credit business and mortgages to retail clients and institutional 
clients. Some FSFs have no retail clients in order to keep the number of employees and 
infrastructure costs low. They offer e.g. credit derivatives to certain intermediaries such as 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or to any mortgage and credit broker.  
 
 11 
Most investment banks are also engaged in proprietary trading and in research. Proprietary 
trading means buying or selling on behalf of your own company, using the company‘s own 
money rather than client money. The profit and loss based on proprietary trading can be 
very volatile. We have witnessed multi-billion dollar profits and also huge losses in 2008 
and 2009, although, this is not a new phenomenon.  
 
A few people working for traditional investment banks are empowered to buy or sell 
certain products such as derivatives with the aim to reverse the original trade into a profit. 
Depending on size, liquidity and duration, certain risky short term or long term investments 
can be disastrous for the investment banks. In case a large loss occurs, the handful of 
decision makers will be replaced. Refco‘s business was based on buying and selling 
derivatives on behalf of investment banks and other direct clients with the need to be 
hooked up with most exchanges. It earned a pre-defined fee based on the number of 
transactions on behalf of the investment banks‘ proprietary trading orders. Its main business 
was to execute and process orders from clients such as banks and institutional clients.    
  
1.2 Current Trends in Financial Markets 
 
As mentioned, proprietary trading is one of the main income streams for many investment 
banks and brokerage firms. Those proprietary trading details are little known and the 
proprietary trading pattern is not evaluated by external or independent evaluators either. 
Occasionally, the public finds out about these proprietary trading patterns if something goes 
wrong, such as a massive loss or a fine imposed by one of the local regulators. An example 
of proprietary trading is ‗basis trading‘. According to the theory, proprietary trading houses 
engage in trading if either the future price‘s theoretical price is too high or too low 
compared to the underlying product or composite index. FSFs benefit from conducting a 
buy or sell order. During the last five years, those buy and sell orders have been more and 
more automated. In order to be able to engage in automated proprietary business, a lot of IT 
investment is required. An IT platform and infrastructure need to be established across the 
organisation. Often, these departments are called ‗high-frequency‘ trading desks. 
Investment banks using ‗high frequency‘ trading treat this as a synonym for IT driven 
trading or ‗black-box‘ trading activities. Banks and brokers with established IT driven 
execution desks are able to execute high frequency orders such as ‗basis trades‘ regularly. 
A basis trade is an arbitrage between the underlying product or index and the related 
 12 
derivative, the correspondent future. Details and examples of basis trading, black-box 
trading and algo-trading are presented in Chapter Six.  
 
An algorithm is a process for reaching a goal, structured in a sequence of accurate steps. In 
an IT setting, this process is a computer program. Chaboud et al. (2009,) define algorithmic 
trading, which correlates with HFT as:  
―In algorithmic trading (AT), computers directly interface with trading platforms, 
placing orders without immediate human intervention. The computers observe 
market data and possibly other information at very high frequency, and, based on a 
built-in algorithm, send back trading instructions, often within milliseconds. A 
variety of algorithms are used: for example, some look for arbitrage opportunities, 
including small discrepancies in the exchange rates between three currencies; some 
seek optimal execution of large orders at the minimum cost; and some seek to 
implement longer-term trading strategies in search of profits. Among the most 
recent developments in algorithmic trading, some algorithms now automatically 
read and interpret economic data releases, generating trading orders before 
economists have begun to read the first line‖ (Chaboud et al., 2009, p. 1). 
 
Depending on the sources, it seems that up to 40% of global exchange-traded derivatives 
are conducted by machines. A Deutsche Bank press release from the end of 2010 highlights 
how much trading is driven by computers and the emerging new role of IT globally. 
According to press news from 12 August 2010, Deutsche Bank AG was disciplined by 
Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) for accidentally selling orders worth Yen 16.7 trillion in 
June due to an algorithm trading error (OSE press release August 2010). The error resulted 
in placing sell orders of Nikkei 225 futures contracts worth $182 billion. The fault was 
quickly detected and only 0.3% of the orders were processed by the back-office. Deutsche 
Bank later acknowledged that the faulty trades were the result of a change in an automated 
proprietary trading system that had been specially designed and implemented for its Asian 
Quantitative Trading (AQT) unit.  
 
Having changed this system previously, separate data files used to obtain prices could now 
be integrated into one data file that combined product and market information throughout 
Asia, according to Deutsche Bank. For the first time, the system was operated using the 
new integrated data file in the evening trading session of 31
st
 May 2010. On the following 
day, the system triggered excessive orders because it was not able to obtain a required 
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benchmark price. As a result, the Nikkei 225 futures index was calculated as zero and the 
system continuously sent selling orders. As soon as Deutsche Bank became aware of the 
problem and decided to cancel the orders, the AQT system was suspended and the bank 
discontinued this specific business in this region afterwards. The bank has been given an 
admonition by OSE for lack of sufficient control of the electronic information processing 
system. Deutsche Bank gave a statement saying it ‗takes the matter seriously and continues 
to implement measures to further strengthen its system-related processes and governance 
and to prevent such an incident from reoccurring‘.  
 
Continuous advances in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have 
transformed the nature of many operations in the financial markets. ICTs have facilitated 
the emergence of electronic trading allowing the automated routing of orders directly to the 
exchange via a network infrastructure. Gallaugher and Melville (2004) believe this sector 
has been changed more than most other sectors. Exchanges offer participants Direct Market 
Access (DMA) as the client is able to conduct his trades with no physical intermediary for 
execution but rather clearing from the broker. According to Schmerken (2007), in 2008, 
85% of all matched orders in the U.S.A. were routed via DMA. Brown (2010) highlights 
that orders executed via DMA were just 1% ten years ago. Kim (2007) refers to High-
Frequency Algorithmic Trading (HFAT) where orders are matched through an algorithm 
program. The program triggers buy or sell orders for a specific product when certain 
predefined conditions are met. Profits can only be made when the current opportunity is 
used and arbitrage trades take place.  
 
Low latency in data updates is crucial for any arbitrage opportunity. Latency within a given 
network refers to any delay incurred in information transmission. HFAT systems need to 
perform faster and faster and the industry is recognizing the limits of technology. In terms 
of infrastructure network latency, speed of transmission, information processing time and 
speed of clearing dictates the efficiency of the trading algorithm. According to Clark 
(2008), reducing latency by six milliseconds drives the cost up by an additional $1.5 
million. Exchange members aiming to retain a competitive advantage in the field set up 
their data centre very close to the exchanges. Being physically next door to the exchange or 
even within the same building keeps latency low. Some exchanges such as Deutsche Börse 
offer members the service of hosting their infrastructure within the same building, known 
as co-location. More and more financial services firms have no other choice than investing 
in such low-latency trading infrastructure. FSF‘s customers had to change their operation 
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and infrastructure in order to cope with the new reality. The table below shows the rise of 
volume generated on the electronic trading system Eurex during the last few years (source: 
Eurex Deutschland GmbH).       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm trading platforms in the industry 
 
The following summary shows how much the industry has moved on since the 1990s. 
Deutsche Bank‘s algorithmic trading platform is called ‗Autobahn Equity‘ and combines 
the bank‘s algorithms with its DMA offering to more than 500 clients. Other banks have 
the following algorithm trading platforms:  
 Barclays Capital: BARX provides access to more than 60 equity trading venues 
through various Execution Management System (EMS) and Order Management 
System (OMS) platforms. Core algorithm: Iceberg, Volume Weighted Average 
Price (VWAP), Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP). Number of Algorithm 
clients: not disclosed. Launch date: 2001. 
 BNP Paribas: Global Execution Services (GES) with focus on equities and 
derivatives. Core algorithm: Paris, VWAP, TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: 
not disclosed. Launch date: 2003 
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 Bank of New York (BNY): BNY ConvergEx focuses on liquidity and execution 
management. It offers interfaces to more than 50 markets. Core algorithm: Closing 
Price, Per cent of volume, VWAP, TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: not 
disclosed. Launch date: 2006 
 Credit Agricole Chevreux (CA): CA Cheuvreux offers access to more than 60 
markets. Core algorithm: Closing Price, Per cent of volume, VWAP, TWAP. 
Number of Algorithm clients: 200. Launch date: 2001. 
 Citigroup: offers access to more than 50 markets via algorithm. Core algorithm: 
Market on Open, Market on Close, VWAP, TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: 
not disclosed. Launch date: 2000. 
 Goldman Sachs (GS): GS electronic trading offers all asset classes. Core algorithm: 
VWAP, TWAP, per cent of volume. Number of Algorithm clients: more than 2000. 
Launch date: 2002. 
 HSBC: Access to 35 markets.  Core algorithm: synthetic close, Per cent of volume, 
VWAP, TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: 500. Launch date: 2006. 
 Nomura – Instinet: covers all markets via Cobra. Cobra is a liquidity seeking 
algorithm designed to maximise shares traded. Core algorithm: Pairs, VWAP, 
TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: 1500. Launch date: 2008. 
 JP Morgan: J.P. Morgan‘s algorithmic trading. Core algorithm: Iceberg, VWAP, 
TWAP, per cent of volume, close. Number of Algorithm clients: not disclosed. 
Launch date: not disclosed. 
 Merrill Lynch / Bank of America: Core algorithm: Market on close, market on 
open, percentage of volume, VWAP, TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: not 
disclosed. Launch date: not disclosed. 
 Morgan Stanley: Morgan Stanley Electronic Trading (MSET): Core algorithm: 
arrival price, VWAP, TWAP. Number of Algorithm clients: not disclosed. Launch 
date: 2009. 
 UBS: UBS Direct Execution offers algorithmic trading. Core algorithm: VWAP, 
TWAP, at open, at close. Number of Algorithm clients: not disclosed. Launch date: 
not disclosed.    
 
Advances in technology continue to transform how our financial markets operate (Hasan 
and Hunter, 2003). As we have seen in the Deutsche Bank Japan example above, the 
volume of financial products traded through computer automated trading taking place at 
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high speed and with little human interaction has increased. Almost a quarter of European 
equity trading volume is generated through high-frequency automated computer trading.  
 
The Department for Business Innovation & Skills (BIS) announced in January 2011 a so-
called Foresight project, sponsored by Her Majesty‘s Treasury. It is led by the Government 
Office for Science under the direction of the Government‘s Chief Scientific Adviser, 
Professor Sir John Beddington. It will explore how computer generated trading in financial 
markets might evolve in the next ten years or more, and how this will affect:  
 Financial stability, 
 Integrity of financial markets including price information and liquidity,  
 Competition, 
 Market efficiency for allocating capital,  
 Transaction costs on access to finance and  
 Future role and location of capital markets.  
 
On the BIS website they announce the following:  
―It will also assess options for addressing the key challenges ahead, and consider 
how the opportunities offered by advancements in computer technologies could be 
capitalised upon by the financial sector. … The aim of this project is to make a 
significant contribution to the efficiency, integrity and resilience of financial 
markets, by identifying options for policy makers in the UK and internationally.‖ 
(Announcement of the Department of Business Innovation & Skills, January 2011). 
 
It is most interesting reading Angell and Straub (1999) where they stated: 
―For these crazy algorithmic (so-called) solutions delivered by ‗the science of 
management‘, most often aided and abetted by the wizardry of information 
technology, have themselves become a problem! Underlying so much of the general 
sickness is a mechanistic drive for categorisation and standardisation and by 
implication comparison, measurement and method, in the mistaken belief that they 
deliver the utility of valuable ‗knowledge‘‖ (Angell and Straub, 1999, p.1).  
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1.3 Need for Research into IT Investment  
 
This research attempts to develop an understanding of the employment of information 
technology (IT) investment and the evaluation methods used in organisations. Many 
researchers have developed methods and concepts in order to help organisations to 
understand and also to manage IT costs. Researchers provide various investment evaluation 
methods and approaches for use by industry. The aim is to understand and make the benefit 
of IT investment visible. My aim is to understand the benefit of IT investment and various 
evaluation methodologies. It is striking that many organisations are still not able to 
understand potential intangible benefits of IT investments. The thesis analyses an 
organisation‘s use of an IT investment evaluation methodology based on quantitative data 
rather than qualitative evaluation methodologies. However, an information system is not 
restricted to the physical artefacts or the use of IT in organisations.  
 
The financial services industry has been transformed also by more regulation and banking 
regulation that ―[…] does not come cheap. Tougher capital rules for dealers, higher clearing 
fees and closer business conduct rules will all generate increased business costs‖ 
(Belchambers, 2010, p. 16). This is reflected in the case study. The recent collapse of 
various investment banks and FSFs highlights the need for sound evaluation 
methodologies. The industry is using mainly quantitative evaluation methodologies based 
on return on investment (ROI) (Butler Group, 2004, p. 113). Qualitative methodologies are 
generally not used for IT and other investment evaluation approaches.  
 
However, research in this area is rare, partly because the underlying business is complex 
and secretive.  Most FSFs do not want to reveal their business practices.  A good example 
is the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market. This multi-trillion market almost collapsed in 
terms of market activity and market liquidity. Unfortunately, we all are directly or 
indirectly influenced by the development of the CDS market, since mortgages and other 
debt markets are dependent on those markets.  
 
Industry people are very concerned about their jobs and related bonuses and many do not 
want any change, even if those potential changes such as migration to electronic exchanges 
may mean more transparency or better evaluation methodologies. One reason why 
investment banks and FSFs do not welcome change is the high margin earned for certain 
products they trade over the counter (OTC). The share of the over the counter derivatives 
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industry is around 83% of the total global derivatives market and much bigger compared to 
the standardised and regulated financial futures and options industry (White Paper: The 
Global Derivatives Market, An Introduction, April 2008, Deutsche Börse AG, p. 7). The 
author‘s argument is that the financial services industry can benefit from additional 
academic research that could benefit firms‘ organisational learning.  
 
Standard regulated exchange traded derivatives can be evaluated constantly and a ‗mark-to-
market‘ price is available whenever a risk manager or an investor needs it. Mark to market 
is a daily industry evaluation of a current long or short position. On a daily basis, positions 
need to be valued based on the previous closing price. Traditional OTC traded derivatives 
are evaluated on a less regular basis because they are less liquid and not centrally 
monitored. If the traded products are not evaluated regularly or if they are not easily 
evaluated, why should IT related investment - one step ahead of the value chain - be 
evaluated and who is interested to evaluate the IT investment? The point here is that, 
without an alternative evaluation methodology, the existing quantitative methodologies 
such as ROI will still be used in future.  
 
Competing IT evaluation methodologies will not be considered by the financial services 
industry unless regulators such as the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleitungsaufsicht (BaFin), or Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) force the pace. The industry, which depends on IT for its daily operations, was on 
the verge of collapse and yet many evaluation tools have not been used. For example, the 
balanced scorecard perspective of Kaplan and Norton (1996) recommends evaluation from 
four perspectives: financial, customer, business process and learning and growth 
perspectives.  
 
The literature review in Chapter Two demonstrates the importance of evaluation and argues 
for a research focus on IT investment appraisal, as this is carried out much more often in 
practice than post-implementation evaluation. Chapter Two briefly surveys the positivistic 
literature of the 1970s and 1980s, which still forms the basis of much of today‘s practice, as 
well as the interpretive approaches of the 1990s. The latter approaches highlight the 
political, social and organisational aspects of evaluations in practice. The literature on IS 
evaluation stretches back many years (e.g. Land, 1976).  IS evaluation is an important and 
complex issue (Farbey et al., 1993; Land, 1999; Hirschheim and Smithson, 1988; 
Willcocks, 1994; Willcocks and Lester, 1999; Smithson and Tsiavos, 2004).  
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Evaluation of IT investment recognises that the use of information systems has become part 
of every manager‘s job. This thesis tries to understand IT investment evaluation in 
information systems that support management decision making at the operational, tactical 
and strategic planning levels. It is also necessary to understand the application of these 
information systems in various organisational departments. The development of 
information systems within organisations has been characterised by a process of evolution 
where we need to look beyond technology (Angell and Straub, 1999).  
 
One of the tasks firms like Refco need to perform is the role of resource allocation. 
Resource allocation determines who will have which role and who will get which role in a 
specific context. He or she has to decide how much money to spend for various things like 
advertising, attending conferences, training needs and number of employees. For the 
understanding of this thesis and the understanding of the findings mentioned in the analysis 
in Chapter Six, it is noteworthy to highlight involved actors who play a crucial role in this 
topic. Many organisations understand that IT investment is embedded in a project. By 
definition, a project is temporary in nature. Projects have a specific start and a specific end. 
In an ideal world, the project consists of a well-defined collection of smaller tasks and is 
company specific. Projects are different from one to another. Mostly, the environment and 
people involved in larger projects will change in due course. Employee fluctuation is one of 
the reasons for lack of available historic background information.  
 
Opportunities and needs arise in any organisation. A new opportunity such as penetrating a 
new market or employing automated proprietary trading systems are examples to which the 
management must address and implement specific project processes. Implementation of 
processes and working towards solutions entails a change for the organisation (Kawalek et 
al., 2005). Projects are generally established to carry out changes. Someone is responsible 
for the successful completion of the project. The evaluator is often the project manager or a 
„change agent‟. In this context, implementing change is seen as a project management 
process (McManus and Wood-Harper, 2003). The process can be seen as temporary and 
undertaken to achieve a particular aim. Project management is the discipline of planning, 
organising, and managing resources to bring about the successful completion of specific 
project goals and objectives, according to Wikipedia. 
 
Investment banks and brokerage companies decided to increase electronic exchange traded 
volumes dramatically with the support of automated processes such as algorithmic trading. 
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They implemented specific ‗automated trading processes.‘ For example, a very large U.S. 
investment bank employed a managing director for fixed income automated trading desk in 
October 2010 in order to build the necessary infrastructure. A financial benefit occurs if the 
project is launched and managed properly. A project is a unique, one-time undertaking and 
will not be done again exactly as before. The reader of this thesis should be aware that 
project managers or „change agents‟ often have no historical data related to previous 
similar projects in the firm. The new managing director mentioned she had no historical 
data or information within the firm. Initially, the change agent has to start the project with 
limited information and the desired outcomes may consume additional time, money, 
workforce and materials. 
 
An example of a project is arbitrage trading between liquid products via automated trading 
systems. This project management can be defined as the application of skills, knowledge, 
tools and techniques to project activities. The project should have identifiable phases, 
namely initiation, planning, execution and closure (Kerzner, 2009; Fuller, Valacich and 
George, 2008). The project manager has to manage each of the four phases. The initiation 
phase reflects the need for potential upcoming action. Potential actions need to be justified. 
In the planning phase, the project solution is further developed. Also, interim deliverables 
are identified, the amounts of money spent are estimated and a formal approval to go ahead 
with the project is required. During the third phase it is necessary to monitor the 
development. During this execution phase, intervention should take place in case it is 
necessary. The fourth phase should reflect expected changes. In order to help the evaluator 
or project manager, it is suggested to follow a ‗to do list‘, which comprises a six step 
process:  
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 Define the opportunity or problem 
 Suggest a project plan 
 Identify task and resource requirements 
 Estimate resource allocation and a related control plan 
 Define potential risk and involve stakeholder 
 Communicate internally and keep stakeholders updated regularly. 
 
The process of IT evaluation employment needs to be analysed in order to understand how 
organisations employ IT evaluation method(s). Also, the characteristics of IT evaluation 
methods are a topic that is often analysed. How to incorporate such a method in an 
organisation is a challenging task (Fuller, Valacich and George, 2008).   
 
The Oxford Dictionary defines evaluation as ‗the activity of finding out or forming an idea 
of the amount or value of something or somebody‘.  
―We all evaluate, that is assess, against implicit or explicit criteria, the value or 
worth of individuals, objects, situations and outcomes, informally and often 
unconsciously every day of our lives‖ (Legge, 1984, p. 3).  
 
According to Smithson and Tsiavos (2004) IT investment evaluation needs to be researched 
further. One of the main problems is to quantify the outcome of IT investment over a period 
of time. Evaluation is subjective and dependent on individual value judgements and 
contributes to the ambiguity surrounding IT evaluation. To address these IT evaluation 
problems, numerous methods and techniques have been developed in the past to aid 
organisations in managing IT costs benefits.  
 
Most of the research in the area of IS evaluation claims that it is complicated and an elusive 
concept. Therefore it is difficult to approach both conceptually and operationally. As 
mentioned, the majority of evaluations are performed using capital investment appraisal 
techniques. Those organisations being aware of shortcomings in the evaluation of IT 
continue avoiding the topic. Within the industry, not many people seem to have an interest 
in sound, systemic and sustainable IT evaluation technique or approach. Also, the term 
evaluation creates a problem itself, which shows that evaluation is difficult not only in the 
IS field but also in other disciplines such as social research. Ballantine et. al. (1994) 
confirmed that organisations use simplistic financial techniques for IT evaluation in 
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principle and they did not believe that this approach and behaviour would change in the 
near future. 
  
One of the aims of the research is to understand how the employment of IT evaluation 
methods occurs. Another aim is to highlight that we need to develop IT evaluation methods 
and we also need to employ them. If we are not able to employ them, we will not be able to 
make a change within the evaluation field. Evaluation is a very subjective activity, difficult 
and influenced by culture, human, social organisation and history. In conceptual terms 
evaluation is never context free or value free. Serafeimidis (1998) highlighted in his PhD: 
―[…] the impact of IS can be seen as the interactions of their technical and social 
components. Consequently, when an IS is evaluated, multiple dimensions are 
expected to be exposed. These include technical, economic, managerial, social and 
behavioural aspects. Each dimension is different and has its own underlying 
theories, measures and inherits its own assumptions‖ (Serafeimidis, 1998, p. 18).  
 
It is very difficult to extract or isolate the potential influence from other internal day-to-day 
activities. Other departments may not be able to get access to the new IT system. 
Serafeimidis (1998) continued: 
―[…] the dilemma for decision makers is not whether to invest or not in IT but it is 
more about the selection of the most appropriate investment, the effective use of 
resources, its integration with other investments, the maximisation of the rewards 
achieved […]‖ (Serafeimidis, 1998, p. 19).  
 
Based on an extensive study of the literature, the author argues that the IS evaluation 
process is necessarily subjective and is strongly influenced by prevailing norms and beliefs 
within the organisation and, in particular, within the management hierarchy. Hence, the 
main research question is:  
“How is IS evaluation socially constructed?” 
 This question can be broken down into a number of sub-questions: 
 How is the appraisal process constructed in the context of high frequency and 
algorithmic trading?  
 How is the appraisal process being transformed due to recent significant changes in 
electronic trading? 
 How are the various actors enrolled into the project? 
 How are the key roles in an IT investment appraisal enacted? 
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 How do actors understand the appraisal of IT investment? 
 How much is the appraisal of IT investment dictated by changing regulation(s)? 
It should be noted that the terms IS and IT are used synonymously in this thesis.   
 
1.4 Case Study Background  
 
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed significant transformations in economic, political, 
social and cultural issues. There is a continuous debate on the globalization of 
contemporary societies (Giddens, 1990). The term globalization has been widely used to 
discuss a large range of ideas related to global interconnections and interdependences, 
across time and space from the flow of information, production of goods, services and use 
of capital and people (Hayes and Walsham, 2000). Nowadays, we take the term for granted 
and the topic is not debated as it used to be anymore.  
 
The idea of the information society derived from Daniel Bell‘s (1973) concept of post- 
industrial society. Bell (1973, pp. 13 ff) claimed that industrial societies have developed 
towards societies of services. Beniger (1986, pp. 6-13, pp. 21-25) argued that the 
information society emerges from the control revolution. According to him, various 
technologies, structures and processes have been developed to allow control of the 
increasing level of information flow. Controlling information flow is one of the new main 
objectives of investment banks and brokerage companies. Notions such as proximity and 
co-location are used frequently by investment banks and trading arcades. Specific IT 
related terms are used and employed by sales persons, managers, compliance and traders 
regularly. Investment banks have built and are building complex infrastructures in order to 
be able to process and execute large numbers of orders in milli- and nanoseconds. The 
landscape is changing and the way flow business is handled and processed between the end 
client, the FSFs and the exchanges is being transformed radically. Numerous firms need to 
invest in the infrastructure constantly.  
 
On that point, exchanges provide customers connections to integrated electronic derivatives 
trading and clearing platform(s). Regulated exchanges offer connection alternatives to the 
market via dedicated lines and also via the internet. Exchanges establish ‗technology 
roadmaps‘ well in advance, which is the exchange‘s strategic plan for evaluating and 
implementing software and hardware enhancements. Those exchanges also introduce 
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optional market data and high-frequency trading interfaces, enhanced broadcast solutions 
and enhanced transaction solutions. They have designed interfaces that provide high-
performance, low latency access to market data, order management as well as risk and 
position information. An enhanced broadcast solution provides access to un-netted market 
data in real-time and with comprehensive market depth. Enhanced confirmation solutions 
allow an exchange member to receive recoverable order and matching event information. 
 
According to Eurex, more than 60% of all options orders and quotes and more than 80% of 
all futures orders entered were using enhanced transaction solutions by the end of 2010. An 
enhanced transaction solution is a two-way socket interface used by a member to send 
orders and quotes to the exchange and receive confirmations. Terms such as low latency 
and open interface are day-to-day terms used in the community. 
 
It should be noted that the main case study firm, Refco, had a certain notoriety and not for 
the sophistication of its IT infrastructure. The firm‘s history is described in Chapter Five 
but it grew spectacularly during the late 1990s and early 2000s with the boom in the 
number of transactions, such that it became the largest broker on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. However, in October 2005, two months after its successful IPO, it was 
announced that the CEO (who also served as chairman) had ‗hidden‘ $430m in bad debts. 
The share price dropped from $28 to 80c overnight and the company was bankrupted. In 
2008, the CEO pleaded guilty to securities fraud and other charges and was sentenced to 16 
years imprisonment.  
 
This thesis does not examine the criminal aspects of Refco, which refer to financing and are 
beyond the scope of the thesis. The focus here is mostly on operational issues. Refco is 
treated as a very successful financial services company that was enjoying a huge growth in 
business and this is how it was viewed by the market before the scandal. As described in 
Chapter Five, although Refco itself failed, its constituent operations continue to this day, 
albeit under new management and ownership.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. In this first chapter a brief overview of the 
need and justification for this research is provided, in order to establish the background for 
the research question(s).  
 
Chapter Two presents an overview of the literature on IS investment evaluation. It also 
provides a review of the development of IS investment evaluation. It introduces the 
research domain and examines the past and current research literature on evaluation of IT 
investment. During the brief discussion of the existing research, it is argued that one of the 
key problems is that most studies have restricted their focus to issues related to the 
evaluation of IS investment effectiveness. Contextual issues are involved and should have 
been taken into account as well. This neglect of context dealt with throughout the work of 
this thesis.  
 
Chapter Three discusses the conceptual framework I have chosen for this thesis. It is argued 
that an investment appraisal, like other evaluations, is socially constructed. It is not a 
mechanical application of accounting but is rather a social process based on human 
perceptions and interaction. It involves the interpretation of evaluation methods and 
accounting conventions. The use of actor-network theory (ANT) and the use of the 
moments of translation are discussed. In particular, the enrolments and activities of the 
principal actors are discussed. 
 
Chapter Four covers the research approach, method and design for this study. It describes 
and justifies the approach, which is interpretive, and the method, which is a case study with 
elements of action research. It also recounts how the research was conducted and some of 
the difficulties encountered.  
 
Chapter Five presents the findings of the case study of the selected financial services firm 
(Refco) in depth, using the empirical data collected from 2004 onwards. It shows the 
organisational context of the case and a description and the background of the case. The 
main part of this chapter describes the events regarding the employment of IT evaluation 
method(s) at Refco as well as describing some of the key regulatory changes since Refco 
imploded. 
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The findings are analysed in detail in Chapter Six using ANT in order to present the case in 
terms of an actor network involving both human and non-human actors. The chapter 
emphasises the inability of Refco‘s (actor) network to respond effectively to the changes in 
the market; in particular, the failings related to its evaluation of IT in the shape of failure of 
the link between Refco‘s management and its IT infrastructure.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter Seven, concludes the thesis and reflects on the long journey of 
this research. Previous research has not reflected the transformations triggered from the 
emergence of HFT in the financial services industry. HFT including processes in operations 
draws attention to the theoretical and practical contributions of this thesis. In addition to 
identifying these contributions, the researcher also highlights the limitations of the research, 
followed by suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a general overview of the literature relevant to this thesis; its purpose 
is to shed further light on the core concepts relevant to information systems (IS) evaluation. 
In the 1980s the IS evaluation literature tended to be positivistic, which changed to a more 
interpretative approach in the 1990s. However, the practice did not follow the literature. It 
is suggested that this may be due to the nature of IS evaluation as a social construction. 
Based on this assumption, this chapter poses the research question: ―How is IS investment 
evaluation socially constructed?‖ This research, which focuses on evaluation in terms of IT 
investment appraisal, contributes to the interpretivist stream of IS evaluation research. This 
chapter also identifies some of the gaps in the current literature. 
 
The literature on IS evaluation stretches back more than thirty years (Land, 1976). While 
most authors differ on the solution to the problem, they mostly agree that IS evaluation is 
an important and complex issue (Farbey et al., 1993; Land, 1999; Hirschheim and 
Smithson, 1988; Willcocks, 1994; Willcocks and Lester, 1999). 
 
The scholarly reflection on evaluation research has resulted in an enormous growth of 
categorization (Stufflebeam, 2001). A distinction is often made between formative (ex-
ante) and summative (ex-post) evaluations (Scriven, 1991). Another distinction is made 
according to the person who evaluates (Shulha and Cousins, 1997). Constructivist 
evaluation concentrates on the notion that objectives are the outcomes of an interaction and 
argumentation process between various interested parties (Fischer and Forester, 1993; van 
der Knaap, 2004). A number of trends can be perceived in the development of evaluation 
research. Van der Knaap (2004) believes that there are some common basic elements in the 
mainstream of traditional evaluation research.  
 
Hansen (2005) identifies the following categories of evaluation models in the literature: 
 Results models  
 Process models  
 System models  
 Economic models  
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 Actor models  
 Programme theory models.  
 
He argues:  
―Design should be determined by the purpose of the evaluation, the object of 
evaluation or the problem to be solved by the evaluated programme or agency. The 
recommendations are based on different rationales: goals-means, context-based 
values and programme theory. Furthermore, in practice other logics may influence 
the evaluation design processes. Four hypotheses concerning such logics are 
proposed: negotiation, appropriateness, ‗routine‘ and projection of competence.‖ 
(Hansen, 2005, p. 447). 
 
This literature review demonstrates the importance of evaluation and argues for a research 
focus on IT investment appraisal, as this is carried out much more often in practice than 
post-implementation evaluation. It briefly surveys the positivistic literature of the 1970s 
and 1980s, which still forms the basis of much of today‘s practice. The more interpretivist 
approaches of the 1990s are reviewed as well. They provide evidence of the political, social 
and organisational aspects of evaluations in practice. 
 
The evaluation literature covers a variety of alternative approaches to evaluation. During 
the last years  
―[…] the evaluator‘s toolbox has continuously expanded. The options are multiple, 
such as opting for summative or formative evaluation or stressing the clients‘, 
experts‘ or general stakeholders‘ concerns. But the choice is also between 
subscribing to realistic evaluation, theory-based evaluation, utilization-focused 
evaluation or empowerment evaluation, just to mention a few examples.‖ (Hansen, 
2005, p. 447). 
 
Some authors claim their particular evaluation model to be the best but there is a need to 
study alternative approaches to evaluation comparatively and maybe to develop ―meta-
models‖ in order to enable us to reflect upon designing evaluations. The wide variety of 
alternative approaches in the evaluator‘s toolbox raises the important question of what 
criteria should be used to compare one approach with another or perhaps decide to combine 
several approaches.  
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In the conceptual framework (Chapter Three) I argue that an investment appraisal, like 
other evaluations, is socially constructed. It is not a mechanical application of iron rules of 
accounting but is rather a social process based on human perceptions and interaction, which 
involves the interpretation of evaluation methods and accounting conventions. There I 
propose the use of actor-network theory (ANT) to ‗model‘ the enrolments and activities of 
the principal actors. 
 
Saunders (2000, p. 7) has conducted research into evaluation and on the tacit practices used 
in an evaluation agency to develop an approach to initiating new evaluators into evaluation 
planning processes. Using these two sources as a base, he suggests that it is possible to 
conceptualise evaluation as a series of knowledge-based practices. These knowledge-based 
practices form the resources of ‗communities of practice‘, i.e. a group of practising 
evaluators. In that, this conceptualisation refers to any job, work or occupation, beginning 
to be an evaluator, just like beginning any job or work, requires the ‗novice‘ to be inducted 
or socialised into the ‗community of practice‘. He believes that understanding evaluation 
activity in this way should provide the basis for some enabling ‗tools‘ for thinking about an 
evaluation design. The learning as an outcome of ‗process use‘ is, in fact, the way we might 
prompt access to a reservoir of experiential and other knowledge in order for evaluations to 
be carried out by evaluators, within the normative frame of a group of evaluators. It 
involves a process of reflexive questioning during which key procedural dimensions of an 
evaluation are addressed, leading to an accelerated induction into key aspects of evaluation 
design. His article is derived from a framework used in CSET (Centre for the Study of 
Education and Training) to undertake commissioned evaluations and research and 
development work with the British Council (BC) which aims to chart evaluation practices 
undertaken by members of staff and to develop evaluation capability. The two sources 
combine to prompt an examination of evaluation as a collection of ‗communities of 
practice‘ based on knowledge resources, into which new evaluators might be inducted. It is 
highlighted that evaluators are understood as working in forms of community.  
 
This idea has been introduced mainly by Lave and Wenger (1991) who coined the term 
―communities of practice‖. It is a variant on the notion that any social group forms 
recurrent behaviours, which are governed by certain norms and values into which a new 
‗recruit‘ or ‗entrant‘ would need to be socialised. Wenger (1998) has captured the essence 
of this process succinctly: 
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―Over time, this collective learning results in practices that reflect both the pursuit 
of our enterprises and the attendant social relations. These practices are thus the 
property of a kind of community created over time by the sustained pursuit of 
shared enterprise. It makes sense, therefore, to call these kinds of communities, 
communities of practice‖ (Wenger, 1998, p. 45). 
 
Critical to the discussion in Wenger‘s work, as in the argument of Saunders (2000), is the 
notion of practice. Her book explores the dimensions of practice in terms of ‗meaning 
production‘, the ways communities work, the way practice is bound into the process of 
learning and knowing. She identifies what practices do but does not construct a definition 
of a ‗practice‘ as such. Saunders (2000) draws on the concept of a ‗practice‘ from the work 
of Giddens (1976, 1979, 1986), which refers to behaviour which is recurrent or routine, i.e. 
happens on a day-to-day basis and is embedded in the normal routine of daily life. 
Therefore a ‗practice‘ is a way of doing something, the pattern of which is reproduced in a 
social context (i.e. work) according to certain rules. The idea of ‗routinization‘ is important 
for us because it refers to the habitual, taken for granted character of the vast bulk of the 
activities of day-to-day working life. Giddens uses the notion of ‗ontological security‘ to 
refer to the impulse we have to create and sustain ‗routines‘ through practices in order for 
us to feel safe and secure in our day-to-day actions. We can then predict with a degree of 
certainty what is likely to happen as a result of a particular event or act.   
 
Saunders (2000) argues for:  
―[the] need to make explicit group ‗ways of doing something‘, or the ‗experiential‘ 
knowledge held by a group or an individual in the work place. Often this 
knowledge is somehow locked in practice and wholly implicit, with its contribution 
to collective learning thus muted or constrained. A worthwhile goal therefore is to 
enable such implicit knowledge to become accessible, enter the public domain and 
initiate a ‗learning spiral‘ through some kind of learning process. From an 
evaluation point of view there are two other distinctions which seemed immediately 
relevant to our discussion. Giddens distinguishes between two types of 
consciousness which have bearing on the process we have described above. He 
gives the designation ‗discursive‘ to the consciousness of the conditions and 
meaning of a person‘s own actions in the work place to which they are able to give 
verbal expression. However Giddens also identifies what he calls ‗practical 
consciousness‘, which is what someone might know about their work practices, 
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including the conditions of their own action, but cannot express ‗discursively‘‖ 
(Saunders, 2000, p.10). 
 
Giddens (1979) argues: 
―Where what agents know about what they do is restricted to what they can say 
about it, in whatever discursive style, a very wide area of knowledgeability is 
simply occluded from view. The study of practical consciousness must be 
incorporated into research work‖ (Giddens, 1979, p. 105).  
 
Saunders (2000, p. 11) believes that, by definition, a practice is given shape by recurrent 
social relations over time. It seems plausible to look for examples of discursive and 
practical consciousness in evaluators, because it:  
― […] consists of all the things which actors [evaluators] know tacitly about how to 
‗go on‘ in the contexts of social [working] life without being able to give them 
direct expression‖ (Giddens, 1979, p.107).    
 
Wenger talks about experience becoming ‗congealed‘ into ‗points of focus around which 
the negotiation of meaning becomes organised‘ (Wenger, 1998, p.8). A community of 
practice produces: 
― […] abstractions, tools, stories, terms and concepts that reify something of that 
practice in a congealed form…with the term reification I mean to cover a wide 
range of processes that include making, designing representing, naming, encoding 
and describing […]‖ (Wenger, 1998, p.59). 
 
Assessing the value of investing in IT becomes very important since certain firms and 
academics believe that a lot of money is wasted. Lucas (1999) discusses the evidence about 
the value from IT investments. He presents the Investment Opportunities Matrix, a 
framework for classifying different kinds of IT initiatives. The matrix indicates which kinds 
of IT investments are most likely to show a return, and the type of return, and the type of 
return one might expect from them. He also discusses the ―garbage can model‖ of 
information technology. It emphasises the importance of conversion effectiveness, turning 
an investment into a successful application, in obtaining value from IT investments. Lucas 
(1999) also introduces a new category of IT initiative, one that shows an indirect return. An 
important point is that the value the firm receives depends on the type of IT investment.  
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Lucas (1999, page 3) highlights that:  
―it is important to understand under what conditions one can expect to find a 
measurable return from IT investments. We also need to find creative ways to 
measure IT value. If we can accomplish these two tasks, it should be possible to 
predict what investments will lead to a return and the nature of that return‖ (Lucas, 
1999, p.3).  
 
2.2 Sociology of Scientific Knowledge  
 
The sociology of scientific knowledge focuses on the analysis of the content of scientific 
ideas, theories, and experiments (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). It emerged as a distinct field out 
of the sociology of science literature which was primarily concerned with science as an 
institution, focusing on the norms, practices, reward schemes and career patterns of those 
involved in science (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). One distinct feature of this literature has been 
that scientific knowledge is seen as a social construction. It can be interpreted in various 
ways. Scientific knowledge and technological practices are both seen as made through a 
process of negotiation and construction. Consensus between conflicting social groups can 
be reached during this process. A key point of this approach to the study of science is that 
all knowledge is to be treated as socially constructed, regardless of particular claims to 
truth. The processes involved in the acceptance and rejection of knowledge claims in the 
social world are of central interest for this study. Controversies are an outcome of 
interactions between involved actors leading to the production of new knowledge (Pinch 
and Bijker, 1987).   
 
2.2.1 Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) 
  
A key concept in SCOT studies is that of relevant social groups who share a set of 
meanings in relation to a specific artefact. SCOT enables us to understand the mechanisms 
through which a technological artefact is developed through its interaction with social 
actors (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). 
―In deciding which problems are relevant, the social groups concerned with the 
artefact and the meanings that those groups give to the artefact play a crucial role: a 
problem is defined as such only when there is a social group for which it constitutes 
a problem‖ (Pinch and Bijker, 1987, p. 30). 
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Related social groups are seen as crucial in the definitions of functions and resolutions of 
controversies out of which change and development take place. They aim for stabilisation. 
It is noteworthy that the interpretative flexibility of scientific findings and concepts plays a 
key role before consensus emerges potentially. We witness controversies in this research 
which help us to focus on the debate around those controversies in question. The involved 
actors highlight the controversies within the specific framework in which they exist, 
followed by searching for consensus. Actors help to ‗reduce‘ the complex project towards a 
more ‗streamlined‘ project. The actors are able to highlight the controversies in a specific 
and often different way even when we realise that those controversies continue to exist. 
Practically, it is helpful to know this, since this enables us to see the complex projects and 
the environment around with a different lens.     
  
2.2.2  The Social Construction of IS Evaluation 
 
Hughes (1987) believes that components, whether physical or non-physical, are 
interdependent artefacts and he refers to technologies as systems made up of many ―messy, 
complex, problem-solving components‖ (Hughes, 1987, p.51). He believes that external 
intractable factors are not under the control of the system managers (Hughes, 1987, p.52). 
The integration of social, technical, political and economic aspects of systems plays an 
important role (Hughes, 1987). He sees such systems and infrastructures as evolving. This 
evolution follows ―a loosely defined pattern‖.  Key concepts deployed by Hughes include 
those of reverse salient, critical problems, technological styles, and technology transfer.  
 
In his opinion, if the complexity of the infrastructure grows, problems of control appear 
that can result in a breakdown of control. These can be linked to the development of 
‗reverse salient‘ in which component elements of the system become less relevant.  
According to Hughes, when systems grow and evolve, ―they acquire style and momentum‖ 
(Hughes, 1987, p.56). This can be seen as evidence of the social construction of 
technology. Crisis may appear followed by the appearance of a new system. We can 
distinguish between an ANT approach and Hughes‘s systems-based social history of 
technology approach. Hughes presupposes a boundary that delineates the system from the 
wider environment within which the system exists. We can refer to inside and outside to 
such technologies. If we want to find an approach that supports an analysis that extends 
from the detail of technological design to encompass social, economic, and political 
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aspects, then we need to engage actor network theory and Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) as well. 
 
As mentioned, a key assumption within this research is that IS evaluation, and IT 
investment appraisal in particular, is socially constructed within a particular context. 
Various managers and accountants interpret and apply particular methods and accounting 
conventions to a proposed IT investment. However, this is not a mechanical process of 
applying a tool to a problem. It needs to be interpreted by the relevant actors. The social 
process involves representatives from various departments such as information systems, 
finance, operations, compliance and sales. 
 
In applying an evaluation methodology, they may subtly change it (Smithson and Tsiavos, 
2004) as the actors carry out their various roles within the organisation (Introna and 
Whittaker, 2002). The above discussion shows the flexibility of financial tools, such as 
ROI, and there is clearly scope for allocating financial costs and benefits in ways that are 
favourable or unfavourable to the proposed investment. Similarly, future tangible and 
intangible costs and benefits, in terms of employee job satisfaction, organisational learning, 
and availability of information, market share, competitive advantage and profitability are 
all open to considerable manipulation. Accounting practices that support the classification 
of computer hardware, communications equipment and software as capital expenditure are 
equally malleable.  
 
Organisational change and related training costs are treated as operating expenses. The 
increasing use of outsourcing tends to shift items of capital expenditure into the operating 
budget. It is not clear how these issues, and their consequences for companies‘ balance 
sheets, are interpreted during IT investment appraisal. Political factors (Wilson and 
Howcroft, 2000) are also important, as well as previous implementations of systems. This 
conception of IS evaluation as a social construction also fits with the ideas of writers 
concerning the social construction of technology (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985; Pinch 
and Bijker, 1987). 
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2.3 What is Value?  
 
The most common meaning of value is monetary worth; in the marketplace buyers and 
sellers place a value on goods and services that is measured in various currencies such as 
Euros or U.S. dollars. When an investor seeks a return on capital, it is expressed as a 
percentage of the original investment. However, the term ―value‖ sometimes has a very 
remote connection with money; for example, a manager describes an employee who makes 
a valuable contribution to the firm. It might be possible to trace this contribution to the 
company‘s profits, but that is not the intent of the comment. Because information 
technology is woven into the fabric of business, this thesis adopts a broad definition of the 
value of IT investments: 
―A good example is investing in IT infrastructure; a company might invest heavily 
to build a network of computers the return from that network comes in literally 
hundreds of ways, as individual employees use the network to do their jobs better 
and IT staff members build applications of technology that take advantage of the 
network infrastructure. At the time the firm decided to invest in the network, it 
could only guess at the nature of activities the network might stimulate. A few years 
later, it is possible to study the return on the projects the network enabled, but it is a 
rare company that would devote the time and resources to such a post hoc analysis‖ 
(Lucas, 1999, page 4).   
 
2.3.1 What is Evaluation? 
 
If we look at the concept of evaluation in a broader context, we will be able to understand 
information systems evaluation. Walsham (1993) states there are a ‗multiplicity of private 
rationalities‘ which influence an evaluation. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives the 
following definition: ‗the action of working out the value of something‘. Evaluation is a 
weighing up process to assess the value of an object or the merit of a situation and it is on 
this basis that the definition used in this research is developed. The evaluation analysed and 
discussed here should support the management and maximise the benefits from an 
information systems investment. 
 
To evaluate an information system it is necessary to understand what the organisation is 
attempting to achieve through the use of the information system. Evaluation is a process, 
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which starts at the project initialisation. A process is a series of structured activities. The 
process starts at IS project initialisation. Each activity is described and should lead on to the 
next activity.  
 
The evaluator‘s approach should be to understand the context in which he or she is within 
the environment. An evaluation is a complex information processing exercise. Therefore 
the evaluator will be able to choose the appropriate evaluation method. The basis of the 
evaluation system is clarification of, and agreement on, the important measurable properties 
of the information system to be evaluated.  
 
2.3.2 Importance of IS Evaluation   
 
IS evaluation‘s importance can be seen in the increasing size of organisations‘ IT budgets, 
the frequency of IS failures (McManus and Wood-Harper, 2007) and a widespread concern 
with cost containment across the IT function (Smithson and Hirschheim, 1998). Evaluation 
can have significant implications for both individuals and groups within the organisation 
(Cornford and Klecun-Dabrowska, 2000; Wilson and Howcroft, 2000). At a more basic 
level, Hirschheim and Smithson (1988) argue that such evaluation is ―endemic to human 
existence‖, and hence an automatic response to a changing situation, while Angell and 
Smithson (1991) see evaluation as providing the basic feedback function to management. 
Researchers have identified evaluation‘s multi-layered nature and its increasing importance 
in a constantly changing environment (Avgerou, 1995; Cornford, Doukidis and Forster, 
1994). Organisational change in conjunction with new IS can cause significant and 
unexpected changes that should be assessed and captured at some point; see for example 
the discussion of Orlikowski and Hofman‘s improvisational model (1997). 
 
The pervasive nature of IT, with its widespread applicability across functions, processes, 
products and services, increases both the importance of IS evaluation and the difficulty, as 
it often becomes impossible to separate the technological aspect from the underlying 
business process. IS evaluation can also add value in terms of diagnosis, planning and the 
reduction of uncertainty, as well as organisational learning. The IS literature demands that 
evaluation should be considered as an integral part of project design, implementation and 
redesign, and understood as a continuous learning process going beyond a single project. 
Poor evaluation procedures can cause problems in the selection of specific projects for 
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investment such as in a hospital (Heathfield et al., 1999). Relatively few organisations 
appear to be confident with their evaluation procedures (Farbey, Land and Targett, 1999).  
 
Most commentators, especially those working at the national level, argue that investment in 
ICTs is very worthwhile in terms of increased output, growth and productivity. For 
example: 
 
 IT is pervasive, with a multitude of uses; it is applicable across many industries and 
all countries. 
 IT is complementary to other new technologies (e.g. bio tech, robotics). 
 The potential of IT is huge, ―probably beyond our imaginations‖ (Coyle and Quah, 
2002). 
 IT speeds up innovation.  
 By increasing access to information, IT can make markets more efficient. 
 Internet allows consumers to seek lowest price, reduces transaction costs & barriers 
to entry. 
 IT has improved many aspects of the quality of life.  
 
However, what constitutes IT/ICT investment is very hard to define. Computer hardware is 
always included, software and communications equipment less often and ‗services‘ rarely. 
For example, call centres, mobile phones and personal digital assistants (palm tops) are not 
easy to categorise. Differences in categorisation and definitions of ICTs between countries 
(and probably companies), as well as different methodologies and lack of data make it 
difficult to estimate the UK‘s performance in using ICTs, both absolutely and relatively to 
other countries (London Business School, 2002). For example, US statistics normally 
include communications equipment whereas those for Australia do not. 
 
Furthermore, at the firm level, little „real‟ data is available: 
 
 Some researchers have used company financial reports as data sources for IT 
investment figures but these are unlikely to be reliable.  
 Companies may record hardware (and perhaps software) expenditure as a capital 
investment but other costs (e.g. consultancy, training, adjustment) are probably 
recorded elsewhere as current expenses. Some researchers believe that hardware 
and software only account for 10% of true IT investment, leaving 90% of the true 
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investment as not capitalised or depreciated, nor appearing in company or national 
accounts as IT investment. 
 The burgeoning outsourcing of IT development and operation exacerbates this 
situation. Client companies, instead of making their own investments (visible in the 
balance sheet) may pay a monthly charge to the vendors, shown as an expense in 
the accounts.  
 
2.4 Definition and Scope 
 
According to Farbey et al. (1999):  
―the term ‗IT evaluation‘ is often used imprecisely. Sometimes it is referred to as an 
event-taking place at the commencement of a project in order to decide whether the 
project should go ahead. At other times this decision point is called ‗appraisal‘, 
reserving ‗evaluation‘ for a post-implementation review of achieved benefits. IS 
evaluation is: ―A process, or group of parallel processes, which take place at 
different points in time or continuously, for searching and for making explicit, 
quantitatively or qualitatively, all the impacts of an IT project and the programme 
and strategy of which it is a part‖ (Farbey et al., 1999, p.190).  
 
The concept of evaluation can be defined as ―a study designed and conducted to assist some 
audience to assess an object‘s merit and worth‖ (Stufflebeam, 2000, p. 35). It often refers to 
programme evaluation. Rossi et al. (2004, p.29) define this as an ―organised, planned, and 
usually ongoing effort designed to ameliorate a social problem or improve social 
conditions‖. Scott (2003) believes that the literature on organisational effectiveness focuses 
on the efforts of organisations and can be directed to private and public organisations. 
During the last few years the focus has shifted towards how the generic tradition can be 
adapted and further developed in order to understand the notion of effectiveness in relation 
to public organisations (Klecun and Cornford, 2005). The two main traditions are 
programme evaluation (Stufflebeam, 2000) and organisation evaluation, which assesses 
organisational effectiveness (Scott, 2003). According to Hansen (2005) the two main 
academic traditions should be included in a discussion about evaluation design because 
both traditions look at ways to conduct assessments. Additionally the programme 
evaluation literature is increasingly recognizing that its evaluation models are also 
applicable to organisations (e.g. Owen and Rogers, 1999, p. 33). 
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However, the basic evaluation models employed within the two traditions overlap 
significantly. In order to overcome the problem of definition, this research focuses on IT 
investment appraisals (ex-ante evaluation), which normally take place early on in the 
development process. Here, proposals are evaluated and decisions taken to proceed with 
halt or reformulate the proposal. I have selected this type of evaluation because it is widely 
carried out within organisations, unlike post-implementation evaluations (Kumar, 1990). 
 
The purpose of ex-ante evaluation is to support systems justification. The ex-post 
evaluations analyse the existing systems in use compared to other emerging systems 
suggested by clients, vendors or simply implemented by the competitors. Ex-post 
evaluations are rarely conducted consequently. Due to the fact that non-tangible evaluations 
exist, whether those are ex-post or ex-ante, the evaluation as such becomes very complex 
and has for many years been an ongoing topic for academics and also recently very 
important for the industry. Competition became so intense that larger and even smaller 
organisations simply cannot afford to ignore professionally organised and professionally 
implemented evaluation methods or processes. As described, ex-ante or predictive 
evaluations are very complex. The evaluator has to understand the existing system in order 
to predict and understand the future system, as well as be able to estimate the potential 
impact of the future system to the employer, employee, shareholders or any client. 
 
Hansen (2005) argues:  
―An evaluation model stipulates the question that a given type of evaluation seeks 
to answer, as well as specifies how to set up the criteria for assessment. Both the 
literature on programme evaluation and that on organisational effectiveness offer 
several typologies of evaluation models‖ (Hansen, 2005, p. 448). 
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Hansen, 2005, page 3: Choosing Evaluation Models 
Table: A Typology of Evaluation Models 
Evaluation Models  Questions    Criteria for Evaluation 
 
Result models 
a) Goal – attainment model a) To what degree has the   a) Derived from goal(s) 
   goal(s) been realised? 
b) Effects model  b) Which effects can be   b) Open, all consequences should  
    uncovered?   be uncovered  
 
Explanatory process model Is the level of activity satisfactory?  Performance is analysed from idea to  
   Are there implementation problems? decision and implementation and to the  
       reaction of the addressees  
 
System model  How has performance functioned  Realised input, process, structure and  
                                                as a whole?    Outcome assessed in same dimensions 
       or comparatively 
 
Economic model    
a) Cost-efficiency  a) Is productivity satisfactory?  a) Output measured in relation to expenses 
 
b) Cost-effectiveness b) Is effectiveness satisfactory?   b) Effect measured in relation to expenses 
 
c) Cost-benefit  c) Is utility satisfactory?  c) Utility measured in relation to expenses  
 
Actor model  
a) Client-oriented model a) Are clients satisfied?  a) Formulated by clients 
b) Stakeholder model  b) Are stakeholders satisfied?  b) Formulated by stakeholders 
c) Peer review model  c) Is professional quality in order? c) Formulated by peers 
 
 
Program theory model   
(theory-based evaluation) What works for whom in which context? Program theory is reconstructed and   
   Is it possible to ascertain errors in  assessed via empirical analysis 
   program theory? 
 
We can broadly divide evaluation models into six categories: actor models, economic 
models, results models, system models, process models and programme theory models. 
Actor models are based on the actors‘ own criteria for assessment. The economic models 
focus on the system perspective. However, these models differ somewhat from ordinary 
system models in that they consider the object of evaluation as a ‗black-box‘ by relating the 
assessment of results (output) to the expenses involved (input). The results models 
describe, as the term suggests, evaluation based on results. 
 
The system models analyse input, structure, process and outcome in terms of results. The 
assessment can be made on a benchmarking basis, by comparing the results with other 
similar systems.  
 
The process models focus on the ongoing processes and efforts on a real-time basis instead 
of ex-post analysis. And the programme theory model focuses on assessing the validity of 
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the programme theory. Programme theory is either reconstructed, and compared with 
empirical analysis of problems, or empirical observation is used to analyse the causal 
relation between context, mechanism and outcome. 
 
2.4.1 Formative and Summative Evaluation 
 
Farbey et al. (1999) distinguish between summative and formative evaluation, where the 
former is oriented towards the past and the latter towards the future. Formative evaluation 
has its roots in the 19
th
 century in Great Britain and the US (Chelimsky, 1985). It is not 
often used in the information systems field. Originally formative evaluation was a 
technique developed to help improve the performance of government and social initiatives 
such as in the field of health care (Scriven, 1967; Patton, 1986).  
 
The concept of formative evaluation is important, since it acts between various stakeholders 
in a given timeframe and given framework. Generally formative evaluation can be 
described as a process whereby the involved stakeholders can contribute their values and 
ideas in a way in which will influence the outcome of the system. The process of 
discussions emerges on an ongoing basis in order to ‗inhale‘ the emerging IS. Formative 
evaluation can be seen as a learning evaluation. A post-modern approach to information 
systems development should be seen as an approach to deliver business value including 
intangible benefits. Simple quantitative analysis is not the intention of the author and also 
not the idea of a post-modern approach.  
 
According to Bhola (1990), formative evaluation is a method of judging the worth of a 
programme while the programme activities are forming or happening. Formative evaluation 
focuses on the process. Formative evaluation can be seen as an iterative evaluation and 
decision- making process. It has an impact on the social programme and also an impact on 
the involved. Summative evaluation is a method of judging the worth of a programme at 
the end of the programme activities. The focus here lies on the outcome (Bhola, 1990). 
Summative evaluation is derived from the word sum. It is seen as an act of evaluation 
assessing the ―sum‖ impact of the social programme.  
 
In systems design both formative and summative evaluation takes place. Whether to choose 
summative or formative evaluation approaches depends on the preferences and needs of 
those performing the evaluation of the information system. 
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Four types of evaluation levels can be followed and seen as a framework for the evaluator: 
 Exploration level 
 Planning and analysing level 
 Decision making level  
 Compliance and control level 
 
Exploration level, planning and analysing level and decision making level can be seen as 
formative because they support the design process. The compliance and control level 
should be seen as summative evaluation. However, the exploration level can also be seen as 
summative because it evaluates the current environment the organisation is in at that time. 
Formative evaluation also includes the stakeholders‘ expectations of the management of the 
organisation.  
 
Most studies have been primarily summative in nature. Finne et al. (1995) suggest that such 
summative evaluations may be used conceptually, instrumentally or persuasively. This 
means that the results of the evaluation may be used to reconsider an investment proposal. 
Different types of measurement tools may be used in different evaluation activities. The 
measurement tools are based on different contingency variables such as organisational 
strategy, structure, size of the organisation, and individual characteristics of the system 
under investigation. No single instrument has been universally accepted as providing a 
valid and reliable summative measure of the information system being evaluated. 
 
According to Love (1991) summative evaluation, which frequently is only performed once, 
is not appropriate for the purposes of improving the management of an investment. He 
argues that a summative evaluation and the reliance on positivistic approaches cannot 
discover the whole picture of the management of an investment, since it is not iterative. 
 
According to Hewett (1986), an implicit formative evaluation activity can be seen in IS 
development. The systems analyst‘s/evaluator‘s engagement with the client is a formative 
process. The creation of the system is an iterative process. The formative evaluation 
process is also influenced by the objectives of the information systems development 
project. Evaluation is seen in the context of objectives and is undertaken regularly.  
 
Formative evaluation has three main characteristics. The first is the frequency of the 
evaluation. The second characteristic is that an evaluator‘s perception of what is being 
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evaluated can change. In due course perceptions can be influenced in conjunction with the 
evaluator‘s understanding of the business objectives. The third characteristic is that the 
business environment changes over the life of a development project. The purpose of the 
information system investment may evolve by the formative evaluation process. This is 
identified as the double-loop learning aspect of the proposed formative evaluation process. 
The basic business objectives which are driving the IS investment are challenged and 
changed if necessary in this double-loop learning process. The double-loop learning 
process can support any adjustment. 
 
Here, evaluation can be seen in a context and depends on the people and stakeholders‘ 
involvement. Technology has to be embedded in the business and organisational 
environment. It is always unique from organisation to organisation and therefore needs to 
be participative as mentioned.  
 
Formative evaluation takes place at each stage in the development cycle. IS investment 
should be an iterative process. Hewett (1986) emphasises the role of iterative evaluation in 
designing systems for usability: 
―Just as the system changes with each evaluation/ design iteration, so too the nature 
or goals of system evaluation can change with each evaluation/design iteration. 
Another reason for treating the evaluation process as an iterative process is that 
evaluation procedures themselves often need to be designed, and redesigned.‖ 
(Hewitt, 1986, p. 277). 
 
The culminating steps of the evaluation start with negotiation. Individual opinions are 
expressed at any evaluation situation. An agreement on the course of action is required 
through negotiation within the group. Participatory evaluation includes a negotiation 
activity among the participants. Through negotiation, the interpretevist bias can be 
―neutralised‖. The value of the information system investment is continuously agreed 
verbally or ideally also in writing. This view of the evaluation process as a negotiation is 
mirrored by Walsham (1993), who refers to the process of IS evaluation as ―a discourse 
that is often mediated by formal techniques and procedures‖. 
 
Participatory evaluation is by nature complex during the interaction and negotiation 
process. Participatory evaluation in investment in information systems is a social process, 
causing dissent until consensus is achieved. Evaluation must be approached systematically. 
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The evaluation process must involve the management. The process of evaluation and the 
relevant information used in evaluation have to be filtered, controlled and formalised. 
 
2.4.2 IS Evaluation in Practice 
 
The topic of IS investment has attracted many researchers. We can find a substantial body 
of literature on the problems of measurement and also the problems that occur using 
traditional investment appraisal methods. The problems organisations face when 
considering planning an IS evaluation exercise are immense. Most organisations do not 
exercise an IS evaluation beyond the standard traditional evaluation methods, which are 
quantitative in nature. Brown (2005) highlights:  
―Nonetheless one of the most persistent results of field work on evaluation practice, 
whatever the original aim of the study, is the continuing relatively unsophisticated 
and low level of evaluation activity in all types of organisations‖ (Brown, 2005, p. 
169). 
 
As we know, different organisations have different methods and routines. Brown (2005) 
continues: 
―[…] at any point in time organisations will have methods and routines that are 
accepted as the standard for evaluating IS. The tools and methods discussed above 
will find little support if they are not aligned to existing culture and organisational 
aims‖ (Brown, 2005, p. 172). 
 
We can imagine that e.g. an association of IS evaluation can be implemented and can help 
to discuss, develop and implement standard methodologies in line with local governments 
expectations. Examples of these trends could be found in Germany, where the Association 
of Alternative Investment has discussed various evaluation methods in this area in small 
groups for many years. The head of this association has been extremely busy after the 
industry became ready to discuss various methodologies in line with the change of the 
German legislation in 2004. Within a year after implementing a new legislation, the number 
of members of this association doubled and during various discussions a common 
methodology has been accepted.  
 
Land (1999, p.2) talks about the socio-technical dilemma. The socio-technical philosophy 
is based on two perhaps contradictory premises. The first can be called ‗the Humanistic 
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Welfare Paradigm‘ and the second ‗the Managerial Paradigm‘. Socio-technical methods 
generally focus on design of work systems to improve the welfare of employees. The prime 
aim of redesigning work systems is the improvement of the quality of working life (Cherns, 
1976). Focus is mainly on concepts such as ‗autonomy‘, ‗empowerment‘, ‗self-regulating 
teams‘ and ‗reducing stress at the work place‘ (Land, 1999, p.2). Land (1999) continues: 
―[…] diagnostic analysis of existing work situations by socio-technical researchers 
found evidence which linked productivity and performance failures to the neglect of 
many of the attributes listed above. There is much anecdotal and case study 
evidence demonstrating that there is a link between concern for employee welfare 
and the effective operation of the organisation including the smooth 
implementation‖ ( Land, 1999, p. 2).  
 
As mentioned by Land (1999), the changes within the second, so-called Managerial 
Paradigm are instrumental and should deliver an improved performance of the organisation, 
hence increasing shareholder  value. We witness in the general press that this is important 
for most private and also in some cases for public organisations such as the NHS. 
 
Land (1999) suggests that the general problem of evaluation  
―[…] can be illustrated by the difficulties encountered by researchers and 
practitioners in accounting ex-post for the benefits accruing to the organisation 
from the deployment of information systems based on computer and 
communication technology‖ (Land, 1999, p. 2). 
 
Researchers such as Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) provide evidence though that investments 
in information and communication technology (ICT) increase productivity. Evidence can 
also be found on macro-level productivity gains. Researchers such as Garrity and Sanders 
(1998) assess user satisfaction in relation to the implemented system. 
 
―However, user satisfaction is not an output measure and it is doubtful whether it would 
convince hard-nosed accountants that it proves the value of an investment‖ (Land, 1999, p. 
3).    
 
Hirschheim and Smithson (1988) categorise IS evaluation approaches into three zones: 
efficiency (concerned largely with technical performance), effectiveness (mostly concerned 
with costs and benefits) and understanding (more interpretive approaches). They found that 
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efficiency and effectiveness approaches dominated practice through the 1980s and 1990s 
(Smithson and Hirschheim, 1998). Proposals for interpretive approaches are reviewed 
below but one of the few approaches to incorporate intangible factors that have been 
implemented at all widely is the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Singh and 
Wood-Harper, 2011). Even this approach attempts to quantify such factors at an early 
stage. 
 
These effectiveness approaches rely on variations of traditional cost benefit analysis 
(Willcocks and Lester, 1994; Ballantine et al., 1994) and offer certain benefits (Earl, 1992; 
Farbey et al., 1993; Parker et al., 1988) such as: 
 Approval by senior management  
 Relation with specific business goals 
 Consideration of intangible benefits 
 
Against these are set various problems (Farbey et al., 1993; Galliers, 1991; Remenyi et al., 
1999; Smithson and Hirschheim, 1998; Walsham, 1995b; Ward, 1990; Willcocks and 
Lester, 1994):  
 Complex projects are implemented over a long period of time and it is not clear 
when to carry out an evaluation. This also applies to varying learning curves. 
 Lack of defined objectives or changing objectives 
 Lack of knowledge regarding the possible impact of IS  
 Disadvantages of considering individual investments rather than synergistic bundles 
or portfolios of investments 
 Many changes are so radical and wide ranging that they are increasingly difficult to 
justify in advance in accounting terms and have to be made on the basis of acts of 
faith.  
 Organisations may want to evaluate these major changes, either in advance or after 
the event, but either the tools and techniques are inadequate or the necessary data is 
not available.  
 Infrastructure and inter-organisational projects are particularly difficult to evaluate, 
both before and after implementation 
 Lack of understanding of the involved human and organisational costs, the danger 
of over- and understating costs, the neglect of intangible benefits and risks and the 
use of inappropriate measures 
 Political problems between stakeholder groups. 
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Most of these problems apply to investment appraisals and post-implementation 
evaluations to a greater or lesser extent. Focusing on investment appraisals, Wen and Sylla 
(1999) describe the following commonly used techniques, most of which originated in the 
1970s or 1980s: 
 
Tangible costs and benefits: 
 
 Return on investment (ROI) (Radcliffe, 1982; Farbey et al., 1993), based on the 
accounting techniques of net present value, discounted cash flow and/or payback 
period. These compare future financial returns against the cost of the investment, 
taking into account prevalent interest rates. Intangible costs and benefits are not 
included. 
 Cost benefit analysis (King & Schrems, 1978), which does attempt to value 
intangibles. 
 Return on management (Strassmann, 1985) attempts to calculate the changes in the 
value added by management but tends to (incorrectly) attribute residual costs and 
benefits to the management process. 
 Information economics (Parker et al., 1988) retains ROI for financial costs and 
benefits but tries to deal with intangibles and risk factors through surrogate scoring 
techniques. Wen and Sylla (1999) find it only appropriate for simple, easily 
modelled proposals. 
 
Intangible costs and benefits 
 
 Multi-objective, multi-criteria (MOMC) (Chandler, 1982) attempts to incorporate 
the views of multiple stakeholders in terms of relative preferences and statistical 
weighting but does not contribute to any ROI calculations. 
 Value analysis (Keen, 1981) emphasises the notion of value, rather than cost but 
such values are hard to ascertain in practice. 
 Critical success factors (Rockart, 1979) attempts to focus on key business 
objectives at the expense of realistic figures.  
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Of the above, ROI techniques are still widely used, sometimes augmented by ad hoc 
techniques to deal with intangibles. However, an editorial in a practitioner publication (CIO 
Insight, 2003) found that ROI: 
 Produced an illusion of objectivity and accuracy, 
 Lacked a universal definition but at the same time failed to take account of the 
particular context, 
 Was rarely checked by managers. 
 
These above-mentioned approaches can be seen as incomplete or just ‗touching the surface‘ 
(Smithson & Hirschheim, 1998; Farbey et al., 1999). During the original way of conducting 
evaluation there was an emphasis towards technical aspects of systems, reliability, cost 
benefit and security. For some time, IS evaluation activity has become more complex and 
influenced by political, organisational and cultural aspects (Walsham, 1993). Ethical 
questions seem to be raised more and more (Cornford & Klecun-Dabrowska, 2001). Many 
authors highlight that, in practice, IS projects are often not evaluated or only half-heartedly 
evaluated (Anderson & Aydin, 1994; Smithson & Hirschheim, 1998; Willcocks & Lester, 
1999; Wyatt & Wyatt, 2003).  
 
Klecun and Cornford (2005) argue: 
―In response to such critiques the scope and content of evaluative activity, as seen 
in the IS literature, has begun to change. The application of rigorous ‗scientific‘ 
methods, for example, cost and benefit analysis, or return on investment, have been 
often questioned, although such questioning has been equally robustly refuted 
(Farbey et al., 1993, 1999; Smithson & Hirschheim, 1998; Bannister, 1999; Land, 
2000; Wilson & Howcroft, 2000. The result has been the emergence of a number of 
alternative or complementary methods, including critical success factors, value 
analysis, and other ‗subjective‘ multi-objective, multi-criteria methods ―(Klecun 
and Cornford, 2005, p.230). 
 
Anderson & Aydin (1994) believe that evaluation activities are a learning process, and it is 
not sufficient to evaluate selected and isolated criteria. Also Kaplan (1998) supports the 
idea that it is necessary to pursue the complex processes that contribute to outcomes. 
Drawing upon both the IS and health informatics traditions, Cornford et al. (1994) provide 
an evaluation framework in the shape of a matrix, comprising structure, process and 
outcome on one axis, and system functions, human perspectives (customer, actor, owner) 
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and organisational context on the other. This matrix adapts a framework developed by 
Donabedian (1978) for evaluating quality of care, and is similar to a U.K. Department of 
Health framework for evaluating IS projects. 
 
Klecun and Cornford (2005) continue:  
―[…] this framework not only encompasses technical, individual and organisational 
characteristics, as well as a societal perspective (‗effect in the wider world‘), but 
also offers a rich template for generating measures and data sources when 
evaluating IS in many settings. It seeks to address the long-term prospects of a 
project, that is, its sustainability, as well as changes to work practices. It also 
implies an ethical dimension, through human perspective as well as organisational 
context‖ (Klecun and Cornford, 2005, p. 231). 
 
System Functions Human Perspectives  Organisational Context 
 
Sustainability,   opportunity costs,  
Structure Technical detail   Work conditions and management   needs, 
Skill requirements implied requirements  
Process Information processing;  Human participation in   
                                                                                      Altered delivery and  practice 
   Correct and valid tasks,   social interaction  
Outcome  Relevant, applicable,  Quality of service,   
                                           Effects in the wider world  reliable and outcomes 
   Figure:  Evaluation framework (Cornford et al., 1994, Figure 3, p. 499). 
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2.5 The Interpretive Literature 
 
Hirschheim and Smithson (1988) criticise the overly positivistic direction of the efficiency 
and effectiveness literature of the 1970s and 1980s. They argue that the adoption of the 
scientific paradigm by both researchers and practitioners represents an inappropriate 
application of positivism and determinism to the description of inherently social systems. 
They find that an excessive concentration on tools and techniques has led to an increased 
formalisation and quantification, resulting in an increased concern for measurement instead 
of understanding. This serves to ignore the inherent subjectivity of evaluation and its 
political and social aspects. Their comments echo those of Legge (1984) who found that 
positivistic evaluation concerning social projects (such as hospitals) was merely rhetoric to 
justify the lack of rationality in decision-making. The scope for subjectivity in the 
apparently scientific practice of measurement is based on the work of Mason and Swanson 
(1981). 
 
During the 1990s, various interpretive (or quasi-interpretive) approaches to IS evaluation 
were proposed in the literature. Farbey et al. (1993) argue for a contingency approach that 
different types of information system require different evaluation approaches. Gregory and 
Jackson (1992) focus on the make-up of the evaluation team while Serafeimidis and 
Smithson (2003) analyse evaluation in terms of the roles of the participants. Symons (1990) 
notes the potential role of evaluation in organisational learning. Symons (1991) and 
Walsham (1993) propose the use of contextualism, based on Pettigrew (1985). Lyytinen et 
al. (1991) derive effectiveness measures from a social action perspective. Interpretive 
evaluation has been advocated by other authors, such as Land (1999), Hochstrasser (1990), 
Symons and Walsham (1991), Willcocks (1994). Smithson and Tsiavos (2004) explore the 
use of actor network theory in the context of IS evaluation while Introna and Whittaker 
(2002) advocate viewing evaluation from a phenomenological perspective. 
 
Land (1999) argues that:  
―[…] the evaluation process is ideally a socio-technical one. That is, it is an 
iterative process of discovery involving all classes of stakeholders. Technical and 
social considerations are equally acceptable. Evaluation is regarded as a mutual 
exploration of the issues, not as a mere recording of technical data. It is recognised 
that evaluation is a political process (Hawgood and Land, 1988), and is seen as an 
 51 
arena for fighting for cherished objectives or alternatively for denying other‘s 
objectives which are seen as harmful to one‘s own interests‖ (Land, 1999, p. 5). 
 
There has been reluctance by practitioners to accept the proposed interpretive approaches 
(Smithson and Hirschheim, 1998). It seems that managers and organisations are not ready 
for the necessary ‗paradigm shift‘ (Hirschheim and Smithson, 1988; Kallinikos, 2001). 
Walsham (1993) argues that interpretative methods of research begin from the position that 
our knowledge of reality and human action is a social construction caused by human actors. 
Geertz (1973) concluded that the interpretive view of the data we collect during our 
research could be seen as: 
―[…] what we call our data are really our own constructions of other people‘s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to‖ (Geertz, 1973, p. 9). 
 
 Compared to the early 1990s, when Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) highlighted that 
interpretivism represents a small proportion of the US IS literature, it is now much more 
common and important (Walsham, 2006). According to Mingers (2003), 17% of papers in 
six US and European based journals during the period of 1993-2000 were interpretive.  
 
Walsham, (2006, p. 321) argues that the setting up and carrying out of fieldwork is the 
fundamental basis of any interpretative study. He divides interpretive research into four 
elements, namely choosing a style of involvement; gaining and maintaining access; 
collecting field data and working in different countries.  
 
Theorists of socio-technical school were among the first to highlight the social as well as 
technical nature of IS and to advocate the design of IS that would enhance job satisfaction 
(Mumford, 1983). Working within the tradition, Land (2000) argues for methods capable of 
valuing both social and techno-economic goals. He suggests, for example, the use of a 
modified version of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). It would include 
customer, internal and external communication, and employee perspective related to 
improving the quality of working life.  
 
The socio-technical approach has evolved considerably in the past decade (Avison et al., 
2004; Horton and Wood-Harper, 2006) and IS researchers emerging from this tradition 
have reached out to different social theories, including social shaping of technology (SST), 
social constructivism and actor-network theory (ANT), seeking a better fundamental 
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understanding of the nature of IS innovations within organisational settings. Wilson and 
Howcroft (2000) propose an approach to evaluation based on SST. They argue that 
technology is a product of a society, influenced by the conditions of its creation and use. 
Wilson and Howcroft (2000) also argue that evaluation is interpreted by engaged social 
groups.  
 
Klecun and Cornford (2005) highlight the hermeneutic tradition: 
―Evaluation approaches drawing on the hermeneutic tradition shift the focus – to 
meanings rather than interests – emphasising the historical dimension of meaning 
and the role of an interpreter (reader of the text) in the process of understanding. 
This draws on Gadamer (1976), who suggests that a text can have many meanings 
depending on the context in which it is read, and that understanding is in this sense 
situated, both historically and culturally. If we consider an IS as a text, and an 
evaluation as an interpreting process, then we see that an IS may have many 
meanings – meanings created by (read by) the various interpreters and other 
‗readers‘, that is, participants in the formal evaluation process but also in the every-
day work situation that a system is embedded in‖ (Klecun and Cornford, 2005, p. 
234). 
 
Jones and Hughes (2001) argue for the use of ‗situated hermeneutic evaluation‘ as people 
are ‗active makers‘ of ‗physical reality‘ through evaluating (important) things in course of 
their everyday life. Davis et al. (1992) also use the concept of Gadamer‘s (1976) 
hermeneutic circle of understanding through the interaction of understanding the parts and 
the whole. 
 
2.6 Summary  
 
Over the years, a large volume of literature has accumulated concerning the topic of 
information systems evaluation. It is clearly an important yet slippery concept. Much of this 
literature is of a theoretical nature that has explored this complexity in detail but the basic 
divide between positivistic and interpretive studies remains. Of the two streams, the 
interpretivist one seems to be the more interesting and the one where IS research can 
further progress.  
 
 53 
Furthermore, much of the literature appears to be divorced from practical contexts and 
there is a pressing need for studies, such as this one, that are firmly rooted in practice. More 
specifically, there are very few ‗academic‘ studies that examine how IT investment is 
evaluated in the financial services industry, despite the importance of the industry and its 
dependence on IT. This sophisticated industry, with its emphasis on short-term profits, is 
unlike, say, general administration or manufacturing and deserves more attention. 
 
Hence, this study will take an interpretivist approach to IT investment appraisal in financial 
services. 
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Chapter 3 - Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis including a discussion 
of its strengths and weaknesses. It is strongly influenced by the work of Callon and Latour 
(1986, 1999) such that actor-network theory forms the theoretical backbone of the study. 
 
Globalisation of financial markets has increased rapidly in the last few years due to a 
combination of deregulation and dramatic advances in information technology (Beck, 2000; 
Giddens, 1998; Kapstein, 1997; Young & Theys, 1999). Increasingly, financial institutions 
conduct their trades through electronic markets. Electronic trading markets like the 
German/Swiss European Exchange (Eurex) have had a major impact on the participants 
(e.g. banks and brokers) on the one hand, and on the markets (e.g. different exchanges) on 
the other hand. Electronic trading has been globally successful since 1997. Most financial 
products are now traded electronically on a relatively few electronic trading systems such 
as Pats Systems and Trading Technologies (TT). 
 
The objective of this research is to explore the interaction of new communication and 
information technologies and the role of actors. Interaction between actors is not 
comprehensively understood. Participant observation research was conducted because it 
allows for a rich study of phenomena in Refco‘s organisational and market contexts. Two 
years of extensive interviewing and observations were conducted. Refco‘s actors‘ 
interpretations were influenced by their constructs. Certain concepts had different meanings 
within the specific social group. The phenomenon of ‗change‘ cannot be studied in 
isolation from the particular environment where the change takes place. In order to create 
the context of the derivatives broking market this research set out to investigate the 
technology and the way it is used to communicate.  
 
The nature of information systems is often complex and involves both human and non-
human components. This is particularly true in an electronic market. ANT can be used in 
general to describe the actors, intermediaries, framing and power that are the most 
important components of such an electronic market, which we call a network. This chapter 
explores whether ANT can help to analyse electronic trading markets. It highlights how 
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ANT is useful to define the various components involved within an electronic market. 
Moreover, the chapter analyses ANT‘s limitations in modelling computer-trading systems. 
This chapter concludes that ANT is useful to analyse an electronic market such as 
EuronextLIFFE or Eurex. 
 
ANT is introduced to describe with a specific vocabulary to what extent technology 
influences human behaviour. ANT shows that the use and development of an information 
infrastructure is a socio-technical process of negotiation. ANT has been widely adopted in 
the social science literature and also in the information systems literature. It can provide a 
framework to describe global networks. ANT will help us to understand the electronic 
markets and, in particular, it can tell us about Eurex‘s success (Smithson and Baygeldi, 
2004). ANT has its origins in studies of the networks of social practices within science and 
technology. Latour (1996) recognises that both human actors and non-human participants 
are equally actants. The neologism actant is often used as a neutral way to refer to human 
and nonhuman actors, thus eliminating the human touch in the word actor. They are defined 
by how they act within the networks. 
 
In this chapter, Eurex and its direct member Refco is used as a case study to analyse how a 
market can be interpreted as a heterogeneous network. Financial products traded on the 
German/Swiss electronic exchange Eurex are accessible from any location in the world via 
companies such as Refco. In order to understand an electronic market like Eurex, I discuss 
the role of an actor network. Heterogeneous actor networks will be described. A network 
consists of different components. Analysing such networks gives us a broader perspective 
and provides insight into markets based on electronic exchanges. It also allows us to 
explore the differing interests of actors within a market. A market can also be seen as an 
exchange. Direct accesses from actors like institutional or private market participants to an 
electronic market are an important factor for the network. Without this direct access, 
electronic trading systems like Eurex would not exist. 
 
My aim is to analyse whether ANT can help to understand the ―components‖ involved in 
the ―actor network‖ of Refco and Eurex. Relatively little literature is available on the 
application of ANT to new electronic markets/exchanges like Eurex, which emerged fairly 
recently. The aim of actors is to buy and/or sell financial products within the actor network 
of Refco and Eurex. Humans and artefacts are involved in this process in order to perform a 
transaction. Both roles within the network will be described in more detail. However, it is 
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necessary to explain concepts like actor, black box, framing, power and intermediary in 
order to understand and interpret Refco and the relevant exchanges. 
 
It will be explained what an electronic market such as Eurex and the intermediary such as 
Refco means. Callon (1998) concludes that framing and the construction of calculative 
actors are essential for a market. To analyse Eurex‘s components, we need to describe what 
framing means. Aspects of power will also be mentioned for the purpose of distinguishing 
between actors. The main components of a network are discussed after defining the basic 
concept of ANT. The question, ―What is an actor network?‖ will be discussed. The framing 
of actors within a market will also be analysed, before highlighting implications for theory 
and practice. Finally, conclusions are laid out in the last section together with areas for 
further research. 
 
3.2 Main Arguments 
 
The issue of information systems evaluation suffers from scarce and scattered theoretical 
background as well as measurement problems (Berghout and Remenyi, 2003). Some 
authors argue that, if the measurement problems were to a certain degree solved, there 
would be sufficient methods of evaluation available. The question ―What is the value of the 
company‘s investment in information systems‖ should be answered systematically. One of 
the issues, in the ongoing ‗process‘ is placing dollar amounts on intangible benefits. The 
author believes that some evaluation processes must be used if the primary question of 
value is ever to be answered adequately. The application of the methods and techniques 
implemented in this research can lead to a clearer understanding of the information system 
investment.  
 
Brown (2005) concludes:  
―IS evaluation exercises involve several elements, all of which must complement 
each other if the exercise is to be a success in terms of creating greater 
understanding of the implications of ICT investment to an organisation. An ICT 
project has two key factors to assess and manage; the hard ones on the nature of the 
technology and what it can do and soft ones associated with the social and 
organisational consequences of implementing and using the technology. Success 
requires a high level of project management skills to ensure that all stages are 
completed to specification and time. IS evaluation exercises can also be viewed as 
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projects that involve both the hard factors of evaluation and soft factors like 
evaluation of the technology and soft factors like evaluation of the organisational 
impact of the technology and organisational processes for decisions. These 
exercises require as high a level of project management skills as for ICT projects‖ 
(Brown, 2005, p. 174). 
 
In relation to data processing, most information systems provide operational benefits such 
as proximity, accuracy or reduction of staff that have tangible dollar values to the company. 
 
For Latour (1993), ANT attempts to overcome what he sees as the major shortfall of 
postmodernism. According to him, the epistemology of postmodernism divides nature and 
society into two incommensurable poles. Nature is only observed, never man-made. 
Humans only make society. The two poles are connected by language in order to refer to 
one of them. Postmodernism separates language and declares it as autonomous. The 
autonomous concept introduced by postmodernism and extended by postmodernism is 
criticised by Latour (1993). He argues that the separation highlighted by postmodernism is 
artificial. He is convinced that we have never been modern. 
 
ANT integrates society, language and nature. It delivers a result, which leads to the 
integration of humans and non-human actors into networks. Networks can be seen through 
the inscription of intermediaries. Intermediaries are a part of heterogeneous networks.  For 
Law and Hassard (1999), an actor network ―is a name, a term which embodies a tension‖: a 
tension, which lies between the centred actors on the one hand and the ‗decentralised 
network‘ on the other. The actor network insists on the achievement-focused character of 
relations (Law and Hassard, 1999). This ‗translation‘ does not tell us how links are made. 
Similarity and difference are unclear. If we assume that ANT is alive, then we can also 
assume that it transforms itself. So there should be no identity or any fixed point. We can 
assume that relations are in general uncertain and can be reversed by actors constantly. 
 
If we believe that the last few years have been years of describing and evaluating IS/IT 
investment in a way that has not done much to move to the next level, I would agree to go 
back to the origin as Latour (1999) suggests. I would like to use the following example: If 
we assume that somebody is in love with a woman and does not know why the aim to 
become a couple and being together is difficult to achieve. Wouldn‘t it be a good idea to 
find out ―where‖ (historically) my background is from? Her childhood, religion etc. may 
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also help to find out more about her-/myself and her/my childhood or in other words about 
the ―social influence‖ in the past influences my live today? Social and cultural background 
may help to understand current human actions and the networks I am part. The author of 
this thesis acknowledges that this example is very simplified.  
 
The author of this thesis believes that it is time to go back to the roots as mentioned in the 
example above. I also agree with Latour that it is necessary to scrutinise more thoroughly 
the content of what is ‗assembled‘ under the umbrella of society. Latour (2006) argues:  
―It is no longer clear whether there exist relations that are specific enough to be 
called ‗social‘ and that could be grouped together in making up a special domain 
that could function as ‗a society‘. The social seems to be diluted everywhere and 
yet nowhere in particular. So, neither science nor society has remained stable 
enough to deliver the promises of a strong ‗socio-logy‘. In spite of this double 
metamorphosis, few social scientists have drawn the extreme conclusion that the 
object as well as the methodology of the social sciences should be modified 
accordingly. After having been so often disappointed, they still hope to reach one 
day the promised land of a true science of a real social world.  
 
No scholars are more aware of this painful hesitation than those who, like me, have 
spent many years practising this oxymoron: ‗sociology of science‘. Because of the 
many paradoxes triggered by this lively but more than slightly perverse sub-field 
and the numerous changes in the meaning of ‗science‘, I think time has come to 
modify what is meant by ‗social‘‖ (Latour, 2006, p. 2).  
 
3.2.1 Why Use This Theory? 
 
After a long time of studying, I found a theoretical approach which comes closer to helping 
me translate and understand electronic markets and the complexity of the notion of 
evaluation. ANT is a very interesting and exciting theory, on the one hand, but has, on the 
other hand, its limitations (Richard and Whitley, 2000; Walsham, 1995). ANT can be seen 
both as a methodology and as a theory. The users of IT have in many cases ignored related 
social issues within these ―heterogeneous networks‖ (Latour,  1991, 1992, 1993, 1996). 
Bijker (1992) describes a society of humans and non-humans as equal actors tied together 
into networks. Language connects both poles. The products of these networks can be nature 
in the form of scientific facts (Latour, 1987) or it can be society (Castilla, Hwang and 
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Granovetter, 2000; Fenwick and Edwards, 2010; Granovetter, 1992; Rosen, 1993) or 
technology (Bijker, 1992; Law and Callon, 1992; Latour, 1991).  
 
My hypothesis is that human behaviour (social aspects) is important for the emergence and 
sustainability of IT investment within organisations. The intention of the research is to 
extend existing research by expanding the social element further and to provide a 
convincing analysis with the aim to animate further research into the relevant areas.  
 
3.2.2 What is an Electronic Market?  
 
Following O‘Brien (1992), Gosh and Ortiz (1994) hold that the changes of the global 
structure of financial markets are the result of the rapidly changing environment. The trend 
towards a global electronic trading platform has become a new reality for most markets or 
exchanges around the world (Clemons & Weber, 1996; Fan & Stallaert, 1999). I focus on 
Eurex, which is one of the largest electronic markets in the world and is slightly different 
from other electronic exchanges. Eurex was formed as a result of the merger of the German 
and Swiss electronic exchanges.  
 
Cunningham and Tynan (1993) try to define electronic trading (markets) in a way that the 
definition needs to be sufficiently adaptable to avoid becoming obsolete because of rapidly 
changing technology. One of the solutions they suggest is to take perceptions of the 
systems in use as the starting point. As a result, it would be possible to refer to ―electronic 
trading,‖ rather than specific communication technologies. They define electronic trading 
as any trading relationship that relies upon the use of computer technology for inter-
organisational communications, normally involving telecommunication links.  
 
Electronic trading systems exploit information technology capabilities to improve the 
efficiency of communications and alter the nature of inter-organisational transactions. It 
can be seen as an automated process of trading financial products in a market. Trading on 
Eurex can be seen as the matching of bid and offer prices from different actors through 
translation. Eurex members can conduct trades directly through a computer link to the 
market or they can simply transact via the Internet. In this context, the most frequent 
confusion is with respect to the meaning of the term transaction. The relevant broker 
calculates how many financial products the actor can buy or sell, depending on the financial 
strength of the end client.  
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When discussing transaction limits, the term transaction does not refer to the number of 
financial products that a given actant may trade, but rather to a processing activity within 
the Eurex system. From a technical point of view, a distinction is made between 
synchronous and asynchronous system transactions. Transactions are termed synchronous 
whenever an exchange participant, triggering an immediate response by the Eurex system, 
initiates them. Participants who have initiated such a transaction await a direct 
(synchronous) system response on their screen. Asynchronous system transactions are all 
those which cannot be directly attributed to an activity by a participant. Predominantly, this 
includes subsequent Eurex system processes carried out as a result of actants‘ activities, 
such as the posting of positions after the conclusion of trades or the broadcast of price 
information to all participants. Some authors describe an electronic market as a single or 
joint action of a variety of actors who are always present in a market. In the next section, I 
will mention two different examples of computer markets or ―networks.‖  
 
3.2.3 Eurex and other Exchanges Electronic Networks 
 
Exchanges such as Eurex provide customers such as Refco with access to the world‘s most 
liquid financial markets. Eurex was launched in 1989 with the aim of competing against 
other financial markets. In order to distinguish itself from the long-established competing 
financial markets, Eurex decided to link actors electronically to their local network in 
Frankfurt. This was possible after the German government changed its financial market 
legislation in 1988. The new legislation allowed financial institutions to launch electronic 
markets almost independently of the influence of the German government.  
 
Trading on the fully computerised Eurex platform is distinctively different from trading on 
traditional open-outcry markets. It transcends borders and offers actors technical access 
from any location, thereby creating a unique global liquidity network. Members are linked 
to the Eurex system via a dedicated wide-area communications network (WAN). To 
facilitate access to Eurex outside of Switzerland and Germany, access points have so far 
been installed in Amsterdam, Chicago, New York, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Paris, Hong 
Kong and Tokyo.  
 
Time and space limited the expansion of the major traditional open-outcry markets. Eurex 
could expand with the help of technology and provide direct electronic access to a full 
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range of products. The powerful German banks forced other participants to join the 
electronic exchange. They also offered their clients ―fee holidays‖ (Franke, 1993). In other 
words clients did not have to pay any transaction fees for selected financial products. The 
success is sustainable because the banks support the system and are at the same time major 
shareholders. One of Eurex‘s other initiatives is expanding its already broad product range, 
either by listing innovative financial products or entering into strategic alliances. It 
facilitates trading of many of the world‘s benchmark financial products between the entire 
range of direct exchange users, institutional and retail investors.  
 
For Shaw and Kauser (2000) a strategic alliance is regarded as a term that is applied to 
independent firms cooperating and forming alliances. Those alliances can also be seen as 
new ―networks.‖ The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and Eurex formed a business and 
technology partnership in the U.S. that has resulted in a joint venture company: a/c/e – 
alliance/cbot/eurex. This alliance was created and launched on August 27, 2000 as one 
global platform. The global platform can also be seen as a ―new network‖ or market. The 
CBOT exchange is modelled on open-outcry. CBOT realised that their actor network had 
become ―unstable.‖ More and more actors were joining the fully computerised market. 
Eurex realised the opportunity to extend their established and stable network through 
partnership. Eurex formed an alliance with CBOT to implement and operate the Eurex 
electronic trading platform in the United States. CBOT and Eurex members can obtain 
direct access to CBOT‘s and Eurex‘s trading platforms. Every exchange participant 
admitted to trading is required to participate in the clearing process of Eurex Clearing AG. 
The participant can choose to participate as a general clearing member (GCM), direct 
clearing member (DCM) or non-clearing member (NCM). GCMs can participate without 
any limits or restrictions. The system is based on a common trading platform. The alliance 
is open to other electronic exchanges. CBOT tried to re-stabilise their actor network 
through the transformation of the open-outcry exchange to a computerised exchange. Many 
financial firms have different network connections. The problems of different network 
connections are not addressed sufficiently in the literature. CBOT/Eurex decided to link 
participating firms to the common platform via a wide-area communication network 
(WAN).  
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3.2.4 Integration of New Electronic Trading Systems 
 
One of the bases of success for these networks is the global accessibility and low 
transaction costs. Transaction cost is the price a member has to pay for a matched trade. It 
is also called ―the exchange fee.‖ The exchange fee dropped dramatically due to lower head 
counts. Lower costs lead to more members or actors stimulating rising volumes. Liquidity 
is typically defined as the ability to convert an asset into cash equal to its current market 
value. In this paper liquidity is something that is easily sold in the market at current market 
prices. In a liquid market, an actor can sell large blocks of financial products rapidly 
without significantly affecting market prices. Before the integration, the CBOT open-outcry 
exchange network was criticised as expensive and ―old-fashioned.‖  
 
Many market participants refused to continue trading on the open-outcry exchange. 
Liquidity declined in conjunction with the destabilisation of the network. The open-outcry 
network was and still is close to a ―breakdown.‖ CBOT decided to transform their network 
to a computerised market. The electronic trading system is identical to the Eurex trading 
system. Actors can electronically transact from all over the world now. The new 
Eurex/CBOT global electronic system is linked to the markets in Frankfurt and Chicago. 
Both networks are integrated and actors have access to financial products from both 
exchanges. CBOT is thinking about a new alliance with different electronic exchanges such 
as Euronext/LIFFE.  
 
3.4 Actor-Network Theory (ANT)  
 
Actor-Network Theory evolved mainly from the authors Latour (1992), Callon (1991) and 
Law (1991, 2009) who were searching for an explanation for the social interaction between 
―us,‖ the humans and, for example, technology, the non-humans. Within the interaction, the 
actors are defined as entities that create things. Humans include all natural creatures. Non-
humans include technology, artefacts or also naturalised constructs. All of these 
components should be seen together in a network. Latour (1993) stresses the need for a new 
interpretation of our modern constitution. He is convinced that nature and culture should be 
treated symmetrically. The traditional view interprets nature and culture as completely 
opposite poles. Which view is correct, the traditional view or the view of Latour and 
Callon? According to Latour (1992), nature, culture and society are constructed 
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simultaneously. These three factors should be seen as interrelated. For Callon (1991), the 
acceptance of a clear distinction between technical and scientific approaches should not be 
taken for granted. Callon (1998) focuses on the market to explain, as economists have done 
in a different context, ―the coordination mechanism between humans, goods and 
technologies.‖ Conflicts of interest are resolved by transactions. The actors are involved in 
transactions within the market. Callon‘s (1991) approach is based on the assumption that 
products and technology are as important as human beings in a market.  
 
Rhodes (2009) provides us with a useful summary of the ANT approach: 
―The methodological cornerstone of the ANT approach is to follow actors to see 
how they attempt to impose worlds upon another, and to describe the dynamics and 
internal structures of actor worlds. It tries to trace and explain the processes 
whereby stable networks of aligned interests are created and maintained‖ (Rhodes, 
2009, p. 4).  
 
I would also like to draw attention to Callon, as he is one of the few academics that are 
willing to answer the question, ―What is a market?‖ in conjunction with ANT. Social 
aspects within economics influence theories more than many authors assumed a long time 
ago. This sociological aspect gives economics and information systems a more complete 
character. He discusses cognitive psychology and presumes that individual economic actors 
are capable of constant mental calculation. Calculation is in Callon‘s opinion a ―complex 
collective practice that involves more than the capabilities granted to actors by 
epistemologists and some economists‖ (Callon, 1998). Culture, as he explains, ―is 
frequently used to explain the appearance of rational actors.‖ He describes it as the atom of 
the market economy. Actors differ in their behaviour within different societies. They 
pursue their own interests and perform economic calculations.  
 
Optimisation and maximisation of an operation can then be achieved. Actors generally have 
divergent interests, which lead them to engage in transactions, which resolve the conflict by 
defining a price. Actors are defined as calculating actors. As Akerlof states, ―I would like to 
ask how precisely do actors define a price?‖ Akerlof‘s idea is that if ―buyers cannot tell the 
difference between second-hand cars by looking at them, kicking the tyres or taking them 
for a test drive, then the price in the market will reflect the average quality of the cars on 
offer‖ (Akerlof, 1984). In order to be calculative, actors must be open to the environment. 
As Callon (1998) points out, actors will be calculative according to social network analysis. 
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Actors enter and leave the exchange network like strangers after the transaction has been 
concluded. It is significant that he says that the actor with the greatest power of calculation 
is the actor whose tools enable it to have the greatest number of relations. Unfortunately, 
Callon (1998) does not explain the power of an actor more precisely. General clearing 
members in Eurex have the greatest number of relations and power. They can act in an 
unlimited fashion within the Eurex framework.  
 
Human and non-human elements are both actors (actants). An actant should be seen as 
superior to just an actor. An actor network consists of and links together both technical and 
non-technical elements. This can be easily explained from our activities, for example 
conducting a trade on Eurex; the buyer or seller is hereby the non-technical element, the 
electronic trading system Eurex can be seen as the technical element. ―Network‖ means the 
interaction between all actors, objects and subjects, that together determine our behaviour, 
or in this case the market.  
 
For example, I am using a PC linked to Eurex and all the technicalities it offers in order to 
be able to conduct a trade. My previous experience allows me to exploit the electronic 
trading system Eurex in more depth and continuously develop my own skills. All these 
surrounding factors: myself as the user, the PC, the advancing technology, my experience, 
are related or connected to how I act now. All these influencing components should be 
interpreted together to produce a framework or ―network‖ as defined in ANT. Networks 
will be explained in more detail within the next sections.  
 
Actors share the scene in the reconstruction of the network of interactions. This leads to the 
stabilisation of the system. Only actors are able to put actants in circulation within the 
system, although uncertainty about the stability of a network does exist. A possible solution 
to reduce uncertainty ―is provided by the network, a network that configures anthologies‖ 
(Granovetter, 1992). The actors, their dimensions, and what they perform, depend on the 
morphology of the relations in which they are involved. The number of connections that an 
actor has with different networks determines what the actor is.  
 
3.4.1 Actors and Black Boxes  
 
Callon and Law (1986) define an actor as an element, which bends space around itself and 
makes other elements dependent upon it. The aim of an actor is to translate its will into a 
 65 
language of its own. In another definition, Latour (1992) sees actors as entities that do 
things. Accordingly, he emphasises that what an actor is not as important as the action itself 
and the competences it performs within the chain. An actor is also defined as an element, 
which performs through trial and error (Akrich and Latour, 1992).  
 
Actors represented in a text perform an act and do certain things. Outside the text, the 
actors have an independent reality. Inside the text, they become actors within the network. 
The more heterogeneous elements a text or an object is able to align, the more likely it is 
that it will become ‗stable‘. It contains a sealed network of humans and non-humans. 
 
For example, a coin is an actor and performs as a mechanism for exchange. The coin is 
acting and is being represented. Actors show that the elements represented in a market do 
act. A computerised market can be seen as a network. The coin as an exchange mechanism 
depends on the strengths of the network. In other words, its performance and success as an 
accepted exchange mechanism depend on the strength of the network. A coin in this sense 
can also be seen as a ―black box.‖ Thus, it is not possible to break up the world into discrete 
objects, events or persons (Introna and Whitley, 1999).  
 
Electronic trading participants in offices and the actions they perform confirm that the 
technology is well advanced and that human-actors such as traders or stakeholders decide 
which system they use and support. An example of two different electronic trading systems 
clearly supports the idea that human actors use their power unexpectedly. LIFFE (London 
International Financial Futures Exchange) used to trade all derivative products (options and 
futures) on the open-outcry market. If we look more specifically to the short-term three-
month interest rate futures we observe a very interesting behaviour of human actors. In 
spite of the immense success of the electronic trading system Eurex, one specific product 
remained in ―London,‖ the Euronext/LIFFE Connect system, namely the three-month 
Euribor futures and options. The social relationship between the actors including the pit 
traders was so robust that the transformation has been to the electronic trading system of 
Euronext/LIFFE instead of Eurex. The ―leading‖ actors and social environment animated 
them to switch to LIFFE Connect. Pit traders, for example, socialise on a regular basis and 
often make their decisions during a dinner or a drink after work. The network in this case 
was still intact and difficult to change. As we know, all fixed income and equity derivative 
products are traded on the LIFFE-electronic trading system Connect. Actors trading the 
short-term interest rate sterling futures on the pit simply supported the LIFFE electronic 
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trading system and switched over and continued conducting trades via this new 
heterogeneous electronic network. The German electronic exchange Eurex ―took over‖ the 
five-year Government Futures and Options (BOBL) and also the ten-year Government 
Futures and Options (BUND). All actors moved from the LIFFE pit to the German 
electronic trading system in a very short time. The actors now act differently and translate 
their activities in an electronic environment.  
 
The reasons for using an electronic trading system rather than an open-outcry exchange are 
mostly costs, time and transparency. Now, back to the unexpected and unusual behaviour 
of the actors in one specific area. The three-month Euribor futures can be traded on both the 
LIFFE electronic trading system/exchange and the German electronic trading 
system/exchange. There are no major differences between those two exchanges, except for 
the difference of clearinghouses. The German clearinghouse gives the actor some 
advantages because it is integrated with the exchange. But the actors do trade Euribor 
products via the LIFFE trading system. It is important to mention that the German 
electronic exchange did offer the service - trading three-month Euribor derivatives - long 
before LIFFE on their electronic exchange. The actors did not support the German 
electronic trading system for one specific product, namely the Euribor products. This 
finding supports our hypothesis that human actors have the power to support or reject 
existing trading systems. The explanation can only be found if we analyse social issues, 
which influence actors‘ activities.  
 
A black box can be treated as a fact where only the input and output counts. A black box 
contains what no longer needs to be considered, those things whose contents have become a 
matter of indifference (Callon and Latour, 1986). Law (1999) states: 
―ANT removes the productive non-coherence even further from view. The black 
boxing and punctualizing that we have witnessed as we have named it made it 
easily transportable. They have made a simple space through which it may be 
transported. But the cost has been heavy. We have lost the capacity to apprehend 
complexity. What we are trying to do is to argue against simplicity-and a notion of 
theory that says that it is or should necessarily be simple, clear, and transparent‖ 
(Law, 1999, p. 10). 
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3.4.2 Emergence of Intermediaries 
 
Networks are created by or through actors. In some cases, a sustainable development is 
interrupted by new developments like new inventions (e.g. open-outcry market versus 
computer market). A new invention can result in new networks. These new networks 
develop out of existing networks. Another example is the failed electronic market Jiway 
(Financial Times, October 2001).  
 
As soon as an actor tries to increase power (Introna, 1997; Foucault, 1983), a starting point 
of a different network can emerge. If actors follow the ―leader,‖ it is likely that a new 
network can emerge. The stability of the network depends on the number and commitment 
of each actor. If the actor is very active he can become very powerful. Two aspects of 
power should be mentioned: the micro politics of power and the semiotic power structure. 
In the micro politics of power, technologies can be used as instruments to build up 
networks of influence (Kapstein, 1997; Walsham, 1993). Walsham also uses the term 
domination. The semiotic power is a result of the ―fixity‖ of meanings. It is built-up during 
the creation of a technological frame. After spending a lot of time on the key technology, 
the technology‘s meaning becomes settled or fixed. It is not easy to revert to a new 
technological frame. Framing will be further analysed in the next section.  
 
Intermediaries are not always accepted in markets, because they can slow down the process 
between two transactions, although intermediaries may be necessary to create a network. 
An intermediary connects actors into a network and defines the network itself. Actors 
create networks by implementing intermediaries between each other. An intermediary is 
anything that ―passes between actors in the course of relatively stable transactions‖ (Bijker 
& Law, 1992). Intermediaries are the language of the network. Through intermediaries, 
actors communicate with each other within the network. For example, one bank employee 
communicates with a broker and asks him to find a buyer for the product within the 
―network.‖ The financial institution employee prefers to conduct the trade via an 
intermediary due to his or her limited time.  
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3.4.3 Networks and „Moments of Translation‟ 
 
A network can be described as a dynamic system of communication, cooperation and 
partnership.  
 
An actor cannot act without a network, since networks consist of actors (Callon, 1987). 
Actor and network redefine each other permanently. The size or the power of an actor is not 
necessary dependent on the size of the network. For example, the Jiway electronic market 
is very small compared to Eurex. But an actor within the smaller electronic market can be 
more powerful. The power of an actor is defined by the position within the network. Actors 
are not necessarily equal (Latour, 1992). It can be criticised that he also says that there is no 
structural difference between large and small actors.  
 
Benjamin and Wigand (1995) discuss the unspecified relationship between things and 
people within a network. They are convinced that networking technologies can reduce the 
costs in exchange transactions. With the decline of costs, business activities previously 
carried out within vertically integrated firms will be shifted to the marketplace. Some 
authors claim that transaction costs can be crucial for ANT. The market structure depends 
on network characteristics and the economies of the network. Part of the development 
within a network is the process of translation. It is possible to have two directions within 
the network. The first one is leading to convergence and the other one to divergence. New 
actors within a network can lead to higher divergence. Those new actors are already 
involved in other networks. Translation is a process that is performed by at least two 
different actors. Actors are, as mentioned, engaged in other networks. This engagement can 
lead to different translations between actors and can lead to various results. It is not clear 
enough in the literature, which role intermediaries have in networks in terms of increasing 
the success rate of translation in networks.  
 
Translation happens if actors use the technology in a specific way with the aim to help 
them. This specific translation potentially leads to resistance to other potential competing 
translations. Actors translate between each other and show interest and develop strategies. 
According to Callon (1991), conventions regulate the translation process. The end result of 
IT investment might be different to the original plan during the translation process. Actors 
influence each stage of the project. In many cases, the project causes unintended and 
unforeseeable results not related to the original plan.  
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Callon (1986) described the construction and deconstruction of actor networks in terms of 
four ‗moments of translation‘ (or phases): problematization, interessement, enrolment and 
mobilisation. These may overlap but can be considered separately for analytical purposes. 
The first moment, problematization, is the phase when the actors and their identities are 
defined. It is the first level of inscription, where the roles are defined and the rules of the 
game are set. In this phase the actors attempt to define the roles of the other actors. In the 
second, interessement phase, actors try to cut off other actors from certain alternatives that 
could alter the role they were allocated during problematization. Enrolment, the third phase, 
is the result of a successful interessement process, which suggests that all the necessary 
actors have been ‗brought on board‘. Things can really start happening in the fourth phase, 
mobilisation.  
 
‗Moments of translation‘ describe the means by which networks emerge. Allies work 
together in order to solve their problems through the network. According to Callon (1991), 
the notion of problematization is used when an actor highlights that it has specific skills 
enabling him to solve his/her problem. A problem is translated, as the allies become actors 
in the selected network defined by their common ownership of the original problem. For 
Callon (1991), the notion of interessement is an act of persuasion of other potential allies 
by those being able to find a solution to the initial problem. An actor makes itself 
indispensable by translating their interests and enrolling them by technology. A successful 
negotiation is a condition of network stabilisation (Latour, 1987). Social investment 
becomes most effective when actors commit themselves as members of the network as 
described in the diagram below:  
 
 70 
 
Source: Figure: Rhodes, J. (2009), „Using Actor-Network Theory to Trace an ICT Implementation Trajectory 
in an African Women‟s Micro-Enterprise Development Orgnaization, page 6.  ANT Key Concepts and 
Translation Moments, Adapted from Hassard, Law, & Lee, 1999; Callon, 1991, 1999; Latour, 1987. 
 
 
A good summary of ‗Four Moments of Translation‘ is provided by Rhodes, J. (2009, page 
6):   
 Problematization 
This is the first moment of translation, during 
which a macro-actor defines the identities and interests 
of other actors that are consistent with its 
own interests. In this way, it establishes an obligatory 
passage point (OPP) and renders itself indispensable. 
Other actors are then approached to join 
in solving the problem through forming an alliance 
with the macro-actor by persuading, cajoling, and 
even frightening others into believing that he or 
she has the solution. 
 
 Intéressement 
The second moment of translation is a process 
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where the actors convene around an issue to 
strengthen their determination toward moving 
through the OPP, all while excluding voices of dissuasion 
from without or dissenting voices from 
within. It is a process of convincing actors to accept 
the definition of the macro-actor by using 
devices to detach actants from elsewhere and 
attach them to this point of view. It also involves 
translating, strategic compromise, and persuasion 
to lock allies into the proposed roles. 
 
 Enrolment 
The third moment of translation is a successful 
outcome of the problematization and intéressement processes.  
Actor-networks grow by 
enrolling other entities through the following steps: 
• translating the purposes of entities and establishing 
themselves as the spokesperson to those 
who are being associated; 
• strengthening connections through political persuasion 
to infuence enrollment strategies; 
• maintaining stability and alignment through constant 
attention; and 
• using humans and machines to enroll actants- 
Internet technology, fax, telephones, TV, and radio 
can be just as seductive as actant ―enrollers.‖ 
 
 Mobilisation 
The fourth moment of translation maintains commitment 
to the problematised cause of action and 
ensures the continued position of the OPP. Of importance 
in this step is establishing the legitimacy 
of the spokesperson. 
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3.4.4 Market as a Network  
 
The motivation behind an actor‘s actions is not predetermined (Callon, 1998). To show the 
strength of ANT and one of the reasons why it was created we use the example of the 
―market‖ which mixes humans and nonhumans and controls their relations. Actors are 
active and able to make difficult decisions to achieve their objective. As mentioned earlier 
in this paper, actors are calculative, pursue their own interests, and make informed 
decisions. Their roles are defined in the computer market Eurex. We can use ANT to 
understand micro-processes of this market. Actors are interested in the outcome of their 
economic calculations. This is caused by the fact that a discord regarding a price during a 
transaction between actors can generally be transformed into consensus.  
 
The ideal situation to be able to calculate is an environment with low uncertainty. Callon 
(1998) uses the term contingent contract to solve the problem of uncertainty in a market. In 
this context contingent means contingent to the precise market situation. For example: I am 
offering a product A in the Eurex network for a price of X1, contingent to Y. If the price of 
Y changes to Y1, I will ask the actor to cancel the order to sell X1. Here the actor can be 
seen as an artefact and/or as a human being. The contracts offered between actors are 
constantly revisable during the social interaction. Shared culture, rules, procedures and 
routines can reduce uncertainties for actors and increase the predictability of electronic 
markets. Unfortunately, behaviour is not always predictable, although interaction and 
negotiation can help to reduce misleading interpretations.  
 
One solution to the question of coordination would be the notion of embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985). Actors can calculate their decisions because they are entangled in 
relations. For Granovetter the solution that is provided by the network is a network that 
configures ontology. The actors, their dimensions and their actions depend upon the 
morphology of the relations in which they are involved. An actor‘s power rises with the 
number of relations within different networks. General Clearing Members (GCM) have 
more power than Non-Clearing Members (NCM) in Eurex. Teamwork and trust lead to a 
network, which can improve performance (Luhmann, 1988). We have seen this behaviour 
of locals switching to the LIFFE electronic trading system rather the German Eurex system. 
EuronextLIFFE has got a fully functional electronic futures spread matrix. Many networks 
become entangled in relations. But it takes time and the rejection of many human actors 
with different power structures before a heterogeneous already established network 
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becomes vulnerable. The global financial system can become vulnerable over time. As 
soon as an actor‘s activities change, their power supporting existing infrastructures 
becomes uncontrollable and not stoppable. Those human actors will — after an unknown 
time — support a different heterogeneous network or heterogeneous networks which have 
different actors and which are possibly in place already. Those networks consist of actors 
and behave like atoms which always remain but which appear in various locations.  
 
3.4.5 Framing of Actors  
 
Actors and goods conducting calculations should be framed and disentangled. Therefore, it 
is necessary to implement boundaries. Actors‘ activities are within these boundaries. The 
notion of externality has been developed in economic theory to show one of the 
shortcomings of the market (Aumann, Hart and Neyman, 1995). Callon (1998) uses the 
notions of framing and overflowing to explain what he means by constructing a market. 
According to Callon, framing is an operation that helps to define actors. He distinguishes 
actors from other actors and goods from other goods. Framing is a tool to create a market. 
Rules and regulations helped Eurex to frame relations. Relations outside the frame are 
externalities. Framing is a continuous procedure. Calculations are not possible without 
framing as explained by Garcia (1986). Garcia‘s study of the transformation of the 
strawberry market in the Sologne region of France explains the development of framing 
and the construction of calculative actors very well and is a good example of how an 
electronic market can be framed. This framing allows actors belonging to the Eurex 
network to calculate. Transactions within this newly created market started in line with the 
existence of the product (strawberries) and a sustainable supply and demand (bid and ask) 
between actors. The different components help framing and lead to transactions within 
Eurex. The strawberry market can also be created electronically and is similar to the 
electronic market Eurex.  
 
Ciborra (1996) emphasises that the modern form of economic organisations as alliances or 
networked or federated firms is considered to be at the forefront in terms of combinations 
of routines and transactions. The actors‘ intention is to stabilise the network in order to 
reduce uncertainty. Stabilisation or closure means that the interpretive flexibility diminishes 
(Callon, 1992). A stable network is able to resist competing translations. It is also able to 
avoid further possible future translations because it is already ―settled‖ (Star, 1995). Latour 
(1992) sees the description of a network as finished when it is ―saturated‖ and an 
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explanation emerges. But how can we measure a saturated market? Is Eurex the electronic 
market saturated and not vulnerable to a breakdown?  
 
3.4.6 Critiques of Actor-Network Theory 
 
Monteiro (2004) provides a good summary of the various critiques of ANT. He believes 
that the aim of ANT is to provide a vocabulary to trace out how plans, goals, and intentions 
are translated and inscribed into alternative choices such as alternative of words. The 
question is whether those choices are relevant to be mentioned or substantial enough to be 
recognised.  
 
Various authors believe that ANT was popular as a theory for only a short period of time 
and is less recognised now. Even in our IS department at LSE I recognise that not many 
students use ANT anymore compared to when I started working on the PhD thesis.  
 
Some authors do not like the term symmetry as used by ANT. Here, with symmetry it is 
meant that technical equals non-technical. In other words humans are equal to non-humans. 
People can easily say: how can a computer and a student be equally treated in the network? 
Also, various people struggle to decide whether ANT can be treated as a theory, or as a 
perspective, or as a methodology.  
 
Latour himself highlights that ANT is not perfect and needs to be discussed in a specific 
context and developed further. Projects are concluded through various steps of translations.  
According to Monteiro (2004, p. 131), ―there is a danger in ANT of emphasizing this goal-
directedness too much‖. ANT has been said to produce actants that are ‗flat‘; they are 
without much blood and tears-or ‗hairy gorilla-like‘ as Latour (1999a, p. 16) expresses it. 
 
In order to illustrate ANT weaknesses, Monteiro (2004, page 133) uses the example of the 
McDonalds fast-food chain. He refers to Star‘s (1991, page 28) example:  
―In ANT terms, the practices of producing and serving McDonalds‘ hamburgers is a 
well-aligned, heterogeneous network of technology and routines, which, in total, 
produce the hamburger. Star‘s point is to think systematically about what it would 
take to request something that falls outside the robust actor-network, for example an 
order for no onions on a hamburger for someone with an allergy. In ANT terms, 
this would require an alternative, competing network to be viable. More generally, 
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this reminds us not to focus on the existing networks only (e.g. McDonalds) but 
also to make visible the conditions for alternative networks‖ (Star, 1991, p. 28).  
 
It is assumed that ANT does not account for pre-existing structures, such as power, but 
rather sees these structures as emerging from the actions of actors within the network. ANT 
has been criticised as overly managerial in focus. Other authors argue that ANT does not 
take detailed social processes into account and only touches the surface by being 
descriptive. Actors are seen as part of networks and are not able to exist without networks. 
It could be asked why, for example, activity theory cannot be used instead. Latour (2005) 
said that he had been reminded that the ANT acronym ―was perfectly fit for a blind, 
myopic, workaholic, trail-sniffing, and collective traveller.‖  
 
3.5 Information Systems Evaluation and Actor-Network Theory
  
For many years, researchers have been highlighting the multidisciplinary nature of IS 
evaluation (Serafeimidis and Smithson, 1994). Berghout and Remenyi (2003, p. 46) argue: 
―Evaluation is a multidisciplinary topic and many theoretical approaches have been 
applied to study evaluation practices and explain the various phenomena. Examples 
of theory-based approaches are: 
 Economics/accounting theory (Dirks and Lent, 1997; Bannister and McCabe, 1999; 
Maanen and Berghout, 2001; Svavarsson, 2002); 
 Interpretative approach (Serafeimidis and Smithson, 1994; McBride and Fidler, 
1994; Abu-Samaha, 2000); 
 Critical approach (Nijland, 2001; O‘Donnel and Hendriksen, 2001; Jones and 
Basden, 2002); 
 Structuration theory (Vaujany, 2001, Jansen and Nes, 2004) 
 Grounded theory (Jones and Hughes, 2001); 
 Contingency approach (Turk, 2000); 
 Soft Systems Methodology and process theory (Bennetts and Wood-Harper, 2003; 
Kefi, 2002; Stansfield et al., 2000; Wood-Harper and Basden, 2006). 
 Cognitive mapping (Newman and Hang, 2002); 
 Option theory (Black and Scholes (1973); Cox Rubinstein, 1979; Jong et al., 1997; 
Clare and Lichtenstein, 2000; Mehler-Bichler, 2001; Svavarsson, 2002); 
 Social theory (Berghout et al., 1996); 
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 Post-modernism (Remenyi and Sherwood-Smith, 1996).‖ 
 
Unfortunately, so far we have no common understanding regarding the necessary 
methodology to understand this multidisciplinary field of study that is IS evaluation. In my 
view, it is unavoidable to put IT investment in a social and historical context in order to see 
the whole picture. ANT offers the notion of heterogeneity in order to describe 
heterogeneous networks. The mentioned concepts of ANT such as heterogeneous networks 
(Akrich and Latour, 1992) and translation (Latour, 1987; Callon, 1991) are useful for this 
research. The heterogeneous networks consist of a number of actors. Therefore it supplies a 
method to study the relationship and interaction of various actors.  
 
Technology is socially shaped. It is not an autonomously developing force in our society 
(Backhouse, 2001). The concept of technological frame (Kapstein, 1997; Walsham, 1993) 
is proposed to explain the development of heterogeneous socio-technical ensembles. A 
technological frame structures the interactions between the actors of a relevant social 
group. One of the main characteristics of the concept is that it is applicable to relevant 
social groups. The concept of technological frame sets the way in which technology 
influences interaction. It also explains how a new technology is constructed by a 
combination of enabling and constraining interactions within relevant social groups in an 
organisation. The stabilization of an artefact is a social process. It depends on our interests 
and personal value judgements.  
 
3.5.1 Heterogeneous Networks 
 
A network can be described as a dynamic system of communication, co-operation and 
partnership between individuals and groups. The concept of the network is found in e.g. 
sociology, business, biology and politics. Callon (1993) defines the term network as a 
"group of unspecified relationships among entities of which the nature itself is 
undetermined". A network can be seen as two systems of alliances (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994): ―Firstly, people who are involved in the usage, construction, distribution and 
implementation of an artefact. And secondly things (non-humans) like coins or computers‖. 
People and things are interconnected (Latour, 1987). An actor cannot act without a 
network, since networks consist of actors (Callon, 1987). Actor and network redefine each 
other permanently. Actors are not necessarily equal (Latour, 1992). One of the weaknesses 
is that the literature does not clearly distinguish between ―small‖ and ―large‖ actors. We 
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need to know not only that there is interaction between human and non-human behaviour, 
but also how it works. ANT has been used in various interpretative case studies (Monteiro, 
2000). A useful definition of information systems is suggested by Cornford and Smithson 
(1996): 
―Information systems are social systems whose behaviour is heavily influenced by 
the goals, values and beliefs of individuals and groups, as well as the performance 
of the technology. As such, the behaviour of information systems is not 
deterministic and does not fit into any formal algorithmic representation‖ (Cornford 
and Smithson, 1996, p.7). 
 
The importance of enrolling the various actors into the heterogeneous network, including 
the influence of non-human actors leads us to adopt actor-network theory. In adopting 
ANT, we are mindful of some of the basic tenets: 
 People and things are interconnected (Latour, 1987).  
 An actor cannot act without a network, since networks consist of actors (Callon, 
1986).  
 Actor and network redefine each other permanently.  
 Actors are not necessarily equal (Latour, 1992).  
  
Callon (1986) is convinced that actors are defined as calculating actors. An actant should be 
seen as superior to a simple actor. ―It can be seen as an automatic door opener‖ (Latour, 
1988) or ―it can be scallops in the sea‖ (Callon, 1986). An actor network consists of and 
links together both technical and non-technical elements. Optimisation of an operation 
within the organisation can then be achieved. The surrounding factors, the Refco employee, 
the Refco PC, the advancing technology, his/her experience, are related or connected to 
how he/she acts now.  All these influencing components should be interpreted together to 
produce a framework or ‗network‘ as defined in ANT.  
 
The emergence and dynamics of heterogeneous networks and the stabilisation procedure is 
an important part of this research proposal. The socio-technical approach to organisational 
change has been discussed for many years. ―It has offered so much and produced so little 
and we need to know why‖ (Land, 1999, p. 7). Analysing such networks in this case study 
gives us a broader perspective and provides insight into the evaluation of IT investments. It 
also allows us to explore the differing interests of actors within Refco and other 
organisations. Similarity and difference are unclear. Benefits are not automatic: ―If you 
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automate a mess, you get a faster mess.‖ (Strassman, 1997, p. 39). In most cases, to make 
significant improvements, IT requires something else (‗X‘) in terms of organisational 
change, industry restructuring, process improvement etc. (the list is long if not endless, 
Smithson, 2004). 
 
Much concern has been voiced about the lack of a unifying theoretical perspective in 
human computer interaction. Although ANT has various weaknesses, it complements and is 
helpful to involve the researcher in different aspects of the fieldwork process. ANT‘s nature 
shows us that we need to find ways to diagnose the problem of evaluation.  
 
Latour‘s and Strum‘s work on the ‗Performative Model of Society‘ (1987) has provided a 
basis for fieldwork design and the collection of empirical materials. The part of the 
performative model is derived from Garfinkel‘s Ethnomethodology (1967). According to 
Garfinkel, society is achieved through interaction. The performative model is used as 
mentioned by Latour as perspective frames through which activities taking place can be 
monitored. By understanding the actors, the evaluator will be able to understand how and 
why translations and associations are evolving. Alliances are constantly formed and are a 
dynamic procedure within organisations.   
 
Latour argues that ANT is ‗relationist‘ rather than relativist. What is included in the 
network needs to be analysed, if ANT is used to support data collection.  
―Substantiation takes place through processes of alliance forming where other 
actors enroll people, resources, symbols and infrastructures. Latour highlights that 
when enrolment, associations and agency are described the lines between ‗in there‘ 
subjective truth and ‗out there‘ objective reality can disappear‖ (Latour, 1991, p. 
129). 
 
Framing is a continuous procedure and relations outside the frame are externalities. 
Calculations are not possible without framing as explained by Garcia (1986). Garcia‘s 
study of the transformation of the strawberry market in the Sologne region of France 
explains the development of framing and the construction of calculative actors or evaluator 
well and is a good example of how e.g. an electronic market can be framed. Callon places 
emphasis on the actor and introduces the term agency. Association leads to translations 
(Callon, 1986). For Callon it is crucial that during translations the concept of the actor 
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affords attribution of agency. Understanding actors and intermediaries helps to understand 
certain constructions.  
 
3.5.2  Re-Constructing Information Systems Evaluation 
 
Smithson and Tsiavos (2004) suggest ‗deconstructing‘ the evaluation process with the aim 
to  
―[…] clarify the importance of both human and non-human actors. These 
arguments lead to the introduction of the notion of evaluation as a time gateway. 
We explore how evaluation is used by managers as a means for managing selected 
aspects of information systems at a particular time and in a particular situation as 
well as the inherent limitations of such an effort. Finally, we approach evaluation as 
a series of open episodes, as a process that comes from the past but looks towards 
the future. Evaluation may sometimes seem rational, orderly and stabilizing but we 
argue that it is never static; rather it is a dynamic process that is always changing‖ 
(Smithson and Tsiavos, 2004, p.1).  
 
They argue that various factors influence groups and stakeholders. 
 
Evaluating can be seen as categorizing and reducing the world to numbers with a 
‗positivistic touch‘ leading to rational decision finding. We can assume that the object of 
evaluation is not the world itself but a reduced version of it, the information system. 
Smithson and Tsiavos (2004) state that  
―[…] evaluation is mostly used in order to justify future decisions. The assumptions 
contained in the information system are projected into the future and amplified 
through the evaluation process. In that sense the evaluation operates as a time 
gateway through which various aspects of the past of the organisation and its 
information systems are inscribed into future systems‖ (Smithson and Tsiavos, 
2004, p.1).  
 
Thus, evaluation is an activity that takes place within the heterogeneous network. It is an 
interaction between human and non-human actors. It is just one activity among many 
activities but it is important for the formation and stabilisation of networks. Where there are 
problems in this interaction – for example, where human actors conceptualise the 
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technology as being faulty or ineffective – the whole network is likely to become unstable 
or perhaps fail to form in the first place.  
 
Based on the work of Smithson and Tsiavos (2004), I use actor-network theory (ANT) as a 
way of describing the enrolment of the various actors into the investment evaluation. This 
seems highly appropriate given the social construction of evaluation. ANT is also useful 
because it accepts the notion of non-human actors, which in this case could include 
evaluation methods, accounting conventions, budgets and documents such as an IT strategy 
and black boxes. 
 
3.6. Summary  
 
Financial products are either traded on open outcry exchanges or on electronic exchanges. 
Both markets can be seen as different heterogeneous actor networks. The shift from 
traditional exchanges towards electronic exchanges can result in uncontrollable networks. 
Risks are involved because many questions regarding electronic exchanges are not 
answered. One of the risks involved is a ―breakdown‖ of a network and the appearance of a 
new one.  
 
ANT has its limitations because it is not seen as a fixed theory. This ―theory,‖ a very 
interesting and exciting one, is on the other hand also controversial (Richard and Whitley, 
2000). Sometimes, it is partly rejected (Walsham, 1995) and can be seen as a methodology 
rather than a theory. It is very useful to explain markets or networks based on electronic 
trading systems in order to understand the complexity of a market. Unfortunately, it is also 
necessary to develop or define the ―components‖ (e.g., actor, power and framing) within 
ANT further. It is also necessary to know more about how IT shapes and constrains 
changes within an electronic market.  
 
This chapter has attempted to bring together a range of different literature. The aim was to 
investigate what an actor network is and conclude what kind of further research is 
necessary in order to describe networks. The nature of information systems is complex and 
involves both human and non-human components; no less so than in an electronic market. 
We explored whether ANT can help to analyse electronic trading systems. An electronic 
market depends on the outlined components or elements of a network. A market or an 
electronic exchange can be seen as an ―actor network.‖  
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ANT can be used as a tool for the analysis of socio-technological development. 
Intermediaries are passed among the actors to assure a certain degree of convergence 
among them. This convergence allows the heterogeneous network Eurex to act in an 
understandable way, which is to translate one actor‘s objectives through different actors to 
achieve the goal via a transaction. A goal of an actor within Eurex‘s network can be seen as 
the attempt to find a counter party who is willing to buy or to sell. The importance of an 
actor within the transaction procedure is defined by his/her/its position within the network. 
Power rises in correlation to the degree of convergence. In a situation where we can see 
high convergence, the network seems to be stable. In this situation it can be seen as a black 
box. Black boxes can be seen as artefacts or structures.  
 
There have been various ―breakdowns‖ of networks (Taurus, LIFFE ―open-outcry,‖ Jiway). 
A ―breakdown‖ of a network (market) can be seen as the result of the move of actors to 
different networks. In many ways, ANT seems to offer a useful approach to studying such 
breakdowns and, in particular, it seems especially suited to studying the creation of new 
networks. ANT enables us to go further than traditional socio-economics or analyses in 
terms of networks proposed by authors like Granovetter (1992).  
 
Eurex as an electronic market is the result of operations of disentanglement, internalisation, 
externalisation and framing. To understand a market we need to understand the 
construction of calculative actors. Framing can be possible only if there are connections 
between actors. Eurex does supply these connections. ANT assumes social relations are 
―in-forged‖ into the technology. It can be system-theoretically presumed that there are 
different types of electronic trading systems. They differ in complexity levels. During a 
system transformation complexity enlarges (e.g., a/c/e, the new electronic market that 
resulted from the alliance of Eurex and CBOT).  
 
One particular benefit of the ANT approach is that it offers a relatively straightforward and 
systematic way of formalising much of the tacit knowledge regarding social behaviour. 
This type of knowledge is held by all of us, in our particular fields of expertise, but it is not 
easily formalisable, unlike much of a knowledge-based organisation‘s low-level data. I 
have shown how this type of knowledge concerning the formation of Eurex can be captured 
in a reusable form, using ANT. The nature of ANT analysis is very detailed and 
comprehensive, which means that an analysis of a large market like Eurex, with all its 
 82 
traders, operators and regulators, becomes very complex. The number of actors shaping 
Eurex‘s network is so high that it is difficult to identify all of them. Furthermore, although 
ANT provides the tools to track the process of change in networks, it does not seek to 
explain the behaviour of actors. Thus, the use of ANT alone makes a network change 
unpredictable and a change to the network causes new changes. Callon (1998) criticises 
that, ―ANT is so tolerant that it ends up presenting an actor, which is anonymous and not 
well defined.‖ Nevertheless, with further development, or perhaps in combination with 
other social science theories, the tools of ANT may become the basis of a more effective 
approach to explaining changes in social and business networks.  
 
From the perspective of this thesis, which focuses on IS evaluation, ANT offers the facility 
to view evaluation in the context of an actor network, in this case electronic trading. ANT 
allows the human actors (developers, traders, brokers etc.) and non-human actors 
(hardware, software) to be considered as part of a whole but it also allows us to look at 
individual links in the network such as the interaction of particular humans with particular 
technologies. This interaction takes place across time as technologies are designed, 
developed and used and part of this interaction necessarily involves various forms of 
evaluation: from formal cost-benefit studies to informal judgements of users. 
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Chapter 4 - Research Method and Design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the chosen approach, the research method and the research design. 
This requires being aware of methodological choices. It can also help to focus and is 
important in social science research. By choosing a particular methodology the researcher‘s 
analysis will be determined by a specific angle. It requires looking at the methodology from 
a certain point of view. For over two decades, there has been a growing number of IS 
publications that advocate the use of alternative approaches to understand the 
organisational, behavioural and social consequences of information systems investment, 
planning, development and use; e.g. Hughes and Wood-Harper (1999), Jayaratna et al. 
(1999), Markus (1994), Orlikowski (1993), Wood-Harper (1992).  
 
While all methods have weaknesses, some are more appropriate than others. The researcher 
has created a framework, by which it is possible to go through certain levels in order to 
understand the whole picture. But what is the whole picture and how does it look like? 
Here, I would like to quote Latour (2005): 
 ―The argument of this book can be stated very simply: when social scientists add 
the adjective ‗social‘ to some phenomenon, they designate a stabilised state of 
affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may be mobilised to account for some other 
phenomenon‖ (Latour, 2005, p. 1). 
 
4.2  Research Approach 
 
In order to look at the social construction of evaluation I have taken an interpretive 
approach to this research (Klein and Myers, 1999). For me as a researcher, this approach 
offers the opportunity to observe and also to distinguish from a positivist approach (Yin, 
1994). The interpretive approach suggests that knowledge of reality can be gained through 
social constructions such as language and processes embodied in common meanings 
(Walsham, 1995).  
 
Actor-network theory (ANT) as a method represents a technique of data collection in which 
the researcher studies the subject within the natural environment. The social world can be 
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studied from the viewpoint of the individual actors. Understanding and interpretation of 
‗human activity‘ is highlighted (Norros, 1998, p. 159). The term ‗qualitative‘ refers to 
qualities of entities, which means that activities are not measured or examined 
experimentally through quantity, intensity, frequency or amount (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1998; Maxwell, 2005). Quantitative research is based around measuring and analysing 
causal relationships amongst variables. The qualitative researcher (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998) on the other hand represents an activity which locates the observer in the world. The 
world can be turned into representations such as interviews, recordings, field works. A 
qualitative researcher analyses actors in their natural environment with the intention to 
interpret the phenomena in the terms of the meaning actors bring to them. The qualitative 
researcher believes that he/she can obtain a closer perspective of the actor. By contrast, 
quantitative researchers believe that interpretative research methods lack objectivity. 
 
IS research methodology requires acknowledging that researchers cannot extract 
themselves from processes of social construction. Researchers are social actors interpreting 
the world. They are already involved in others‘ construction of reality. Gadamer (1976) 
argues that interpretations are based on past experience, perception of the present and the 
projection of the future. Gadamer also highlights that only some part of lived experience 
can be separated. Latour has done some work for ―me‖ and the following words are very 
well summarised; as good, probably better, as they would have been my own words. 
Although, with all respect, I assume that we both would not be able to find the precise 
English wording from French, his native language, and German as my ―native‖ educational 
language in order to describe the following:  
 
―What I want to do in the present work is to show why the social cannot be construed as a 
kind of material or domain and to dispute the project of providing a ‗social explanation‘ of 
some other state of affairs. At the present stage of their development, it‘s no longer possible 
to inspect the precise ingredients that are entering into the composition of the social 
domain. What I want to do is to redefine the notion of social by going back to its original 
meaning and making it able to trace connection again. Then it will be possible to resume 
the traditional goal of the social sciences but with tools better adjusted to the task‖ (Latour, 
2005, p. 1).  
 
My research approach is qualitative and interpretative or in other words anti-positivistic. 
Anti-positivism emerged through a critique of positivism. This philosophy supports the 
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view of individuals involved in a given activity. The social world has been studied from the 
viewpoint of these individuals that we call actors. Anti-positivists reject the notion of the 
researcher as an unbiased observer. Instead the research should be capable of seeing the 
world as it is. Understanding and interpretation of human activity is highlighted.  
 
Nevertheless, I have decided to include pure quantitative data in order to support the 
findings of the interpretative approach. If other researchers would like to compare the 
Refco case with other case studies, it is important to concentrate on case studies from the 
same sector. As an example it would be difficult comparing data from organisations in the 
service sector with data from the non-service sector. If we assume that computers do 
contribute positively to e.g. fast execution or productivity growth, than we can assume that 
the traditional information productivity paradox is largely a measurement problem. This is 
related to the problem of assessing service sector productivity, because computers are used 
more in the service sector. Personal computers appear to have a large impact on 
productivity. Measuring computer inputs accurately is difficult. I interpret data on the 
number of PCs per employee as a provider of an indication of the extent of usage of 
computers within the firm. The organisations needed to evaluate their in-house and external 
IT/IS developments in order to implement a long-term business and IS strategy.  
 
The interpretive approach to this research is compatible with my theory. Walsham (1995) 
suggests that interpretive research opens doors to the researcher in order to understand 
humans‘ thoughts and their actions. I embed my research in the interpretative approach 
suggested by Walsham (1995) in conjunction with ANT. I have analysed IT and other 
departments at Refco in two countries and the actions they perform. In order to do this, I 
analysed and observed their interactions. All the inputs have been precisely recorded and 
discussed individually and in groups. I observed what kind of input has been conducted and 
why this specific input has been chosen. Those findings have been discussed within the 
relevant department within the organisation in order to clarify their activities. This was a 
daily and continuous procedure and has been repeated regularly for a period of more than 
two years.  
 
Since the 1980s, sociological and historical studies have developed a constructivist analysis 
of technology in contrast to the standard image of technology that was largely 
‗technological determinist.‘ The idea that technology is socially shaped, rather than an 
autonomously developing force in society or a primarily cognitive development, is not new. 
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Angell and Smithson (1991) ―choose to take as our point of departure – information 
systems are social systems‖. Land and Hirschheim (1983) also agree ―an information 
system is a social system that uses information technology‖. Social shaping models show 
that technology does not follow its own momentum. Technology is shaped by social 
factors. Existing social concepts are reinvented and different approaches are introduced in 
the context of rapid technological and social change. Approaches, which lean toward 
society, begin with the assumption that technology and its resulting consequences are 
planned and shaped by social actors. These social actors include large institutional entities. 
Bijker (1992) also argues that the social construction of technology (SCOT) is socially 
dominated. Other authors argue that technology develops according to its own internal 
necessity and out of dynamics with no human control. Is technology constructed by society 
or society made up of technology?  
 
4.3  Research Method 
 
The applied method is a detailed case study, which allows ―an investigation to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as organisational and 
managerial processes‖ (Yin, 1994, p.3). I decided to carry out a single embedded in-depth 
case study as the case is of a revelatory nature (Yin, 1994). A case study allows a rich 
insight into a particular context, which is important for the whole issue of the meanings and 
measurement of evaluation. Thus the social construction of these notions takes place and 
can be observed within one organisation. This makes the empirical aspects of the research 
much more manageable (Engestroem and Middleton, 1998). 
 
A case study refers to the collection and presentation of detailed information about a 
particular participant or small group, frequently including the accounts of subjects 
themselves. A form of qualitative descriptive research, the chosen case study looks 
intensely at an individual participant pool, drawing conclusions only about that participant 
or group and only in that specific context. I do not focus on the discovery of a universal, 
generalisable truth. Emphasis is placed on exploration and description. To obtain as 
complete a picture of the participants as possible, case study researchers can employ a 
variety of methods. The methods include interviews, protocol analyses, field studies and 
participant-observations, which have been applied during the very extensive fieldwork.  
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I have had good contacts with the senior management of Refco and access to many people 
within this company. Also, I have worked for Refco during the research period. 
Subsidiaries in London and Germany have been chosen as the prime location for the 
fieldwork. The head of IT in London and Germany has been interviewed and further face-
to-face meetings have been held in February 2004. The company‘s main business was 
broking derivatives and similar financial products. In this type of business, in a highly 
competitive environment, information is very important and could be seen as the lifeblood 
of the business. There is considerable information sharing through databases and the 
Internet. The organisation was a sophisticated user of IT with a comparatively small IT 
budget.  
 
I started with a small pilot investigation of a small to medium sized IT project, in order to 
test the research approach and techniques. For this I interviewed everyone involved, not 
just a few selected people. This pilot expanded and became incorporated into the main 
research. I also modified my research procedures and treated the pilot as a learning 
experience. For the main research, the projects needed to have a significant IT content, as 
well as being large enough to ‗tell a good story‘ but not too large that the empirical part of 
the research became unmanageable (Cornford and Smithson, 1996). The organisation had 
various IT-based projects running at any one time and project selection was not a problem. 
 
My intention was to focus on the way the investment appraisal (including ex-ante 
evaluation) is conducted and how the various actors behave, based on the conceptual 
framework above, and become enrolled into the project. I also followed the project through 
to its implementation, taking special note of events that took place in the course of 
development. This organisation, like many others, did not normally carry out a formal post-
implementation evaluation but I interviewed the key actors at an appropriate time after 
implementation. This should give me some indication as to whether, and how, their views 
of the evaluation had changed. There was also the possibility of seeing how the fate of this 
project fed into the next IT investment appraisal. These post-implementation activities were 
not essential to the research, as the focus was on the initial investment appraisal but they 
could provide a very interesting account of the dynamics of the social construction of 
evaluation. 
 
Throughout the research, I combined interviews with the collection of documentary 
evidence, in terms of investment costs and outcomes. I relied mostly on semi-structured 
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interviews with managers, developers and users who were closely involved with the 
project, as well as the heads of the support functions, such as human resources. As my 
access to the company was good, I attended relevant IT investment and project 
management meetings to observe the actions taking place. I also collected relevant 
documentation concerning, for example, accounting standards and investment evaluation 
criteria.  
 
The chosen fieldwork design and methodology enabled me to capture the flow of activities. 
I observed the case study firm Refco very carefully over a long period of time. The 
outcomes of these activities were verbal interviews, fieldwork texts and in contrast also 
pure figures in order to support the findings. Principles and procedures from social science 
theory enabled me to analyse the collected data further.  
 
4.3.1  Elements of Action Research 
 
In order to understand and conduct this research, there are elements of action research that 
have complemented the case study and that have helped to monitor activities within the 
involved organisation. The work of authors such as Law (1991), Latour (1991, 1992, 1993, 
and 1996), Walsham (1995), Callon (1998) and Wood-Harper (1985) helped to structure 
my research. 
 
Action research has been used in social science since the 1940s, with the aim to integrate 
theory with practice through an iterative process of problem diagnosis. It is still not very 
well recognised by IS researchers. Hult and Lennung (1978) believe action research can 
assist in practical problem solving, is performed collaboratively, uses data feedback and is 
applicable for the understanding of change processes in social systems. In the chosen 
participatory action research, actors try to overcome potential problems by controlling most 
of the actions. According to Checkland (1991) one of the strengths of action research is in 
its iterative process of problem diagnosis, action intervention and reflective learning by the 
involved parties. 
 
The research process has been in a continuous interaction with the ―field‖. Being in the 
field and acting within the field physically was important. Practitioners should carry out 
systematic research on themselves and their own practices. According to the literature, Kurt 
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Lewin ‗invented‘ the term ‗action research‘. His main arguments are learning from 
experience and studying social systems by changing them.  
 
Also, Trevor Wood-Harper has been an advocate for many years and has been 
recommending using action research since the 1980s (Eardley et al., 2007; Wood-Harper, 
1985). According to Baskerville and Myers (2004) and Wood-Harper (1985), IS 
researchers should aim to make their research in the field more practical and relevant to the 
industry concerned:  
―Action research aims to solve current practical problems while expanding 
scientific knowledge‖ (Baskerville and Myers, 2004, p. 329). 
 
 They use the term ‗helping role‘ and continue:  
―[…] the essence of action research is a simple two stage process. First, the 
diagnostic stage involves a collaborative analysis of the social situation by the 
researchers and the subjects of the research. Theories are formulated concerning the 
nature of the research domain. Second, the therapeutic stage involves collaborative 
change‖ (Baskerville and Myers, 2004, p.329). 
 
However, action research is not a ‗yes/no either/or‘ method but rather contains ‗shades of 
grey‘ or shades of involvement (Walsham, 2006). At one extreme, the researcher spends all 
his working hours for the focal organisation wrestling with the research problem in 
question. However, this was not my position. I was employed by Refco for most of the 
study period but I was not directly concerned with IS evaluation. I was certainly an 
‗insider‘, working for the company, but IS evaluation was ‗someone else‘s job‘. I did not 
have responsibility for this evaluation but I was in a position where I could occasionally 
contribute towards the discussion. Nevertheless, I was conscious of the problems and I used 
my position within the company to gain access to the main actors in order to interview 
them or to complete my questionnaires.  
 
I was actively involved in day-to-day business, including internal and external meetings. 
The research within Refco combined the application of theory to practice. It helped to focus 
on practical problems, collaboration and was action- and change-oriented at the same time. 
An important characteristic was the aim to understand a social situation in the IS field and 
simultaneously assist in practical problem solving.  
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Walsham, (2006) argues: 
―I made the distinction in Walsham (1994) between an ‗outside researcher‘ and an 
‗involved researcher‘. I saw the former as, for example, a researcher carrying out a 
study mainly through formal interviews, with no direct involvement in action in the 
field or in providing significant feedback to field participants. I saw the latter as a 
participant observer or action researcher. Although the above distinction still seems 
useful to me, I would view involvement now as more of a spectrum, and as 
changing often over time. At one end of the spectrum is the ‗neutral‘ observer, but 
this does not mean unbiased. We are all biased by our own background, knowledge 
and prejudices to see things in certain ways and not others. I meant  by neutral that 
the people in the field situation do not perceive the researcher as being aligned with 
a particular individual or group within the organisation, or being concerned with 
making money as consultants, or having strong prior views of specific people, 
systems or processes based on previous work in the organisation. At the end of the 
involvement spectrum is the full action researcher‖ (Walsham, 2006, p. 321).  
 
Thus, I would suggest that this study has strong elements of action research but is better 
classified as a case study. 
 
4.4 Research Design - Data Gathering and Access to Refco 
 
During the fieldwork, I was a PhD student at the LSE in the information systems 
department. Preliminary data collection began in October 2003. I had access to the 
organisation constantly and was also present within the premises of Refco Germany and 
London. Fieldwork data could be accessed at any given time, from the offices in London 
and Düsseldorf, Germany. Further data or interviews have been selected indirectly from 
offices in New York and Paris. However, I was physically present at the offices in London 
and Düsseldorf. For the bulk of the time, namely from January 2004 until March 2006, I 
had direct access to data and was also present in the organisation‘s office in Düsseldorf.  
 
It was important that the adopted theoretical framework provided a foundation for further 
discussions and analytical evaluations. During the period mentioned above, the main 
stakeholders were identified and semi-structured interviews were conducted. Interviewees 
were asked to describe their background, their current role and their involvement directly or 
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indirectly with electronic trading systems used by the organisation and its clients. The 
majority of interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Interviews 
have been conducted on an ongoing basis in order to clarify aspects of the project. 
 
During data collection, emphasis was placed on being physically present at meetings, 
which took place at least once a week. However, some meetings were cancelled and 
rescheduled. A diary of these interviews has been maintained and was crucial for data 
collection. Additionally, e-mail correspondence was practised regularly. A business and 
product development group was implemented in the London office and one person in the 
German office was part of this group. The direct participation enabled me to monitor any 
new events or discussions even before other parts of the organisation were involved or 
enrolled. Data collection continued until March 2006. Finishing data collection was a 
significant act that had to be carefully planned and sensitively enacted, due to my close 
involvement at both field sites in London and Germany. Participants were asked to 
comment on the analysis of that material.  
 
The methodology was chosen carefully and a research plan was constructed before data 
collection. In the course of collecting data, some hurdles had to be overcome, including the 
collection of sensitive internal information. It seemed that the company was in particular 
concerned about possible reputational risks. By using an interpretative approach, it was 
possible to keep in mind the principles of the adapted research plan and the overall research 
question: “How is IS Evaluation Socially Constructed: A Case Study of IT Investment 
Appraisal”. 
 
Prior to working in the German office from March 2003 until March 2006 I had been 
working for six months in the U.K. Head Office, namely from October 2002 until spring 
2003. Due to my German language skills I moved to Germany in order to gain access to the 
local office. 
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                                                              Interviews Questionnaire     Total 
IT Department    58  45  103 
Marketing Department   17   9  26 
Sales Department    12  15  27 
Product Development Department  41  77  118 
HR Department     4   3  7 
Management      6   3  9 
External Vendors    21  29  50 
External Clients    28  14  42  
Total      167  195  382 
Table: Overall numbers of interviews and questionnaire responses 
 
A total of 167 interviews were conducted with 36 different interviewees, and twenty of the 
interviewees were interviewed several times. Initial contacts were made on the basis of who 
was doing what. Interviews varied greatly in length and context, with some conducted in 
the relatively formal semi-structured manner envisaged at the outset, but with others carried 
out on a more ad hoc basis as opportunities to ask questions arose within various locations 
in the organisation. A large amount of documentary evidence was collected during the 
study such as: 
 Minutes of meetings 
 Notices 
 Email from various local and overseas offices 
 Promotional material such as booklets, company brochures and flyers 
 Websites, which were different from office to office until 2004 
 Internal reports 
 Press reports and articles 
 
As discussed in the previous section, conducting fieldwork in these cities enabled me to 
have direct access to the informants. This section offers the background of the fieldwork, 
how the informants were selected and how the actual interviews and observations were 
carried out. Essentially, the company relied on order flow businesses. Brokers often refer to 
the derivative broking market as an information network. An information network is a 
network of people, as well as a technological network. Both can define, accommodate and 
facilitate communication and information exchange. This represents both the human actors‘ 
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network and the technological network. Actor-network theory has questioned whether we 
are entitled to make a distinction between those networks. Both human actors and 
technological artefacts are seen in a symmetric way.  
 
The users‘ perceptions and also their actions influence the way specific technologies are 
developed in due course. It is argued that the structure of the relationships in the market 
shape technology through its use and is being shaped by the use of technology. The case 
study is described in terms of relationships and information technologies. Agents are 
treated as reflexive, knowledgeable actors (Giddens, 1984). These relationships enable or 
limit specific flows. Writing-up the evidence collected in the field is consistent with the 
framework.  
 
The selected professional informants can be defined as a category of workers:  
1. Who have distinct skills, 
2. Who work in the company employment relationship or have similar long 
term contracts 
3. Whose work activities involve inter-departmental work activities 
4. Who are software suppliers, generally vendors 
5. Who are the company‘s important clients 
 
Most of the interviewed professionals were employed by the organisation directly. Those in 
London and Düsseldorf had also been working in different organisations, with an average 
of ten years work experience. At the initial stage, the informants were chosen by my 
personal network. Later, these informants referred me to other informants. In other cases, I 
simply went to the department and started a conversation. I have been able to interview 
people from March 2003 to October 2005. During the interviews, I asked the interviewees 
to introduce me to their colleagues, such as people in the IT departments. It was good that 
some did that without being asked. The process of selecting and contacting informants 
relied upon various personal networks, or what Nardi et al. call ―intentional networks‖ 
(Nardi et al., 2002). The informants had direct or indirect relationships with each other. 
This fieldwork of contacting and interviewing various professionals can be seen as 
utilisation of those personal networks and the basis for conducting the fieldwork over a 
long period. This chosen approach was very time consuming though (Walsham, 2006). 
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As explained above, I employed two data collection methods in this field study: semi-
structured interviewing and ad-hoc observation. The main data collection method was 
semi-structured interviewing. Each interview took from forty-five minutes to one hour on 
average. The interviews were recorded, except five that could not be for confidentiality 
reasons. All the recorded interviews were transcribed and the non-recorded ones were 
reflected on and summarised immediately afterwards based on the notes taken during the 
interviews. I also have e-mailed all interviewees. The following list outlines the interview 
themes applied throughout the semi-structured interviews:  
 Employee‘s personal background: age, education, nature of job, position, year(s) of 
working in current position, previous positions and job history 
 Use of IT tools: PC, numbers of email sent and received, frequency of phone calls 
to customers   
 Frequency of meetings with clients, with employees or external vendors 
 Details of projects currently involved in: types, members, duration, current stage, 
activities in your charge, project management 
 Business objectives and development, personal development 
 Location of work e.g. head office, subsidiary, home 
 Frequency of communication  
 Positive and negative aspects of independent work activities 
 Impact of computing technologies on everyday work activities: New opportunities 
and problems? 
 
Ad-hoc observations were conducted during each interview session. The period in which 
the interview was actually held was a good opportunity to observe the informants‘ daily 
activities. During various coffee breaks I had the opportunity for an informal talk with the 
informant after the interview session. In two cases an opportunity occurred to interview the 
relevant person in local pubs after work. In three cases interviews were also conducted 
during dinner in restaurants in Germany. The informal talk provided me with the 
opportunity to gain ―lived‖ data about the nature of their current work. I could observe in 
depth their activities. Observations have been followed up by notes shortly after. E-mails 
have been sent using the internal company e-mail and I had my own company e-mail 
address. These e-mails are stored and will be kept for seven years, since the German 
legislation requires storing and keeping all e-mails for a long period of time for compliance 
reasons. Another advantage of having a corporate e-mail address was that I was able to 
continue verbal interviews supported by formal e-mails locally or globally.  
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This section explains some general aspects of the informants. Occupations of the 
interviewed professionals were different. Due to their specific individual skills it was not 
easy to involve external people without those specific skills. Important informants were the 
IT specialists. Their working activities were distinct from other professionals, such as sales 
people. I interviewed professional workers who were employed full-time by the firm but 
were not given much independence in their everyday work activities. The activities can be 
described as involving a high degree of customisation and interaction with other 
departments such as sales and with clients. A high degree of knowledge is required in order 
to fulfil the client‘s needs. For example, the salesman has to get approval for travelling and 
other marketing costs from his boss.  
 
The management constantly evaluated the pros and cons of every penny spent for a project. 
The evaluation procedure was not standardised and a decision was based on experience and 
future income expectations. In this regard, the salesman had to defend his actions 
constantly and keep the management updated. As mentioned, computing technologies and 
internet-based applications have dramatically transformed their work. I have interviewed 
several professional workers whose work practices were often standardised. Those included 
heads of departments. Around thirty informants were male and six were female. There was 
an under-representation of females in terms of gender distribution in this field study. The 
age distribution of the informants was as follows: 15 in their 20s, 35 in their 30s, 40 in their 
40s and 10 in their 50s and older. People in their 40s accounted for the largest age group in 
this field study.  
 
Amongst all the informants, some were travelling a lot. Also, the dramatic increase in the 
accessibility to the internet benefited their work practices. Most of the informants regarded 
their offices as their main work sites. The work place has been split into two daily shifts. 
The daily shifts applied and concerned departments with client contacts and the IT-
department, the so-called E-support desk. They planned to expand the daily shifts to three 
shifts, enabling them to offer a 24-hour customer service. Derivatives broking is a diverse 
industry, which concerns all forms of transaction either via phone or via the internet. As a 
result of this diversity there are various types of broking markets, with different degrees of 
regulation and standardisation of offerings in each of them.  
 
All the interviewed professionals had a good command of new ICTs. All of them used 
internet-connected personal computers (PCs) for their daily work activities. The results 
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presented above concerning the informants‘ profiles and their ICT use aimed to offer an 
overview of the professionals interviewed during the field study. It is obviously necessary 
to examine much more detailed data in order to discuss their everyday work practices.  
 
4.5 Data Analysis  
 
The report format is descriptive. It determines and describes ―the way things are‖ and is the 
basis for the case study and this PhD (Wood-Harper, 1985). It is predominantly social 
science and does not necessarily have independent variables.  
 
Throughout the research, I combined interviews with the collection of documentary 
evidence, in terms of investment costs and outcomes. I relied mostly on semi-structured 
interviews with managers, developers and users who are closely involved with the project. 
Also the heads of the E-support team, including the back office and transaction 
management and occasionally the human resources department have been involved. Due to 
my good access to these people, I was able to attend relevant IT investment and project 
management meetings to observe exactly the actions taking place. I also collected relevant 
documentation concerning, for example, accounting standards and investment evaluation 
criteria.  
 
As mentioned earlier, this research has a specific scope and analytical lens. The field study 
has been conducted in this line of conduct. With in-depth interviews and ad-hoc 
observations of more than thirty professionals working in London, New York and Frankfurt 
aiming to provide contextualised data about how they got their job done. The analysis of 
fieldwork materials has been done simultaneously to the data collection. The outcome of 
fieldwork activities has been texts, such as interview transcripts and minutes of meetings. 
Certain emerging technologies such as algorithmic trading systems have also been 
described. Access to the entire German office‘s clients and other important data of that 
company was possible. At the beginning of the fieldwork the data collected was not in 
proper order. It was referenced within the fieldwork diary though. The diary linked data to 
various events. Then it has been translated into an index of fieldwork documents. Latour 
(1999) identifies the preservation and re-arrangement of temporal order as one of the key 
analytical acts made possible when the researcher moves from the field site back to the 
research school. 
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The focus of the case study chapter reflects the course of events as the researcher observed 
them. They were also reflected in the fieldwork documents collected. Fieldwork documents 
were classified in terms of time, location, date, fieldwork event and the type of text 
collected. The significance of data was related to the core research question.  
 
The process of data analysis can be divided into the following stages:  
 thematizing, the reason and subject of the research;  
 designing, planning the structure of the study;  
 data collection, conduct interviews, obtain observations, use of questionnaires; 
 analysing data; verifying, assign the validity of the research findings; 
 reporting, to process the findings of the research.  
 
In order to support my research I collected data in the form of interviews, observations, and 
questionnaires. Interviews were conducted with Refco‘s employees, Lehman employees, 
Eurex employees, Deutsche Börse employees, Patssystems employees, and FSA, various 
hedge funds and HFT firms. Interviews lasted between thirty and sixty minutes. From these 
interviews only the essential parts that were relevant for the research were extracted, 
summarised and integrated in the thesis. Interviews were very useful to get the story behind 
the interviewees‘ experiences. This provided me with the opportunity to pursue in-depth 
information around the topic. In some cases I used interviews to clarify and to further 
investigate responses to questionnaires. Certain people have been interviewed repeatedly in 
order to probe follow-up questions related to the complex project.  
 
I used different types of interviews, including informal, conversational interviews without 
pre-fixed questions. One of the advantages was to remain adaptable to the interviewees‘ 
circumstances. On the other hand, a general interview guide approach has been used to 
ensure that the same general information could be collected from each interviewee. In 
certain situations, telephone interviews enabled me to gather information rapidly. In order 
to avoid jeopardising the results of the study it was important not to bias the study. Parts of 
the research that could not be covered by the interviews were filled in with my own 
observations of action and relationships amongst the companies‘ employees. I took notes of 
my observations and used those in order to support my findings.  
 
Regarding the questionnaires, it was crucial not to influence the interviewee in terms of 
outcome. The aim was to remain objective and ask the questions in a specific, neutral and 
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anonymous way. I promised to keep the results of the questionnaires anonymous in order to 
retain honest answers.  
 
All collected data in the form of interviews, observations and questionnaires had to be 
consolidated because the entire mass of data would not have fitted into the thesis. Only the 
important data contents were brought forward in order to remain focused. Data collection 
and processing has taken up a major portion of the research time, since it has been time 
consuming and extensive. 
 
In structural terms, ANT is fairly simple, comprising actors and networks. Thus the first 
stage of the analysis comprised scouring through the data to identify actors, both human 
and non-human, and to gauge their relevance to the network. The former (identification) 
was straightforward but the latter (judgement of relevance) was much more subjective; for 
example, how relevant were human resource actors or vendors‘ maintenance programmers? 
Rather than aiming for comprehensiveness in this huge and complex network, as this was 
exploratory research, I focused on the ‗main players‘, both human and non-human. I 
wanted to gain insight rather than trying to log the entire network. 
 
The other key element of ANT for this research was the notion of inscription and moments 
of translation. This involved taking the data concerning the main players and coding the 
relevant actions and motivations according to the four moments of translation. This was 
inevitably subjective and became an iterative process as I uncovered the narrative and 
refined my understanding of what had taken place. 
 
4.6 Summary  
 
This chapter described and justified the research approach, which is interpretive, the 
research method, which is a case study with elements of action research, and the research 
design, including the data collection and analysis. 
 
Terms such as accuracy, timeliness and reliability tend to play an important role in the 
evaluation process. This research does not create a brand new method; its purpose is to 
provide insight into existing practices through taking a rather different perspective: actor-
network theory.  
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The overall research design of this thesis is exploratory. It does not aim to validate pre-
defined theoretical constructs. The data collected in Refco aims to improve our knowledge 
of evaluation in the context of electronic markets.  Theory generation can be a derivative 
objective for interpretive research. The research process of this thesis adopts an iterative 
approach.  
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Chapter 5 - Case Study 
The Rise and Fall of a Global Financial Services Firm (Refco) 
- The Role of IT Investment - 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the data within the global financial services firm, Refco Group, 
collected during March 2004 and December 2005. It describes Refco in a detailed manner. 
The chapter concentrates on internal issues at Refco, including its status as a financial 
services firm, its organisational structure, and its relationships with its branches in other 
countries, head office, vendors and clients. This thesis does not go into great detail 
regarding specific financial products such as fixed income, commodity, equity and foreign 
exchange derivatives. Our journey investigates whether IS/IT investment evaluation is 
socially constructed or, in other words, where and how related decisions are made. It is 
without doubt complex and certainly not straightforward to measure or define IS 
investment evaluation. Moreover, there is an overwhelming instrumental focus and, besides 
standard corporate interests, individual interests are highlighted within the development 
process and project evaluations.  
 
The chapter presents the empirical findings of the research project. The first section 
outlines the background of the case. The second and third sections focus on empirical 
findings and related case studies. The data collected and employed in this project are both 
primary and secondary. 
 
5.2 Company Background - History of Refco 
 
Refco began operations in 1969 by providing execution and clearing services in agricultural 
commodities. In 1974, it started to diversify after it realised the potential of the newly 
launched listed financial futures markets. In 1982, the company initiated capital markets 
broking operations following the introduction of margined foreign exchange products. In 
1985, it acquired a U.S. brokerage firm and it continued building a global futures markets 
operation. During 1998, Refco moved into asset management by acquiring asset 
management firms in New York and in the U.K. Following the acquisition of a futures 
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broking firm in 2000 the company became a leading online broker. Between 2001 and 
2003, Refco continued to consolidate its leading market position through acquisitions. 
These acquisitions were followed by massive redundancies some months later, which 
occurred as a result of overlapping business areas and due to the pressure of keeping IT and 
operational costs low. 
 
Refco became recognised more widely after it handled Hillary Clinton‘s cattle futures 
trades, which converted a $1,000 investment into more than $90,000. During the 1990s, 
Refco repeatedly came under the scrutiny of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), the US governmental body that regulates these kinds of operations. In 1999, Refco 
was fined for allegedly manipulating customer accounts and for failing to comply with 
rules regarding order taking and record keeping of customer orders due to the lack of 
compliance, IT investment and other related skills. The securities arm of Refco, Refco 
Capital Markets, which was not regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) or the CFTC, was under investigation by the SEC for improper short sales in an IT 
company, ITC. The CEO built the additional unregulated business and offices of Refco in 
the U.S. and independently of the FSA-regulated European subsidiaries. The unregulated 
U.S. offices functioned like ―stand-alone‖ offices and were not very transparent entities 
compared to the healthy and regulated brokerage subsidiaries. For example, Refco 
Overseas Ltd. London was regulated and regularly checked by the FSA. Also, the German 
subsidiary was regulated by both the UK FSA and the German Bafin. Bafin has a similar 
role to that of the FSA, namely monitoring members and the market from the compliance 
point of view.  
 
Refco‘s clients included Wall Street banks, hedge funds, companies with exposure to 
commodities and retail clients, who were generally speculators or day traders. In spring 
2005, the CEO and other senior management based in New York decided to list the 
company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); in other words, to register the 
company via an IPO. The official argument was that Refco needed external shareholders or 
additional cash in order to invest in IT and also to start penetrating the Chinese market. It 
seemed that some managers wanted to ‗cash in‘ by listing the company on the NYSE. 
According to Refco‘s August 2005 IPO prospectus, its 2,500 employees served over 
200,000 customers in 14 countries. In its fiscal year ending February 28, 2005, Refco 
processed 654 million listed derivatives contracts, clearing more trades than the Chicago 
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Board of Trade or the New York Mercantile Exchange and making it the largest broker on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
 
Refco became a publicly traded parent company and consisted of three main units: Refco 
LLC, its regulated futures trading business; Refco Securities LLC, its regulated broker-
dealer securities unit; and Refco Capital Markets, Ltd., its unregulated over-the-counter 
division, which engaged in a variety of off-exchange trading, including derivatives. After 
the successful IPO, Refco Capital Markets was investigated by the SEC and ceased 
operations at the end of 2005.  
 
Refco‘s May 31 2005 balance sheet showed $74.3 billion in assets and $74.1 billion in 
liabilities. As with many financial institutions, the bulk of Refco‘s assets consisted 
primarily of ―goodwill‖ and other ―intangible‖ assets, the value of which depended largely 
on its ability to operate profitably and free of scandal. Its assets were very small and 
consisted of $185.4 million in shareholder equity. The equity-to-assets ratio was only 0.2%, 
compared with other Wall Street brokers‘ ratios of 3 to 4%. 
 
The CEO of Refco joined the company in 1982, after working for more than a decade in 
commercial lending with an international bank. He became chief financial officer in 1984 
and was promoted to chief executive officer two years later, becoming CEO and chairman 
in September 1998. He kept a low profile and was credited with building Refco into the 
largest independent futures broker in the world mainly through acquisitions. A private 
equity company (anonymised as PEQ), founded in 1974, had a good track record in the 
private equity buyout area, such that their previous four buyout funds had over 20 years 
enjoyed estimated average annual returns of over 50%. PEQ‘s involvement with Refco 
began late in 2003. As a new main shareholder of Refco, PEQ was concerned about 
―reputation issues‖ associated with Refco‘s history of compliance. The CEO of Refco 
assured PEQ that he had cleaned up the company and that no compliance issues remained. 
That was supported by an outside law firm and by the fact that Refco had brought in as 
general counsel a former regulator from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC). PEQ may also have seen in Refco, which was growing 30% annually, an 
opportunity to duplicate the success of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.   
 
After ten months of due diligence in which PEQ spent millions of USD on advisors such as 
KPMG, McKinsey & Company and others, PEQ bought 57% of Refco in August 2004 at 
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$8 per share. It invested a total of $500 million in equity as part of a $2.25 billion leveraged 
buyout that included an $800 million bank loan due in 2011. Before the IPO, the senior 
managing director at PEQ confirmed that the firm‘s ultimate objective was to take the 
company public: ―That is certainly a goal of ours. We can‘t put a timeframe on it. We hope 
that we‘ll be able to become a public company within the next few years, but it will depend 
obviously on the performance of the business and the market opportunities.‖ 
 
In August 2005, Refco went public despite the fact that its IPO prospectus disclosed two 
―significant deficiencies‖ in its internal controls at fiscal year-end February 28, 2005. The 
auditor of the prospectus reported that Refco‘s finance department ―did not have the 
resources to prepare financial statements that complied with federal law‖.  
 
Apparently Refco‘s IPO was launched successfully, although internally some senior people 
from branches outside the New York head office did not understand why an IPO was 
launched in August without prior marketing and without the complete involvement of 
senior managers outside New York. Also, it was very unusual, and to a certain degree a 
breach of trust, not to issue shares to all employees, at least at face value. One senior 
employee sent an e-mail to the head office, asking how he could participate in the IPO 
because he wanted to become a shareholder of ―his‖ own company. No feedback or 
comment was available from the head office, which provided an e-mail address for specific 
questions related to the IPO.  
 
Refco raised $583 million on 26.5 million shares at $22 per share on the first day of the 
IPO listing. The stock price increased 25% during the first day of trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Refco‘s two main owners, the CEO and X Partners, according to 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, netted $145 million, by selling 5.375 
million shares, and about $210 million respectively. X Partners kept 38% of Refco after the 
offering. Almost two months later, Refco‘s announcements of the CEO‘s possible 
wrongdoings caused the company to collapse. The largest independent financial futures 
brokerage company in the world had collapsed. News of the collapse was on every major 
TV channel and all major newspapers including the Times, BBC, CNN and FT.  
 
In October 2005, the regulated core business of Refco was split into two. An American 
hedge fund bought the American entity and an English hedge fund bought the remaining 
European parts of Refco.  The name Refco no longer exists; it disappeared like a ghost. 
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Instead, Marex Financial Ltd. was created at the end of 2005 and commenced trading on 
26
th
 January 2006. Marex was formed following the acquisition of Refco Overseas Limited 
by Marathon Asset Management. Marathon also acquired the assets of Refco Trading 
Services (RTS) and EasyScreen. EasyScreen provided integrated electronic trading systems 
used by traders to connect to worldwide financial exchanges. The CEO stated: 
―We are delighted to announce the launch of Marex Financial. This is the start of a 
new independent brokerage company that will allow us to provide our clients with 
value-added services. Marex Financial is well capitalised and the company‘s 
experienced team commences business with the infrastructure, technology, and 
financial controls associated with the best firms in our industry. We are grateful for 
the widespread support we have received from our clients throughout Europe and 
our peers in London as we look forward to building upon this solid foundation‖ 
(CEO Marex Financial Ltd., 26
th
 January 2006). 
 
Marex offers execution and clearing services in metals, energy, agriculture, interest rates, 
equity indices, stock options, foreign exchange and fixed income. It was capitalised with 
£100 million from its sole shareholder Marathon Asset Management LLC (―Marathon‖). 
Marathon is a New York based alternative investment and asset management company with 
over $5 billion in capital and approximately $11billion in assets under management. Marex 
provides global clearing services across all major exchanges. It has memberships of the 
following exchanges: London Metal Exchange, Euronext Liffe, ICE Futures, EDX, Eurex, 
IDEM, MEFF and SAFEX. 
 
The change of senior management at Marex continued in 2009. On December 10
th 
2010, 
JRJ Group, the London-based investment firm announced that it had reached agreement to 
acquire a majority stake in Marex Group Ltd. Europe‘s leading independent futures broker. 
Marathon Asset Management, the current majority shareholder, retains a minority stake in 
the business.  
 
JRJ, said:  
―Marex is already a leader in a dynamic, growing market and is run by a great 
management team. We‘re delighted to partner with this excellent company‖ (10th 
December 2010). 
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JRJ, which is regulated by the FSA, is a specialist investment firm established in January 
2009 focuses exclusively on the financial services sector, providing capital, operational 
expertise and strategic guidance to enhance the value of its investments. Samsung Futures 
Inc. reported that it established a platform enabling individual and corporate clients to trade 
LME metal products on line via Home Trading System (HTS) for the first time in Korea. 
The on-line trading platform is an in-house system developed by connecting its HTS with 
the electronic trading system, E Trader, of Marex Financial Ltd (Marex), which is Samsung 
Futures‘ LME clearing broker and business partner based in London.  
 
Marex announced in January 2011: 
―After many years of hard and successful work, the CEO will be leaving Marex. He 
has been instrumental in the firm‘s growth and development, after its spin-off from 
Refco, through its ownership by Marathon and its sale to JRJ‖ 
(www.marexfinancial.com, January 2011). 
 
5.3 Products and Services  
 
Refco offered their clients exchange listed derivatives. Retail and institutional clients were 
looking for a service, namely execution and clearing services, which Refco could provide. 
Refco was an industry leader in execution and clearing services for global exchange traded 
derivatives in electronic and open outcry markets including: listed futures and options on 
metals (precious and non-precious), energy, agricultural, financial, equity and also OTC 
derivatives. These products are all well known in the financial services industry. Refco 
provided banks and hedge funds with execution and trading services via strategically 
located execution desks, electronic trading (Direct Market Access (DMA), research, 
clearing facilities management, risk management, account management and, to a certain 
degree, IS services. Refco‘s diverse and global client base was comprised of institutional 
clients, corporate clients, private clients, government agencies, hedge funds, managed 
futures and pension funds. Refco offered clients access to various exchanges; its global 
access to financial futures and options markets throughout the world included membership 
of the following exchanges: 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
 106 
Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) 
COMEX 
EUREX 
Euronext Amsterdam (AEX) 
Euronext Brussels (BELFOX) 
Euronext LIFFE (London International Financial 
Futures and Options Exchange) 
Euronext Paris (MATIF and MONEP) 
Helsinki Exchange (HEX) 
Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) 
International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) 
Borsa Italiana Group (IDEM) 
Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT) 
Korea Stock Exchange 
Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange 
Kuala Lumpur Options & Financial Futures Exchange 
Berhad (KLOFFE) 
London Metal Exchange (LME) 
MEFF (RV and RF) 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) 
OM London Exchange (OMLX) 
Singapore Exchange (SGX) 
Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange (TIFFE) 
 
Refco made sporadic investments in information systems after 1988. General basic 
accounting applications were the first areas of investment for the then small company. As 
the years passed, more basic IT services needed to be supported by information systems 
investment.  
In particular, during the period from 1991 to 2003, a very rapid growth and expansion of 
the company occurred. Refco‘s client base and trading volume increased dramatically. In 
the fiscal year of 2004/2005, which ended at the end of March, Refco became the world‘s 
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largest independent Futures Clearing Member (FCM), mainly due to acquisitions and 
aggressive pricing, beating most competitors. More and more clients asked for access to 
various exchanges, executing via algorithmic trading machines. An information system 
processing department and a more globally focused back-office was established in order to 
process the exploding order flows. Generally, during the early years in the eighties, the 
order flow processing was conducted mostly manually via the back-office clerks in the 
different time zones: New York, Chicago, London and Singapore. Other offices, such as 
Paris and Frankfurt handled client order flows either via London or through the other main 
time zone head offices in order to be processed during the day. Senior management 
established back-offices in the main time zones, which can be seen as a sort of 
‗centralisation‘. Since client complaints of miss-bookings rose from year to year, the 
management was forced to invest more in IS, mainly related to back-office and accounting.  
 
It was obvious that the increase in client complaints, such as booking mistakes or missing 
bookings, threatened Refco‘s reputation. During the final years, more and more hedge fund 
start-ups and also established hedge funds became clients of Refco. Later, the number of 
hedge funds rose to ten thousand during the peak of 2007. The aim of hedge funds is to 
invest client money in a way that the return on investment outpaces traditional asset 
managers and traditional investment. In particular, Alternative Investment (AI) hedge funds 
often used short-term investment approaches that required different services from Refco. 
For example, one AI hedge fund was a so-called trend follower and had an investment style 
based on daily market volatility, in other words algorithmic. If the market became more 
volatile, the number of transactions rose.  
 
During higher market volatility and increased market uncertainty the increased number of 
transactions needs to be booked quickly via a central counter party in order to reflect the 
straight-through processing. Also, orders taken from clients need to be recorded properly. 
According to FSA Policy Statement 08/1, telephone recording, recording of voice 
conversations and electronic communications have to be managed by certain rules (FSA, 
March 2008). FSA introduced new rules requiring certain firms to record and retain 
telephone conversations and other electronic communications linked to taking client orders 
and dealing in financial instruments for a period of six months. FSA wanted to become 
more efficient and detect more market abuses in the UK. FSA can ask firms ‗in certain 
cases to retain, for longer than six months, recordings that might be useful as evidence‘. 
Records of phone conversations and electronic communications can help to understand 
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each individual case. The FSA markets division has the authority to contact a firm and to 
ask for telephone or electronic communication records. This may follow the receipt of a 
suspicious transaction report (STR), or follow from notification by an exchange. In the FSA 
June 2008 ‗market watch‘ issue no. 28 it was highlighted that 
―[…] records of phone conversations and electronic communications can play an 
important role in investigations of market abuse by providing context and helping 
to establish the facts. Taped records can provide evidence of knowledge and intent 
– crucial elements in building an enforcement case but not always easy elements to 
establish‖ (FSA market watch, issue no. 28, June 2008, p. 1). 
 
5.4 Clearing Transactions 
 
In 2004, Refco processed and cleared more than four hundred and fifty million futures 
contracts in one year. Refco employed only a few data processing people who had 
experience in the new areas of information systems. The rest of the back-office employees 
were young clerks with just minor experience in listed derivatives. Many of the young 
clerks interviewed did not know the products they cleared and inputted manually. Certain 
IT people worked in the same company for many years, which was not helpful in terms of 
knowledge transfer. Generally, it is assumed that people working for various organisations 
gain more skills and transfer these skills to the new employer when they change 
organisations. Internal or external training can improve the skill set as well. No regular 
training occurred in the company.  
 
It became clear that, due to the massive increase of data processing, the way the data used 
to be processed had to be improved and updated. In particular, the data processing centre in 
U.S.A. became more and more vulnerable, since IT investment was minimal. The last IT 
investment had been some years ago and the staff interviewed would not reveal the amount 
invested.  
 
Pressure rose to hire new people and increases in staff levels and new computer equipment 
expenditures occurred. New hires also dramatically increased information systems costs 
though.  IT expense levels grew to 30 Million USD from 1991 to 2003, according to a 
senior IT manager. Still, compared to investment in IS/IT by the banks, Refco‘s investment 
was much lower. It seemed that the company was financially unable to invest in IT, even if 
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they had wanted to. Due to the company‘s low level of own equity it was not possible to 
invest larger amounts in IS.  
 
Management concern about the increasing costs was manifested in increasing control over 
information systems expense through the establishment and operation of a management 
steering committee. The management in the global headquarters in New York dominated 
this committee. In 2004, a few external consultants were engaged to review information 
systems activities and to advise the management about information systems control 
processes. The external consultant recommended stronger ―user‖ participation in planning 
information systems expenditures and in project systems development activities. The 
consultant recommended a feasibility study with an emphasis on user determination of the 
benefits of information systems investments. The external consultants had been asked to do 
the job in a short period of time but it appeared that the findings of their initial research was 
never discussed or analysed by the senior management. In other words, the management 
continued as normal and did not refer to the recommendations of the consultants.  
 
The consultant‘s recommendations were not taken on board, apparently due to lack of 
money. From the interviews, it was widely believed that the responsible people within the 
organisation always felt under pressure to make money. It was not easy to explain that a 
large part of the net income should be re-invested in information systems. A legal 
framework or pressure from regulators did not exist at that time; there was much less 
oversight by regulators compared to 2011. 
 
By the end of 2004, very simple procedures for implementing and developing systems had 
been established. These procedures included various written and verbal evaluation 
procedures. They were dominated by the simple expression ―how much money is the 
company going to make if we decide to increase IT investment expenditure‖. 
 
Managers were participating in the definition of business objectives. The organisation was 
learning how to calculate the financial benefit of achieving their objectives. The 
management involved continued to express concern about the size of the information 
systems expense. Most managers asked, ―What is the value of our investment in 
information systems?‖ Exchanges upgraded their infrastructure regularly to improve the 
way clients were connected. This was the beginning of fierce competition between 
exchanges for business. Every year, Eurex introduced software releases in November to 
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improve processing speed for customers. It changed the way in which it handled messages 
pertaining to order book activity that were sent to members. Messages relating to non-
persisting orders and quotes became faster compared to persistent orders. Various 
exchanges continued offering clients the choice of which order type they preferred to 
prioritise in terms of speed or reliability. The way clients were linked to the exchange via 
Refco or any other clearing house determined how fast orders were submitted and 
executed. In the world of algorithmic trading, a financial services firm needed fast 
connections to exchanges, otherwise it would be out of business. Such clients required a 
particular IS infrastructure.  Some interviewees believed that algorithmic trading companies 
comprised more than 30% of the exchange volumes.    
 
5.4.1 Accounting Methods and Transaction Reporting Failures 
 
Schedules of investments and benefits by objective were developed to track the flow of 
value in each month. Generally, discounted values were used. When I started the interview 
procedure, the accounting people in London did not calculate the daily income for the 
European subsidies. They calculated and collected all income during each month and 
compared the overall expenditure against it for each department or subsidiary. Invoices 
such as utility bills for external data suppliers were booked during the first week of each 
month. Therefore, it was not possible to have an exact figure in terms of net income before 
the second or generally the beginning of the third week of each month. Also, other 
subsidiaries, such as Refco Chicago or Refco New York, charged other offices, such as the 
German branch, indirectly via the London office. The London office then charged service 
costs to the German branch. Also some other costs such as account opening documentation 
work were charged as ‗other overhead costs‘. These other overhead costs were not 
transparent and used to differ from month to month.  
 
During the year 2003/2004, the London head office implemented a more accurate 
calculation methodology in order to evaluate the daily P&L. This daily P&L was calculated 
on a simple statistical method, based on the last month‘s net income. The accounting 
department took the accumulated previous month‘s commission income and divided this by 
the previous month‘s total expenditure. This figure can be illustrated as following. If the 
total net monthly commission was USD 1 Million and the total expenditure was USD 
800.000, then the net income ratio for the previous month would have been 80%. Based on 
this ratio the accounting people calculated the current daily gross commission income and 
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compared the previous total expenditure, namely USD 800.000 divided by twenty business 
days. The daily total expenditure was then USD 40.000. This daily expenditure figure was 
used for upcoming months until it needed to be adjusted due to changed costs in the 
following quarter. In other words, if on a typical Monday the real actual gross commission 
income was USD 10.000, - then on that specific day the relevant department would have 
lost USD 30.000, - due to the average daily cost of USD 40.000. At the beginning of the 
month these gross daily income figures were adjusted and subtracted by the total month to 
date (MTD) commission expenditure. The advantage of this method was that the 
management had a clear idea of the daily fixed costs, so that certain pressure existed due to 
the fact that everybody knew how much money needed to be earned on a daily basis in 
order to cover at least the costs. This methodology was not adjusted for bank holidays. 
 
This meant that, if the management decided to invest USD 200.000 in IT today, the daily 
average office costs would have increased substantially in the upcoming months. Even if 
the following month showed a ten per cent net client commission income increase to USD 
1.1 Million the overall net performance would have decreased to a daily gross income of 
USD 5.000, - instead of daily income of USD 10.000. That shows the return on investment 
would have decreased by 50% due to the additional IT investment in the following months 
and gradually neutralised in the upcoming months. It was not difficult to imagine that the 
local management hesitated to invest in IT or other related areas, which in turn influenced 
the client services and other required basic services such as providing transaction data to 
regulators such as FSA, Bafin or CFTC.  
 
Information systems investment at Refco between January 1
st
 2003 and December 31
st
 
2006 aimed to enable the company to cope with the growing demand for electronic access 
to various electronic exchanges and at the same time also make a net profit. Refco did not 
establish a performance standard for attaining objectives. For example, the company 
expected to achieve a high percentage of the high priority objectives, although no official 
framework or evaluation methodology existed. 
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5.4.2 The Role of Back-Office Employees 
 
The middle managers believed that no standard IS investment evaluation methods were in 
place. Generally, they said that they did not know any IS investment method used in the 
industry. Middle managers were the link between various front offices and back offices. 
They tried to filter important activities in order to channel to the right persons or 
departments and find ways to process orders or process missing executed orders. They 
aimed to support various departments and at the same time communicate between front 
office and back-office. Generally, the back-office was on a different floor or in a different 
part of the building. Questions from a back-office clerk regarding specific trades, which 
needed to be processed, would be followed up by the middle manager.  
 
As an example, a sell of 10 March Oil futures at market price was executed. The related 
client was a hedge fund with the account number 45671. The back-office clerk was not able 
to process the trade because the original order had a different sell order execution place at 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) instead of IPE. The trader who took the order 
from the client needed to write on the trade confirmation the exchange‘s name and product 
code as well. He forgot to mention the exchange NYMEX and the order was placed at 9:14 
am London time. Orders received in the morning were generally executed at the exchange 
(IPE) unless the client mentioned otherwise, as he did in this case. Oil can be traded on 
NYMEX or via the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). If the trader had written 
CLH11 as a product code then the clerk would have known that the product code CL stands 
for Crude Oil, listed on NYMEX, H stands for the month March and 11 for the year 2011. 
Due to the lack of IT investment the firm had to take many orders via phone instead of 
electronically. The way orders were executed and processed, namely manually, increased 
the miss-trade rate enormously. Various people interviewed in separate banks mentioned 
that such error rates cost companies millions of dollars annually.     
 
The typical back-office role was to process client data in order for the clients to receive all 
necessary information. At the same time, the back-office‘s role was to select and process 
certain information that would then be used for internal evaluation criteria. These internal 
evaluation criteria incorporated the following subjects: frequency of conducted trades, 
number of contracts a client trades per day, size of the traded contracts and type of contract. 
Another important aspect was whether clients exclusively traded and cleared within the 
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firm or whether the client used a different clearing member. All the above-mentioned 
criteria influenced a client‘s risk profile.  
 
In order to gather and analyse the data within a short period of time, the electronic trading 
system needed to be connected to the back-office. This happened via multiple internal 
servers. Some of these servers delivering the information were located in cities around the 
world. The client interlinked particular servers with the London and U.S. office in order to 
process all conducted activities. For example, if the client conducted a trade on the Mini-
S&P futures contract via the electronic trading system in London, the trade would then be 
processed in the US. Overnight, the information would be processed and would be 
available in London for the back-office. Certain in-house staff, such as the E-support team 
could constantly watch and monitor the clients‘ conducted trades simultaneously.  
 
Peter (not his real name) was a 42 year-old back-office employee interviewed, who was 
working in London and was experienced in back-office as well as front office trading. He 
used to work for a large organisation prior to being approached by Refco. His role at Refco 
was to improve the organisation of the back-office, which he‘d recently reorganised in 
order to make it more efficient and effective. 
 
When asked to describe his day-to-day work activities, he responded:  
My job is to make sure that all conducted orders and trades are booked and 
reported in the most efficient way. I am also trying to reduce the error rate in terms 
of processing trades as well as the required time to process trades. We need to 
process trades fast and correctly. I have to ensure that all conducted trades are 
processed as soon as possible. According to the exchange rules and according to 
the clients‟ account documents, which have to be signed by each individual client, 
we have to make sure that the processed client data is accurate.  
 
The client on the other hand has the obligation to check his or her statements every 
morning and let us know whether specific information on his/her statements is 
incorrect or missing. The client has the obligation to report the possible mistakes 
on the statement within twenty-four hours, after trades have been conducted. Our 
company also checks the client‟s statements on a daily basis, but due to the nature 
of the business, lack of time and human resources, we often are not able to find 
possible miss-bookings. Fortunately, our clients tend to check their statements 
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regularly. Though, some clients do not call or send us an e-mail in order to 
complain about incorrect statements. If we have accidentally booked a trade in 
favour of the client, most clients wouldn‟t complain, because it could mean a profit. 
We process millions of contracts every month and are simply not able to do this 
without a certain error rate. 
 
When asked about the usual miss-booking rate, he replied:  
There is no clear answer to that. We do not have an official figure or conducted a 
statistical research in term of evaluation yet. Although, in order to give an 
indication it needs to be highlighted that the booking error rate is much higher in 
the US markets. Various US markets are still based on open-outcry markets and 
therefore bookings are input manually. The use of technology is still limited in the 
US and has only caught up in recent years, compared to many years of electronic 
processing experience here in Europe. 
 
He stressed the importance of collaboration among the other project members. In his 
opinion, an organisational structure involving a number of projects could help to achieve 
his goal, namely optimising internal structures in terms of processing the flow of data. In 
the interview, he noted how difficult it was to keep members‘ motivation and productivity 
up and to maintain organisational unity. He argued that professional services rested heavily 
upon each professional worker‘s experience and skills, but also in particular on IT services.  
 
When asked whether he was also responsible for integrating various electronic trading 
systems into the back-office infrastructure, he responded: 
Yes and no. Many systems, which need to be integrated, are sometimes very 
complex IT integration projects. Since I am „only‟ the project manager, I have to 
rely on our IT staff. Our IT staff are not programmers though. What we normally do 
is to ask the relevant vendors to program the system in a way so that it fits in our 
system. Sometimes, these people spend weeks and months either in our office or in 
their offices in order to achieve this. Certainly, the external programmer needs to 
know our internal system before we are able to go ahead. This can be very time-
consuming. Generally, we tend to use the same external people for various projects, 
in order to reduce our workload. 
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At the time, some employees, especially these based in Germany, believed that the CQG 
system was an ideal fit with the existing trading systems. Peter claimed he did not know the 
system very well. He believed that it would be a waste of time to enrol CQG, because it 
would be very time-consuming. In addition, he was unsure what senior management would 
think about it:  
At the end of the day, we will be asked how many clients are going to use CQG and 
how much money this system can contribute to our P&L. We also have to consider 
that the German office is relatively small and new and I am not sure whether we 
should support them more than necessary. 
 
Despite the view in the German office that this new trading platform could be a door-
opener to many new clients such as hedge funds who had been using CQG before, he was 
very sceptical:  
I doubt that many of our clients will use CQG. As mentioned, I don‟t believe that 
our management will massively support this idea. We also have never evaluated the 
idea integrating CQG because, if people come up with new ideas or project 
suggestions that would consume resources and money, we would rather reject them. 
We usually follow the management‟s instructions. 
 
When pressed about how this potential project could be enrolled or kick-started within 
Refco, he said: 
As you can imagine, the first step needs to be done in the form of discussions 
between several departments. For example, it would be helpful if certain members 
of staff, ideally some with higher influence, suggested that a number of potential 
clients or ideally existing larger clients would like to use CQG instead of the 
standard established electronic trading systems such as Patssystems, which we 
have been using for years. Alternatively, the IT or E-support staff could discuss this 
topic between various departments and offices until a common demand or 
awareness occurs. In other words, the idea must spread around for a while and be 
discussed further before we would move on to the next level and involve the senior 
management. Another approach could be made if the senior manager from CQG 
talked directly to our boss and informed him about this new project. Only at this 
stage, we would be able to evaluate these ideas in more detail. 
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Dan (not his real name), 39, had worked for the company for five years. He worked in a 
separate ‗risk office‘, together with five risk management colleagues. They worked 
independently of each other.  
 
He described their work as follows:  
Every morning, we look at the data in order to find out what different clients have 
traded on the previous day. Than we compare the open positions with the margin 
requirements from the exchanges. If a client has not the sufficient margin in his 
account, we immediately notify the responsible sales person. The sales person has 
to contact the client and ask him to close his positions or to transfer some 
additional money on his account, in relation to his margin requirement from the 
end of the previous business day. We do have some exceptions. If a larger and well-
established institutional client has not transferred the required margin, we do not 
worry much, even if the margin requirement is large, since it is unlikely that a client 
will go bankrupt. Technically this well-known institutional client has got no 
restrictions in terms of having large positions. Generally, we assume that these 
balance sheets or clients are sound. 
 
In accordance with his work, Dan sometimes had to travel to visit clients in various cities. 
It was the nature of his job that not all risk management investigations could be performed 
electronically or by telephone; some required face-to-face meetings with clients.  
 
5.4.3 IT Investment at Refco 
 
Refco had made investments in information systems since 1982. They purchased hardware 
and software from vendors such as IBM. General accounting applications were the first 
areas of investment in the 80s and 90s. As the years passed, more accounting needs were 
satisfied by information systems investment. Management control, timeliness of reports, 
accuracy of corporate records, and potential savings were reasons for the investments. 
Refco reflected the experience of many companies in these application investments. 
Business justification for the investments was not documented. During the period from 
1991 to 2005, a variety of events created rapid growth and expansion of the company, as 
mentioned above. Within a few years, Refco‘s sales increased dramatically due to the rapid 
growth of exchange-traded derivatives. 
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The monthly P&L report showed all associated costs for Refco. Refco‘s aim was to receive 
a return on its investment in information systems within a short period of time. Expected 
ratios of values to cost had to be achieved in a relatively short period, which generally did 
not exceed the one-year horizon. In other words, short-term return on investment was 
expected and had to be achieved, rather than a long-term approach. The main reason was 
that the management approving IT expenditure was under pressure to keep costs low, 
otherwise they would lose their jobs.  
 
Information systems investment became important to the management, due to external 
pressure from clients and regulators. In October 2004, one hedge fund wanted to close their 
account and move the business to a competitor due to either miss-bookings, lack of 
reporting to the regulator or even occasionally missing trades. Companies such as the 
examples mentioned by the FSA above had been forced to invest more in IT due to 
penalties. Consequently, authorisation was given for an expansion of the use of information 
systems. Only due to external pressure either from competitors, regulators or important 
institutional clients did IT investment occur. IT investment was not a proactive approach; it 
was a result of having no option as can be seen in the cases of Credit Suisse, Getco and 
Instinet.  
 
Refco‘s investments in IS investments were reported and monitored by the management on 
an ongoing basis. Consequently, all following periods were closely monitored and 
evaluated. Relating IS investments to the attainment of business objectives was an accepted 
approach. Problems occurred when the dollar benefits of the projects needed to be 
calculated, evaluated and justified. 
 
The managers understood that Refco‘s systems development evaluations were helpful to 
understand other related or unrelated intangible benefits and costs. Refco placed business 
objectives in the early stages of project definition.  Objectives were reviewed during the 
system implementation. Refco established a performance measurement framework, which 
was vague and general in nature though and performance measurement concepts contained 
in reports were not followed up. 
 
Refco‘s return on investment was the basis for the investment value evaluation report. The 
people involved realised that it was difficult to calculate accurately. Objectives were set up 
from a financial point of view. During various brainstorming exercises it was recognised 
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that no other evaluation methods existed. Only Return on Investment methods were 
commonly used. One manager felt that Refco should invest in basic research in the use of 
information systems. However, this did not happen.  
 
5.4.4 Investment Value and Cost Evaluation at Refco 
 
It was difficult to predict the dollar cost of an investment in information systems and the 
value of the objectives that were attained. A useful report was a summary of prior periods, 
monthly and present period. The organisation of objectives into priorities was also useful. 
The percentage return on the investment was shown by the ratio of values to costs. This 
ratio was used to evaluate the merits of new projects or to evaluate a long period of 
investment in the field. This had a lot in common with return on investment evaluation. The 
expected ratio for investment was compared with the actual ratio. This value was 
established by management and used in the investment evaluation process. A proposed 
introduction of performance standards aimed to measure performance of the information 
systems activity. Such reports could be used to evaluate the level of current investments 
and the return on those investments. Various benefits of information systems investments 
fell into the group of intangible benefits. This category of evaluation was used when 
improvements or changes did not have clear tangible benefits.  
 
As mentioned, the process of determining a dollar value in this category was very difficult. 
Evaluation methods such as replacement costs and performance measurement represented 
simple ways to evaluate. The value of the implemented information system against the 
alternative to replace the current information system was discussed as well. Was the 
internal and external user able to use the data could also be seen as an evaluation method. 
The business objectives of information systems needed to be clearly identified. Within 
senior people, it seemed that different business objectives existed. The lack of common 
business objectives led to the inability of choosing the right information system.  
 
As an example, we can use two electronic trading systems. The first one, called Refco 
Express, was designed in particular for small retail clients. The other was called J-Trader 
(Patssystems), which was designed for institutional clients. Choose to promote and build a 
retail client business platform, one would have to cope with thousands of small clients 
paying a very small fee and consuming a lot of time and corporate resources.  
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The assignment of costs to objectives was subjective. It was difficult to allocate costs of 
systems development and computer operations to general business objectives. An 
information system was implemented to assist in reducing costs. A starting date for 
historical accumulation of data had to be selected. Refco‘s information system history 
showed collecting historical data was selected as the starting point. Costs and benefits were 
evaluated from that point. Previous investments have not been included in this research 
generally. However, they cannot be ignored. Refco invested in various business projects but 
had not established a performance standard for attaining objectives. Expected ratio values 
were calculated from actual input from the operation of the information systems.  
 
5.4.5 Refco Report Format  
 
The concept of relating information systems investments to the attainment of business 
objectives was readily accepted as an appropriate process. One of the core problems 
managers had was calculating the dollar benefit of the objectives. The format of the 
objectives attained evaluation report was helpful in order to keep the manager‘s attention 
focused on the attainment concept. Measuring performance was crucial through the use of 
information systems. Managers found that measuring performance, as a function of time 
was helpful in understanding the report. The managers recognised that time dependencies 
were the reality and therefore the time dependencies were mentioned in the reports. The 
first display of time was the day-to-day comparison. The day-to-day report or display was 
based on the previous day‘s activities. The involved managers were generally interested in 
the day-to-day report, even if they received a monthly report at the end of the first week of 
every upcoming month. 
  
The second display of time was in measuring performance in achieving business objectives 
that were scheduled for attainment in the current and past period. Some managers did have 
clear objectives, but had not been able to measure those other than in real currency terms. 
Information systems staff had only been involved during the implementation and, after the 
IS was established, only in case of troubleshooting.  
 
Refco‘s systems were generally from external independent providers and their standards 
required that business objectives be set in the early stages of project definition. Managers 
wanted objectives to be clearly stated. Objectives were needed so that evaluation and 
measurement could be accomplished. Managers discussed the subject of how to state an 
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appropriate number of objectives. Refco‘s European arm established a performance 
measurement programme for management control during 2002/2003. Returns on 
investment concepts seemed to be the basis for the investment value evaluation report. 
These concepts were related by the managers to the return on investment procedures used 
by Refco in evaluating capital investments.  
 
Managers expressed increased interest in the information system investment. They agreed 
that the objectives should be evaluated from a financial point of view. The assignment of 
dollar value was the responsibility of the person requesting the information systems 
expenditure, controlling it with a ―cap‖. However, this internal expenditure cap was set at a 
very low level. Very useful was the display of investment in ―non-profit‖ activities. Only 
one manager felt that FSF should invest in basic research in the use of information systems. 
The feedback regarding the objectives attained values was positive. Translating the 
business activity into business objectives was a little more common than the other way 
round. Some people said that the common values confirmed their impression that 
information systems were important contributors to the expected objectives.  
 
5.4.6 Case Study-The Early Days of High Frequency Algorithmic 
Trading  
 
The following project has been selected in order to highlight the importance of electronic 
trading systems in regards to connecting clients to various exchanges. Clients opened 
accounts with Refco because they wanted access to various exchanges such as Eurex, 
NYMEX, CME, CBOT, and EuronextLiffe. In order to enable Refco‘s clients to conduct 
buy and sell orders through the main derivatives exchanges it was essential that the best 
electronic trading systems were chosen and implemented. If the client were not able to get 
an easy, reliable and cheap access to these exchanges then Refco would not survive. In 
short, clients needed to trade fast and cheaply. 
 
To satisfy customer demand, Refco needed to provide various trading systems, with 
different strengths and weaknesses. This project is particularly interesting, as it shows the 
necessity to combine different systems in order to allow customers to have access to the 
trading screens. The back-office played an important role, since the entire client activities 
had to be processed, either automatically or often manually. The manual work error rate 
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was generally higher. Various systems in different locations had to be integrated and the 
data had to be properly processed in the back-office. It was also important for the project 
that more and more traditional open-outcry exchanges were transforming themselves into 
electronic exchanges, which led to pressure on Refco. The exchange transformations meant 
that Refco could not process the entire chain starting from taking the orders and placing 
them in the pits to clearing manually anymore. Gradually, the pits or floor trading 
disappeared. The nature of electronic exchanges is that certain processes and clearing occur 
electronically. We also witnessed exploding exchange traded derivatives due to the 
electronic exchanges. Companies such as Refco needed to increase process capacity in the 
back-office substantially such as increasing the number of servers able to process the 
increased business.  
 
Refco‟s business strategy comprised: 
Front end trading systems such as Pats Systems, TT and CQG: In line with the core 
objective of a high operating efficiency and non-proprietary trading business model, Refco 
had embraced and driven new trading technology: 
 Providing access to multiple platforms and offerings and let the client decide which 
ones suited their trading preferences. 
 Proactively driving this process into the market place. 
 Driving Application Programming Interface (API) integration and working with 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for the clients‘ benefit. 
 
However, the implications for the back-office, including the IT infrastructure, were not 
properly thought through. The IT infrastructure, aiming for full straight-through processing, 
web access to accounts and risk management services would be as follows: 
 
 
 Managers Own 
systems  
 SP direct order 
upload to 
Platform 
 
 
Trade 
recap 
Back office main 
server 
Web access 
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5.4.6 Risk Management Aspects 
 
Dan, employed as head of risk management, had been involved in many of the company‘s 
projects. He used to work in an unrelated department and had just recently moved to the 
risk department. As head of the risk department he worked together with five employees. 
His job was to collaborate with numerous sales people including these who worked for 
other subsidiaries in Europe. One of his principal day-to-day activities was to ‗watch‘ 
clients. He needed to be informed about clients‘ trading activities.   
 
At the time, many people, especially in their 30s and 40s, had experienced redundancies or 
decided to leave their financial institution. Faced with unemployment, many decided to 
become independent and self-employed. With few exceptions, these people had been 
accepted as self-employed clients by Refco, who worked from their homes or for small 
‗trading arcades‘.  
 
Dan described the motivation to work in the risk department as follows:  
Constantly handling different clients‟ behaviour in terms of risk from Refco‟s point 
of view is interesting. My personal experience shows that most clients prefer using 
electronic trading systems rather than the phone in order to conduct trades. Most of 
them try to trade as much as possible in order to make as much money as possible. 
Often, they try to breach the position limits we have previously agreed and set up.  
In general, position limits are set up in correlation to the margin requirements from 
the exchange and the available deposit. Retail clients in particular have to transfer 
a certain amount of money to our corresponding bank before we calculate the daily 
intra-day and overnight limits. Position limits are expressed in the amount of 
contracts this client can keep. Within these limits the clients can trade as much as 
he/she wants.  
 
The dilemma we face on a daily basis is that the client having access to our 
electronic trading system or via phone, can breach these limits persistently, since 
we are not able to fully control his activities. For example one constantly active 
retail client has got four FDAX overnight contract limits and eight intraday 
contract limits. With our existing electronic trading systems we are not able to stop 
this client breaching the limits. The professional automated trading systems (e.g. 
Patsystem) are not able to stop this client from keeping/holding eight contracts 
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overnight instead of the allowed four contracts, approved by Refco. The reason for 
that is our not sufficiently updated internal IT infrastructure. 
 
Dan also pointed to the risk that retail clients could have problems transferring additional 
cash following the margin requirements on the next day. The company decided to develop 
an in-house trading system, which was able to monitor the risk, the so-called ‗risk based 
margining‘. Here, clients could trade as often and as much as he/she wanted, depending on 
the clients‘ collateral. 
 
This IS project lasted for two years. The aim was to roll out everywhere in the world in due 
course. Due to the complexity of this IT project and the global scale, many other 
departments such as risk management, compliance and marketing from the London and 
New York offices had to be involved.  
 
Dan‘s concerns in terms of business processes were that, in a competitive environment like 
this, they had to be profit seeking and risk averse at the same time. They also had to work 
as efficiently as possible in a limited period of time. The market or contracts could move so 
fast and within a very short period a client could lose a lot of money. 
 
Dan had concerns about this project: 
I have not been very satisfied, knowing that the project started in the U.S. and we 
have not been much involved so far. Here in Europe we are going to start getting 
more involved with this project soon and it will consume many months to test the 
system before we can finally implement it. Meanwhile, I have to tell our clients and 
sales people that we are not able to automate the risk control. At the same time we 
have to look at clients‟ needs and expectations on a case-by-case basis. I felt like 
being involved in internal politics rather than solving the client‟s problems. Our 
company does not allow me to speed up the process, because implementing new 
processes would consume a lot of money. I have to be careful since I do not want to 
annoy certain colleagues in the New York head office. They will give me a hard 
time if I am suggesting different business processes too aggressively.  
 
Clearly, Dan and his risk management colleagues were struggling. 
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5.4.7 Evaluation of Electronic Trading Systems  
 
Dan regarded himself as being ahead of the current organisational changes, which he saw 
as too slow in terms of implementing suitable and up-to-date technology. He received calls 
from various clients demanding a more sophisticated electronic trading system. He found 
himself squeezed between the clients and internal management: 
As I mentioned, working in this company puts a lot of restrictions on your daily 
work. Take the example of a specific client: in a firm, you need to have a 
confirmation from your boss that you can loosen the internal rules in terms of 
potential risk. It is time consuming and your boss will ask you what the current 
standard internal rules are and the effects the changes may cause. He will also ask 
you about the client‟s importance and for more background information about the 
client. Generally, he would rather orient himself to the proven internal rules rather 
than accepting new loosened or different rules. 
 
Dan found the degree of flexibility in his work activities was restricted. In such a work 
environment, inflexibility hindered the daily work activities and hence the business as a 
whole. His experience showed that the important client will move on to a different firm in 
due course if a certain degree of flexibility is not shown. It frustrated him that larger clients 
would get almost everything approved and the question of internal corporate risk standards 
would be avoided. 
 
Dan saw the importance of being flexible and adaptable to the clients‘ needs:  
Several clients are very skilled nowadays. Some clients used to work for banks or 
other organisations and therefore have gained some education and have sometimes 
incredible skills. They keep asking for an electronic trading system being capable of 
providing multi-products at the same time. They want a system that matches and 
calculates the entire client positions. As an example, one large client wants to trade 
futures and options electronically. Both futures and options long and short 
positions should be matched against each other in order to reduce the amount of 
money used as margin. Instead, Refco asks the customer to open two separate 
accounts, one for the electronic futures trading system and one sub-account used 
for options trading conducted via the phone.  
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Often we reject the client‟s demand to conduct trades solely via the electronic 
trading platform. The risk department seems unable to monitor the option trades. 
Although, this does not make any sense and I believe that the risk for Refco can be 
reduced, if we enable the customer to conduct all his/her trades via the electronic 
trading platform. Now, quite frankly, I think the technology can enable us to offer 
the clients what they want. For me, it seems that certain people within our 
organisation are simply incapable of evaluating this matter properly. I also believe 
that a certain resistance to technology implementation and investment occurs due 
to the fact that some employees are afraid of losing their job. Instead of being 
proactive, they rather reject the clients‟ needs and therefore risk losing several 
clients. 
 
5.4.8 Technology-Network Access to Exchange Applications 
 
Dan stressed how using IT helped his daily work. The computer had become essential to 
his work: writing reports, emailing, storing data, etc. These day-to-day activities helped to 
evaluate the clients‘ activities. He was not particularly advanced in terms of technology 
adoption in work activities. He would rather not be too dependent on technology, since his 
IT skills were limited and regular training was too time consuming and expensive. The 
company had no specific training budget. Therefore he had to ask his boss for approval, 
something he considered as inefficient. Dan explained he planned to buy a PC for his 
private use and hoped it would improve his PC skills. At work he had to ask the IT 
helpdesk on an almost daily basis to help him with a hardware or software problem. He 
gathered the IT skills he gained so far through learning by doing and on a trial and error 
basis.  
 
Refco connected clients to various exchanges including Eurex, which allowed members to 
connect to the exchange system via the Member Integration System Server (MISS). A 
multi-member installation allowed a centralised hardware operation and maintenance and 
could reduce the infrastructure costs of the members. The provider of a multi-member 
front-end installation had to ensure that mutual data privacy for the members sharing the 
multi-member installation was guaranteed. A member must not be able to access another 
member‘s private data such as position reports and trade confirmations. Eurex offered 
members a connection portfolio for the Enhanced Broadcast Solution comprising of 10, 20, 
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30 and 50 Mbit/s connections. This enabled members to select the appropriate bandwidth 
tailored to their individual business requirements.  
 
Refco‘s network administration and responsibilities: The exchange was responsible for the 
administration and operation of the network from the back-end up to the boundary of the 
carrier demarcation point at the member‘s site. The administration and operation of 
equipment beyond the connection to the Exchanges such as routers, MISSes, workstations 
and other members devices at the member‘s site were the responsibility of the member. 
Refco needed to buy the hardware, software and also needed to be capable to install and 
cope with any new software releases. Exchanges constantly improved their technical 
offering. As an example, Eurex continued to invest in its trading system in order to reduce 
the processing time of technical transactions. At the same time, Refco‘s and also the 
exchange‘s daily load on the system had grown massively over the years. 
 
According to Dan, the level of IT investment has a major impact on Refco‘s operations, IT 
and risk management. There was a need to invest in IT because: 
 Speed was so important to achieve low latency 
 Risk needed to be evaluated in the context of algorithmic trading 
 
5.5 Development of Algorithmic Trading   
 
Algorithmic trading is redefining system boundaries including higher data transmission 
speed. One investment bank has stated that every millisecond lost results in $100m per 
annum in lost opportunity. Milliseconds seem to be crucial; latency will affect its 
competitive advantage in the marketplace. Brokers are using models for analysing market 
data for subsequent trade execution. Also hedge funds with focus on algorithmic trading 
push the market to invest in technology and try obtaining comprehensive market 
information faster such as order book and execution data. The aim is to monitor market 
movements faster and delete or change orders before others can match them in the market 
space. Data signals will be transmitted at speed of light soon. The main causes of latency in 
networks are propagation delay: time for a certain amount of bytes to be transferred over a 
medium, depending on the physical distance. Serialization delay is the time a unit of data 
(e.g. packet) requires to be serialised for transmission on a narrow channel. It depends on 
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the chosen bandwidth. The figures below demonstrate the sort of delays occasioned by 
propagation, serialization and queuing. 
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Due to growing algorithmic trading, the volume of market activity is rising from year to 
year (Futures Industry, 2010; Hall, 2010; West, 2010). The transaction load and sync time 
development on Deutsche Börse/Xetra can be seen on the diagram below: 
 
 
 
The risk related to algorithmic trading is that human beings constantly need to adjust or 
change the algorithm. An algorithm working today can be useless in six months‘ time. Pre-
trade risk functionalities empower members to proactively manage their risks in terms of 
order size; order frequency; maximum order quantity; order limits per time interval. The 
following kinds of order types are handled in the matching engine (E=Eurex, X=Xetra): 
market orders (E/X), limit orders (E/X), stop orders (E/X), combination orders (E), one-
cancel-the-other (E), market-to-limit orders (X),iceberg orders (X), mid-point orders (X), 
immediate-or-cancel, ill-or-kill, good-for-day, good-till-date, good-till-cancelled. 
 
In the case of an outage of the backend computers, an automated failover takes place. The 
control over the affected order book will then be taken over by a different new ‗host‘. At 
the same time, all ‗persistent orders‘ will be transferred as well. ‗Non-persistent orders‘ will 
get lost. This will be signalled to the market via a dedicated broadcast message. Orders 
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marked as ‗persistent‘ will be stored on hard disk. It will consume additional round-trip 
time and will be recovered in case of failover. 
 
Orders marked ‗non-persistent‘ are only kept in ‗memory‘ and this important for algo-
traders. Recovery is not possible. Users will only be aware of a failover situation through 
an electronic message. Execution confirmations will be sent instantly after an order has 
been matched. This is a synchronous message which carries only minimal data and goes 
back straight to the user ID of origin. Trade confirmations will be communicated slightly 
later. These will carry all trade-relevant information and is an asynchronous message which 
will be broadcast in a specific data stream. Execution confirmations support fast round-
trips. Backlogs in matching should not occur at all. For efficient load-balancing order books 
are spread across multiple exchange backend hosts.  
 
Following diagrams 1, 2 and 3: Eurex Deutschland AG, Neue Börsenstrasse, Frankfurt. 
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5.5.1 Systems Integration into the Back-Office 
 
The second project concerns the integration of different electronic trading systems into the 
existing back-office. 
 
Electronic trading and back-office systems needed to be integrated into the in-house risk 
management system. The external vendor or systems supplier provided the systems‘ 
descriptions or manuals. A well-established company that had been offering online 
analytical tools and online research for years had developed one electronic trading system 
called CQG. According to CQG, the new expanded software provided extensive historical 
online data for charting and technical analysis. For people using the CQG platform, trade 
data was constantly accessible. CQG offered the following online historical data: Intraday 
historical bar charts, long term historical bar charts, tick charts and volume charts, online 
trading system. 
 
CQG had been offering the above-mentioned services for many years. Customers were 
generally long term customers. During 2005, CQG decided to add and offer clients the new 
online trading facility, enabling them to analyse historical data and conduct trades via the 
same system. This new CQG software had been presented to some Refco offices during 
2005 but was rejected by some executives. The ones who knew the older version saw the 
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potential due to their experience and personal judgement. The German office members 
discussed the CQG software and all the new changes CQG could implement were 
highlighted. It was obvious to some people that this new electronic trading system could be 
distinguished from others in terms of: 
 Accessibility: some old and new clients were already using the old CQG version.  
 Price: the added trading function did not cost extra. 
It allowed customers to analyse their trades before they conducted them. The experienced 
people were aware that this combination could add value if implemented within Refco. 
CQG mentioned that they had also talked to Refco offices in France, the U.K. and the U.S. 
 
CQG also highlighted that new clients could get a 20% discount on the system, which costs 
USD 700 per month rental fee per customer, if they signed up via Refco‘s promotion or 
recommendation. The German office had several meetings with the vendor and wanted to 
support CQG as much as possible. In another meeting several weeks later, a senior CQG 
representative informed some Refco Germany employees, that they were the most 
interested and most supportive office members so far. He also mentioned that various 
executives in the European head office in London decided not to support offering the CQG 
software to clients. German office employees could not understand why this new software 
should not be promoted within the group. Nevertheless, Refco Germany still pushed the 
London head office to enrol and implement the software. However, this attempt failed in 
the end. 
 
5.5.2 Outsourcing Back Office and Trading System Upgrades 
 
Peter stated that firms often outsource electronic trading systems to independent vendors. In 
order to accomplish this task, companies have to efficiently coordinate the constantly 
changing system with the external vendors. There are three main reasons for outsourcing 
the electronic trading systems software: 
 Costs and budget 
 Employees‘ skills and knowledge and 
 Risk of failure  
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In terms of the evaluation of the offerings of independent external vendors, Peter said:  
In many areas it is difficult and sometimes controversial to evaluate certain aspects 
of IT investments. But in this case, it has been relatively easy and straightforward 
for various reasons. Certainly, the three earlier mentioned aspects (costs, skills and 
risk of failure) played a major role in this decision. It was easy for us to take 
external vendors services on board, since they already existed and had developed 
functional systems some time ago. About eight years ago, many smaller or more 
established vendors existed in this area. Due to a lot of competition some did merge 
or had been taken over.  
 
These vendors‟ core business is to develop and maintain the software constantly. 
We are simply afraid of ending up spending a lot of money and not being able to 
deliver. Even if we could do it today, we may not be able to continue to do so, due 
to fast technological changes and advances. We have seen so many financial 
services companies who spend a lot of money and time and finally failed to develop. 
Additionally, maintenance is very expensive, clients‟ needs change constantly and 
the software used today may be useless next year. Therefore, our strategy is to offer 
clients various electronic trading systems in order to give her/him freedom of 
choosing the right trading platform software. 
 
Peter saw few disadvantages in linking the back-office to external vendors‘ software.  
The external software has been developed in a way that enables different financial 
services companies to use it. This means that other competitors use or offer their 
clients the same software too. But since our back-office distinguishes from other 
competitors‟ back-offices, the software is not tailor-made. Initially, it was very 
time- consuming and sometimes frustrating to enrol or integrate the system in our 
current back-office. After having accomplished that any standard software upgrade 
can now relatively easily be adopted. Certain adjustment exercises have become a 
routine. Clients generally know that multiple financial services companies offer the 
same trading platform. More than a dozen other companies, for example, use the 
software Patssystems.  
 
The clients can therefore choose with which they want to open an account. And 
generally, they don‟t care. Although, if the clients believe that our competitors are 
charging similar prices and we can‟t offer a better service, I wouldn‟t necessarily 
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expect the clients to choose opening an account with us. In my opinion, it was a 
good idea to outsource the development of our own software. As you know, we have 
been developing our own system. But even after years it still fails to deliver.  
 
Having integrated various external electronic trading systems into the back-office, and 
gained some years of experience with these systems and customers, he viewed the systems 
as a highly important control system. Without them he would not be able to implement a 
day-to-day control system in regards of the number of conducted trades and the constantly 
trackable profit and loss situation per individual client. He said that without these systems 
any ‗rogue trader‘ would be able to increase her/his overnight position to a level where they 
could go bankrupt. Unauthorised trades would go undetected for a certain limited time. In 
other words, the electronic trading systems enabled them to act transparently. The systems 
needed upgrading from time to time but this became more or less routine. The vendor did 
most of the work. With Patssystems, they had an excellent relationship with the company 
and they also employed ex-Patssystems staff in order to reduce their own workload and to 
balance their own lack of skills within the company. They also offered clients an electronic 
trading system called Trading Technology (TT). However, following litigation between TT 
and several financial firms they were evaluating whether to dispose of TT. Many 
sophisticated clients were using TT and liked the vendor‘s capabilities in terms of a 
relatively reliable order routing system. If they wanted to continue using TT as one of the 
few electronic trading systems that are integrated into Refco‘s back-office, they might have 
to pay higher charges in future. 
  
Peter emphasised the issue of controlling and measuring risks. Every sophisticated 
electronic trading system offered so-called risk tools, with which the user and also Refco 
could manage potential market risks. The system‘s risk tools needed to be evaluated as 
well, by the risk department. If they did not like the risk tools, they would not be 
implemented.   
 
Peter also emphasised that external systems had been implemented due to the failure to 
deliver internal systems. 
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5.6 Personnel and Organisational Issues  
 
John (not his real name), aged 50 and a senior sales manager with more than twenty-eight 
years of working experience, had been working for the company for five years. John didn‘t 
have a university degree and was not overly excited about technology. He was not very 
keen on using technology and didn‘t believe it helped him a lot.  
 
Technology might make me unemployed. The clients I have been covering for many 
years are clients who call me on the phone to receive a service. If they don‟t call me 
anymore I will become unemployed. Some traders moved to Gibraltar and use 
direct market access (DMA) from there. The electronic trading systems are very 
much reliable now. The traders don‟t need to interact with me anymore. Once they 
are set up they stop calling me. We normally receive calls if they have a technical 
problem, which doesn‟t happen more than once a year. 
 
The personal goals of individuals may have a significant impact on project success. 
Individuals can influence project by the level of motivation and John doubted the 
effectiveness and reliability of the technology. He confirmed that, as a senior manager, his 
individual decisions and his motivation concerning technology could affect the chances of a 
successful project.  
   
Clearly, keeping individuals‘ motivation at a high level is essential. A lack of motivation to 
apply skills in the organisation can endanger the success of the project. Amongst the 
interviewees, nine declared that they needed technology and their subjective evaluation 
supported the idea to implement more IS. Another six employees supported IS expenditure 
and preferred being technologically skilled or trained.  
 
Most of the interviewees highlighted that the success of software projects would increase if 
the managers had some ownership of the outcome. This could be achieved through 
outcome-based contracts. If the three parties, management, vendor and user shared 
responsibility for outcomes, rather than for work accomplished, more successful software 
projects could be witnessed.  
 
Project failure could be avoided if actors support the project rather than reject it.  More than 
twenty interviewees mentioned that they would like to be their own risk managers and to 
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influence their individual risks and rewards. Software implementation and investment alone 
are not a guarantee of project success. More than thirty interviewed employees highlighted 
that outcome-based contracts would help towards a project‘s success.  
 
5.7 The New Role of Regulators 
 
The FSA mentioned in its Newsletter, Issue No.19 March 2007, anonymous cases related to 
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) in order to help firms understand FSA 
expectations and to promote additional internal training:  
 
―We have attempted to address areas that are currently of particular priority to the FSA. 
Such a case is referring to Contract for Differences (CFD):‘you work for a medium-size 
broker as a compliance executive; most of your clients are either institutional or medium to 
high net worth individuals. Part of your daily job is to monitor all the previous day‘s trades 
against regulatory announcements. You review recent regulatory announcements and run a 
sample, risk-based physical check of yesterday‘s trades. You notice that a large UK-based 
defence company has just announced winning a major US contract and so far today the 
share price is up 20% to 120p. Three accounts have made significant long positions in the 
week before the announcement. You decide to look at the accounts and their trading history 
in more detail. Your firm usually transacts this particular name at the 100,000 shares, and 
it‘s a very liquid name.  
 
Account 1. Long 100,000 shares at 98p. This account belongs to an institutional investor 
who trades regularly in the name; there is nothing unusual in the size. Also, the account had 
put on similar trades on three other defence companies at the same time.  
 
Account 2. Long 150,000 at 97p. This account belongs to a private investor. However, you 
notice that he has only just opened the account and this is his second trade to date. The first 
trade was a long 50,000 on a different stock and is still flat profit. You review Know Your 
Customers (KYC) documents and find that his stated annual income is £ 50k. The timing 
and the size of the trade strike you as suspicious, especially in the context of his income 
relative to risk taken on the trade.  
 
Account 3. Long 80,000 at 99p. This also belongs to a private investor. The account has 
traded regularly but only ever in small cap tech stocks and usually in much smaller size. 
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You look at his KYC documents and discover that his stated income is £ 500k. Despite the 
size of his stated income the size and sector of the trade strike you as suspicious when 
reviewed in light of the good timing. We would expect an STR for the second and third 
accounts, along with as much detail about their trading history as possible. You should 
provide relevant recordings about the orders (if phoned in).  
 
After MIFID we will require a new directive type classification to be used when reporting 
transactions in credit default swaps. We will not proceed with our proposal to require firms 
to identify whether a principal transaction was executed for proprietary or for client 
facilitation. It will not be mandatory to include seconds in the trade time field. Where 
seconds are unavailable they can be defaulted to ‗00‘. To identify the client or counterparty, 
firms should use either the FSA reference number or Swift Bank Identifier Code or, in 
circumstances where neither is available, a unique code. This internal code must be 
allocated specifically and consistently to that client or counterparty by the reporting firm 
across all asset classes. When reporting a transaction in a single stock (or debt) over the 
counter (OTC) derivative or a single name credit default swap it will be mandatory to 
populate the underlying security code field with an ISIN‖ (FSA, Newsletter, Issue No. 19, 
March 2007). 
 
On 8
th
 April 2010 FSA announced in Issue 62 that they imposed fines totalling £4.2m for 
transaction reporting failures. The firms mentioned are Credit Suisse (£1.75m fine), Getco 
Europe Limited (£1.4m) and Instinet Europe Limited (£1.05m). Credit Suisse Europe is a 
bank with headquarters in Zurich, Getco is an algorithmic trading company and market 
maker on certain exchanges and Instinet is a niche player in agency brokering.  
 
FSA states:  
―Firms are required to have systems and controls in place to ensure they submit 
accurate data for reportable transactions by close of business the day after a trade is 
executed. The FSA uses the data to detect and investigate suspected market abuse 
such as insider trading and market manipulation. All three firms were found to have 
committed multiple breaches that resulted in failures to provide transaction reports 
promptly and correctly to the FSA. Instinet was also found to be in breach of FSA 
principles, as the firm did not have adequate systems and controls in place to meet 
the transaction reporting requirements and failed to take adequate steps to review its 
processes and the accuracy of its transaction report data. Each firm could have 
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prevented the breaches by carrying out regular reviews of its data. Despite repeated 
reminders from the FSA during the course of 2007 and 2008, none of the firms did 
this‖ (FSA, Newsletter, Issue No. 62, April 2010). 
 
Alexander Justham, Director of Markets, said:  
―Firms must meet their obligation to provide accurate and timely data. Without 
quality data we cannot properly detect and investigate market abuse, identify 
market wide risks or have a comprehensive understanding of the activities of each 
firm. This data is vital in our efforts to combat financial crime and we will continue 
to pursue firms that fail to provide quality data. Firms and their management must 
ensure they implement and operate systems and controls that are able to ensure 
quality transaction reporting. The standard of regulatory reporting by these firms 
fell far short of what the FSA expects and requires‖ (FSA, Newsletter, Issue No. 62, 
April 2010). 
 
According to the FSA:  
―The firms cooperated fully with the FSA in the course of the investigations and 
agreed to settle at an early stage. In doing so each firm qualified for a 30% 
discount. Without the discounts the total fines would have been £6m‖ (FSA, 
Newsletter, Issue No. 62, April 2010). 
 
5.7.1 The Credit Suisse Case 
 
The problems of Credit Suisse concerning the FSA‘s new approach to regulation are 
described below because of their relevance to the situation in Refco and to the wider 
financial services industry. The problems concern regulatory provisions and inadequate 
controls in relation to transaction reporting. The material presented comes from FSA 
publications and is not a result of primary research. 
 
The FSA wrote in a letter published on 8
th
 April 2010 as follows: 
 
The FSA gave Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Credit Suisse (UK) 
Limited, Credit Suisse International, and Credit Suisse AG (collectively ―Credit 
Suisse‖ or the ―Firm‖ a Decision Notice on 29 March 2010 which notified the Firm 
that pursuant to section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (―the 
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Act‖), the FSA has decided to impose a financial penalty of £1.75 million on the 
Firm in respect of breaches of rules set out in chapter SUP 17 of the FSA Handbook 
which occurred between 5 November 2007 and 20 November 2008 (―the Relevant 
Period‖).  
The Firm has confirmed that it will not be referring the matter to the Financial Services and 
Market Tribunal. Accordingly, for the reasons set out below, the FSA imposes a financial 
penalty on the Firm in the amount of £1.75 million. 
 
FSA stated:  
―Accurate and complete transaction reporting is essential to enable the FSA to meet 
its statutory objectives of maintaining market confidence and reducing financial 
crime. The primary function for which the FSA uses transaction reports is to detect 
and investigate suspected market abuse, insider trading and market manipulation.  
A transaction report is a data set submitted to the FSA and related to an individual 
financial market transaction which includes details of the product traded, the firm 
that undertook the trade, the trade counterparty and the trade characteristics such as 
buy/sell identifier, price and quantity‖.  
 
In the Relevant Period Credit Suisse breached Chapter 17 of the Supervision Manual, 
which is part of the FSA Handbook in that it failed to submit accurate transaction reports in 
respect of approximately 40 million transactions. The FSA considers these failings to be 
serious, particularly because: 
Credit Suisse‘s failure to submit accurate transaction could have a serious impact 
on the FSA‘s ability to detect and investigate suspected market abuse and 
consequently could impact the FSA‘s ability to maintain market confidence and 
reduce financial crime. In addition, its failure has impaired the FSA‘s ability to 
provide accurate transaction reporting data to overseas regulators; 
Credit Suisse failed to report all 30 million LSE transactions it executed during the 
Relevant Period, and inaccurately reported a further 10 million transactions across 
all of its asset classes; and  
Credit Suisse‘s failures occurred during a period of heightened awareness around 
transaction reporting issues as a result of the implementation of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (―MIFID‖) and public statements by the FSA.  
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After the FSA brought errors in Credit Suisse‘s transaction reporting to its attention, the 
firm took a number of steps, which mitigate the seriousness of the failings. These included: 
Conducting a ―Front to Back‖ Review of the Credit Suisse transaction reporting 
process, and engaging external consultants to provide quality assurance in relation 
to that review; 
Developing and implementing a quality control process to ensure the accuracy and 
completeness of transaction reporting to the FSA going forward; 
Implementing an enhanced Transaction Reporting Awareness training programme; 
Improving communications with the external reporting mechanism for LSE 
transactions.     
 
The transactions, which are required to be reported to the FSA, are defined in SUP 17.1.4 
R, which states: 
A firm which executes a transaction to trading on a regulated market or a prescribed 
market (whether or not the transaction was carried out on such a market or in any 
OTC derivative the value of which is derived from, or which is otherwise 
dependent upon, an equity or debt-related financial instrument which is admitted to 
trading on a regulated market or on a prescribed market) must report the details of 
the transaction to the FSA. 
 
On page 6 of the FSA publication from 8
th
 April 2010 it is mentioned:  
Prior to the implementation of MiFID, all of Credit Suisse‘s transaction reporting of 
LSE transactions was conducted through the External ARM. Credit Suisse decided 
that after MiFID implementation: 
It would continue to transaction report all of its LSE trading, amounting to 25% of 
its reportable trading activity in the relevant period through the external ARM; and 
The remainder of its transaction reporting would be through its own in-house ARM 
named DARE, which it set up for this purpose. As a result Credit Suisse‘s MiFID 
implementation project in respect of transaction reporting focussed upon the design, 
development and testing of systems to report transactions via DARE.  
Between August and October 2007 the external ARM issued eight operational bulletins to a 
Credit Suisse email account designated to receive such operational bulletins. These 
Bulletins stated that if firms wished the external ARM to continue transaction reporting on 
their behalf after MiFID, it was necessary to submit a mandatory static data form prior to 
the implementation of MiFID.  
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Credit Suisse did not submit the static data form to the External ARM, and the External 
ARM stopped transaction reporting on behalf of Credit Suisse on 12 November 2007. 
However, after this date Credit Suisse believed that the External ARM was continuing to 
transaction report its LSE trading, as it had done prior to MiFID. Credit Suisse had several 
meetings with External ARM during the Relevant Period in which they discussed the 
inclusive fees paid by Credit Suisse for clearing, settlement and transaction reporting. 
Credit Suisse assumed from these discussions that the reporting was continuing. Between 
August and early October 2007, Credit Suisse conducted User Acceptance Testing 
(―UAT‖) in respect of its arrangements for reporting non-LSE transactions, which it 
intended to submit to the FSA through DARE. As part of UAT 2,930 test cases were 
executed, focussing on many of the transaction reporting requirements. As a result of the 
testing a number of shortcomings were identified and remedied. Between February and 
May 2008 Credit Suisse conducted a review of the key changes to transaction reporting 
through DARE in the three months following MiFID implementation. No equivalent 
review was carried out in relation to transaction reporting through the External ARM.  
 
During the relevant period Credit Suisse mistakenly assumed that 25% of its reportable 
LSE transactions were being reported on its behalf by the External ARM but failed to 
develop and implement controls to confirm that these reports were being submitted, 
whether in accordance with the standards of SUP 17 or at all. This failure occurred despite 
repeated warnings by the FSA in Market Watch and TRUP that firms should regularly 
review the integrity of their transaction reporting data. Firms were also encouraged through 
Market Watch to request transaction reporting data from the FSA in order to verify the 
integrity of transaction reporting data. Credit Suisse did not request transaction-reporting 
data from the FSA submitted through the External ARM. If it had done so, or had otherwise 
monitored the accuracy of its transaction reports, it would have become apparent that none 
were being submitted in relation to LSE transactions.     
 
In early August 2008, the FSA observed, in the course of a review of non-LSE transaction 
reports, that Credit Suisse was reporting the unit price of some transactions in minor 
currency (pence) instead of major currency (pound sterling). After analysing the issue, 
Credit Suisse confirmed that this affected a total of approximately 300,000 equity 
transactions denominated in sterling, which were attributed to a single system and business 
area.  
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Credit Suisse‘s own analysis of the ―unit price issue‖ also identified that a number of 
exchanges and Multilateral Trading Facilities (―Miffs‖) were being incorrectly identified as 
―Off-Exchange‖ rather than by the identifying Market Identifier Code allocated to each 
exchange and MTF; this error affected 1.3 million transactions. In mid-September 2008, the 
FSA identified that Credit Suisse was reporting certain transactions using Greenwich Mean 
Time (―GMT‖) rather than British Summer Time ―BST‖) during British Summer Time. 
After preliminary analysis of the issue, Credit Suisse stated that this affected transactions 
executed on a single exchange, totalling 5 million transaction reports, and identified that a 
further 140,000 transactions were affected by a similar issue where the time was incorrectly 
adjusted. In addition, the FSA identified in December 2008 that Credit Suisse had 
incorrectly populated the ―Counterparty one‖ field in certain transaction reports with an 
internal code instead of the Counterparty Swift BIC. Credit Suisse subsequently confirmed 
as part of its ―Front to Back‖ transaction reporting review that this issue affected 2.2 
million transactions, 0.5 million transactions of which had already been affected by 
incorrect categorisation as ―Off-Exchange‖, as stated in paragraph 2.29 above. The FSA 
identified in November 2008 that Credit Suisse had not submitted any transactions 
executed on the LSE for an extended period of time. Credit Suisse confirmed that the 
External ARM had stopped reporting such transactions on its behalf on 12 November 2007, 
affecting 30 million transactions, and re-enabled reporting with the External ARM from 20 
November 2008.    
 
Transaction reporting has been discussed globally recently due to market uncertainty. As a 
result of market uncertainty legislation for OTC derivatives is undergoing change. On 20
th
 
October 2009, the European Commission published its proposal to reform the OTC 
derivatives markets. In the US legislative process has begun and the first draft bills have 
been published already. The G20 issued a statement on 29
th
 September 2009 outlining 
commitments for reforming these markets. The main area of discussions covered at global 
level is: 
 How greater standardisation of OTC traded contracts can be achieved; 
 How the involved banks and other financial services can contribute by offering 
STP, electronic trading and clearing. 
 How CCP can reduce counterparty risk and potentially stabilise the entire financial 
services industry; 
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 How IT investment has an important role to play in supporting regulatory 
objectives; 
 Whether it is possible meeting regulatory objectives without forcing trade flow 
through organised trading platforms. 
 
Companies such as JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs (to 
name a few) have many institutional end clients such as hedge funds and asset managers. 
These end clients started demanding so called OTC flexible contracts and wanted to trade 
these options and futures. Two main exchanges in Europe offer these OTC flexible 
contracts as an exchange traded and centrally cleared product. Clients can trade these non-
standardised OTC Flexible Contracts via Eurex or via Euronext/LIFFE.  
 
The problem is that the client can chose to specify any strike price, maturity or whether the 
contract should be cash settled or based on physical delivery. Due to the fact that these 
kinds of contracts are tailor-made contracts, it is not easy to straight-through-process them 
(STP). Certain back-office clearing systems such as Rolfe& Nolan systems have got the 
functionality and enable the banks or brokers to clear these non-standardised products. 
Other clearing systems such as the market dominating Sungard System do not offer the 
entire OTC flexible contract module to their clients. Some banks such as UBS, Credit 
Suisse, JP Morgan use Sungard and are not able to clear OTC flexible futures due to the 
fact that Sungard is not able to offer them this specific clearing module.  
 
Instead, institutional clients trade these products via other financial services firms with the 
capability to clear flexible futures. Also, according to interviews with JP Morgan, Credit 
Suisse, UBS and Goldman Sachs, Sungard charges clients an extra amount for this extra 
service. Sungard told its customers that they would consider programming and offering a 
new extra OTC flexible futures module if they paid for it. Alternatively the costs could be 
covered by the exchanges directly since they are interested to increase volume in this 
relatively new segment. According to the feedback from various involved banks, 
institutional clients ‗forced‘ the banks to conduct the OTC flexible futures trade even 
without the capability to clear the contracts. It had to be booked manually and was a very 
time consuming exercise for the involved banks. The risk management department was 
involved since having positions in products you cannot clear properly is a nightmare for 
any bank. As an example, it is not possible to calculate the entire portfolio margin 
requirement for this specific client. That means the institutional client may have to pay an 
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excessive amount of money in order to cover the margin. Still, the risk management team is 
not able to calculate the entire portfolio since part of the portfolio is not reflected in the 
margin calculator used. 
 
5.8 Summary 
 
The past fifteen years have seen an explosion in the amount of electronic trading, much of 
it high frequency, algorithmic trading. The huge increase in the number of transactions has 
been accompanied by increasing demands for fast execution of complex trades, such that 
latency and proximity became important. These trades, in turn, created a huge demand for 
fast, reliable back-office clearing, as well as significantly raising the levels of risk in the 
market, which called forth much more intensive regulation from the FSA and other 
regulators. All of this created massive demands on the IT infrastructures of financial 
services firms like Refco. 
 
What was needed by companies like Refco was a change in the way that they viewed IT 
and hence the way that they evaluated IT investments. Unfortunately for Refco, they were 
unable to make these changes and continued to view IT as an overhead cost that needed to 
be minimised. 
 
The case shows that gathering information is crucial. Flexibility and adaptability of work 
activities to clients‘ needs and some other contingencies are the professional‘s competitive 
advantages in the market. The PC enables employees to utilise time and space in daily work 
activities efficiently. The work activities need to be seen in specific contexts. As one may 
realise, traditional exchanges are transforming into electronic exchanges and can be seen as 
IT companies nowadays. In order to be linked to exchanges in a most efficient and effective 
way, organisations such as Refco need to adopt and implement new technology. 
 
Within the organisation, the concept of power played a major role. The designing, 
developing and implementing of IT/IS had always to be approved by the management. 
Some employees mentioned that the organisational actors used power and political actions 
to affect the way IT/IS was managed and used. Several employees pointed out that power 
concerns affected how individuals within the organisation adopted technology, trained the 
users, designed systems and promoted projects. Departments used their control of financial 
resources to guide systems implementation.  
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Electronic trading systems enable firms like Refco to control the number of conducted 
trades and the profit and loss situation per individual client. These electronic trading 
systems limit any potential ‗rogue‘ traders‘ intentions to build massive positions to a level 
where the company could gain severe losses. Unauthorised trades would go undetected for 
a certain time. Electronic trading systems enable financial services companies including 
large banks to control the clients and protect them at the same time. Such firms provide 
their clients with access to exchanges via electronic trading systems, which on the other 
hand can offer a risk management and control tool.  
 
Globally, regulators and politicians started to realise that the financial services industry had 
to be regulated. New legislation was (and still is) implemented in order to ‗control‘ the way 
derivatives are traded and processed. Expected new legislation will force financial services 
firms and exchanges to increase their IT investment budget over the next few years. 
 
On April 2010, FSA declared on their website: 
The final notices for Credit Suisse, Getco Europe Limited and Instinet Europe 
Limited can be found on the FSA website. 
Previous warnings on the importance of transaction reporting can be found at: 
Market Watch issue 19 and Market Watch issue 28 
The FSA regulates the financial services industry and has four objectives under the 
Financial Services Markets Act 2000: maintaining market confidence; promoting 
public understanding of the financial system; securing the appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers; and fighting financial crime (www.fsa.gov.uk). 
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Chapter 6 - Analysis and Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter brings together the key issues and insights from the case study through an 
analysis using actor-network theory. The objective is to provide insight into how 
information systems investment evaluation interacts with the other activities within the 
electronic trading network. The analysis starts by highlighting the major findings from the 
case study in terms of the research agenda of the thesis. A discussion of the empirical 
research findings is undertaken based on ANT.  
 
6.2 Case Study Findings 
 
This section summarises the contributions and the problems experienced in the case study 
in terms of the research agenda and the integration of IS evaluation into the electronic 
trading (actor) network.  
 
All exchanges acknowledge that HFAT has reached a critical mass within the industry and 
needs to be served properly. The exchanges offer low integration costs and in some cases 
offer to contribute to clients‘ infrastructure costs. Advances in electronic trading 
infrastructures reduced transaction costs per trade. Hedge funds started demanding extra 
resources from Refco and other brokers‘ operations in the back-office. Those hedge funds 
became new actors within the financial services industry with specific demands for 
services.  
 
The Social Shaping of Technology approach (SST) provides information concerning the 
context within which technological innovations are framed. SST suggests that the 
materiality of every technology is socially shaped and diverse political and social powers 
influence the process of any development such as the emergence of hedge funds. Compared 
to SCOT‘s focus on social determinism, ANT sees the social and the technical with no 
distinction in this case study. More than ten thousand hedge funds needed a connection and 
a service from one or the other financial services companies such as Refco. At the same 
time, regulators monitored and regulated both actors: Refco and its hedge fund clients. In 
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order to serve the client properly certain Refco senior managers based in the U.S. had 
different and divergent ideas in terms of problematization. Problematization did not occur. 
 
As we know, the hedge fund as an actor can only be defined in association with another 
actor such as Refco. ‗The symbolic boundary between people and information technology 
is in a constant state of flux.‘  The actor-network is constituted by various heterogeneous 
actors connected with associations. Refco had a specific relationship to hedge funds as 
actors. However, they had divergent and often conflicting interests. Refco itself was an 
actor within the financial services industry actor-network and aimed to keep costs as low as 
possible. On the other hand, hedge funds wanted to receive the best execution services in 
terms of IT and operations. The alignment process of a network where both human and 
non-human actors are engaged was not in place when the volume started to increase 
rapidly. Hedge funds were successfully enrolled when the required technology 
infrastructure was offered by Refco. The actor who is animated to use a specific technology 
such as HFT would join the network.  
 
The four stages of translation mentioned in Chapter Three were not followed in the 
translation process and in the creation of an actor-network. Translation could have 
happened between actors when an actor introduces to another actor his/her preferred 
scenarios for the use of an existing or new technology. Here, Refco did not have an 
upgraded IT infrastructure and at the same time it had had problems with the regulators for 
many years. For instance, various clients complained about execution prices for futures. In 
an ideal world, Refco could have followed the ‗four stages of translation‘, namely 
prolematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization. 
 
As we know, the process of translating the actors‘ diverse interests in order to offer them in 
a certain way to enact and at the same time keeping the network stable is known as the 
‗sociology of translation‘. This process depended on the situation of the hedge funds. A 
rejection of alternative translation(s) occurred when more and more hedge funds decided to 
open accounts with Refco‘s competitors, because they started offering an advanced IT 
infrastructure by investing in technology. Actor-networks can become unstable and they 
can constantly be in a state of fluctuation because of their aim to redefine their structure as 
we have seen in this case. The process of translation can lead to alternative translations, 
where Refco decided to ignore regulators‘ concerns and at the same time ignore hedge 
funds‘ and other large institutional clients‘ requests for advanced technology. When a 
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translation leads to alignment of the interests of the majority of allies, the actor-network 
formed will be coherent. In this specific case this did not occur. 
 
Legislation can influence translation. When a network is resisting reversibility within the 
frames of specific institutional legislation, then the behaviour of its actors can become 
standardised. The network can become reliable and predictable. This new network can also 
be seen as a black box, which can be transferred within the contexts of other actor-
networks. An actor-network is constituted by various heterogeneous actors connected with 
complex associations. Refco‘s employees in various departments such as IT, compliance, 
risk, sales and HR often conflicted with each other and were actors at the same time. A 
network can be considered as successful when an adequate body of actors is enrolled. An 
actor can be persuaded that it is in his/her own interest to utilise a technology. As soon as it 
provides an answer to his/her problems, he/she will decide to become part of the network.  
 
The process of translating the actors‘ diverse interests in order to enact in specific ways 
while maintaining the overall network stability is known as the ‗sociology of translation‘. 
We need to consider the specific situation in which the actor is in order to expect a positive 
translation. For example, a human actor will try to secure his/her job before making any 
decision with the consequence of losing his/her job afterwards. 
 
For Refco, translation took place only among senior Refco management in the U.S.. 
Refco‘s management introduced their preferred scenarios for the use and purpose of 
technology to the hedge fund world with contradicting objectives. Refco wanted to spend 
as little money as possible and the hedge fund world wanted the most state of the art 
technology in order to continue increasing daily transactions. During the translation 
process, fewer and fewer hedge funds followed Refco‘s suggestions and the creation of a 
stable and sustainable actor-network was more and more under threat. 
 
During the problematization phase, a hedge fund based in Guernsey, tried to communicate 
the lack of available IT infrastructure and the problematic situation to other actors. The 
focal actors‘ aim was to highlight to other actors within Refco what kind of resources were 
needed to configure a solution to their mutual problem.  
 
Other hedge funds, or in ANT terms ‗allies‘, started supporting the hedge fund. In this 
situation, the hedge fund was seen as indispensable and started establishing an obligatory 
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passage point (OPP). According to Callon (1986b), the OPP is highly aligned with the focal 
actor‘s interests, other actors need to be persuaded and adapt their behaviour in order to 
pass through this point. A network cannot be stabilised if there is no successful translation 
of such point. As a next phase, the focal hedge fund actor continued to animate other hedge 
fund to not enrol into Refco‘s IT infrastructure but to set up new accounts with other 
brokers. Problematization and continued communications aim is to show alternative 
benefits and stabilise other hedge funds in the new infrastructure.  
 
Obviously, the focal actor was successful with the translation and animated other hedge 
funds to use the competitors‘ HFT technology and enrol to their network. The mobilisation 
phase continued and the new structure of the network became more and more obvious. 
Hedge funds that set up their new accounts with other brokers were not willing to leave the 
network again. Actor-networks may always be in a state of fluctuation because of their 
tendency to alter and redefine their structure (Callon, 1989). Even if the translation had 
been positive the result does not need to be a new stable network. Refco‘s management‘s 
preferred scenario was undermined by the focal actor‘s alternative translations.  
 
After Refco went bankrupt, a new ‗follow-up‘ company was created in Europe. Alternative 
translations reversed and hedge funds started using the follow up company, Marex 
Financial Ltd. The relevant translation depends also on the new financial legislation. The 
level to which the actors of the network value structures defines how convergent the 
network value is. A successful translation leads to a robust network and becomes 
irreversible. Marex Financial Ltd. was created at the end of 2005 and started processing 
client orders on 26
th
 January 2006. Marathon also acquired the assets of Refco Trading 
Services (RTS) and EasyScreen. EasyScreen provides integrated electronic trading systems 
used by traders to connect to worldwide financial exchanges. 
 
6.3 Trading in Proximity with Exchanges  
 
Global exchanges have provided proximity services since 2007. The number of members 
participating in proximity hosting surpassed one hundred in 2009. Deutsche Börse (DB) 
provides proximity services through two sites with a round trip time of information 
transmission of less than 10ms. Members are provided with ultra-secure data centre space, 
no power failure and high reliability. Until recently traders could only connect through 
DMA to their local exchange or any other exchange in order to receive price information. 
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Refco‘s clients based in the USA received information at a much slower pace of 130ms 
compared to a firm located in London which offered less than 30 ms.  
 
Milliseconds are important in HFAT. Information transmitted within a network is impeded 
by serialisation and so called switching delay. The serialisation delay is associated with the 
bandwidth of the connection and can be minimised by high capacity transmission lines. 
Various nodes in the network cause the switching delay. Propagation delay depends on the 
physical distance between the network nodes and can only be minimised when the distance 
is reduced.  
 
During the transformation of exchanges, actors have gained new roles within the industry. 
Refco‘s clients‘ IT infrastructure was often outsourced to a low-latency specialist IT 
provider. DB has contractual arrangements with global network operators such as COLT, 
BT or Deutsche Telekom. Now, the translation and mobilisation phases will be described 
and discussed. 
 
6.3.1 Processes of Translation  
 
Proximity hosting was seen as a possible solution to decreasing revenues on the one hand 
and increasing client knowledge on the other hand. Refco‘s clients became more and more 
sophisticated and at the same time gained access to relatively cheap advanced technology. 
Exchanges such as DB and NYSE coped with this new trend and started offering additional 
services based on IT. Exchanges started initiating the problematization phase. They invited 
exchange members, banks and brokerage companies into so-called ‗IT working 
committees‘. The working group consisted of IT, back-office and business staff across the 
entire financial services industry and consulted every three-month. The identification of the 
problematic situation and its communication to other actors within the industry including 
vendors and telecommunication companies took place regularly. The main actors 
supporting such services were the members with the end client demand and new revenue 
streams.  
 
Exchanges and also new vendors proceeded into the interessement of potential allies. The 
new partnerships enabled the emergence of new services and new collaboration between 
actors. Refco was not involved and did not show any interest to participate or being 
engaged in this new industry trend and transformation. No representative from Refco was 
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invited to the relevant working groups set up by exchanges. The emergence of proximity 
hosting led exchanges to engage with telecommunications companies. The creation of the 
actor- network occurred while exchanges worked with companies from different sectors.  
 
When mutual interests were aligned with those of the exchanges, they enrolled to the actor-
network as inscribed by the focal actor. Refco and other brokers knew that it was too 
expensive to set up data centres on their own. Proximity services are relatively cheap and 
provided exchanges with an alternative way of connecting clients. Compared to Refco, 
other brokers decided to be involved in order to remain competitive.  
 
On the other hand, regulators such as FSA were concerned that HFAT was disruptive to the 
market. Software vendors such as Patssystems offered platforms allowing orders to be 
spread simultaneously on multiple exchanges at the same time. Meanwhile, few exchanges 
started offering enhanced risk solutions without adding significantly to latency in terms of 
execution time. As technology supports the development of HFAT, the role of hardware 
vendors in proximity trading has become very important. Brokerage firms and trading 
companies have to rely on vendors to support their business. An actor-network has been 
established and does not seem to be reversible. New actors such as Colt in the 
telecommunication industry and independent data centre providers are enrolled and 
mobilised.  
 
Is technology constructed of society or society made up of technology? The key term actor, 
for example, is not used as in conventional sociology where actors are usually defined as 
"discrete individual, corporate, or collective social units" (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 
p.17). This network can be read through the inscription in the intermediaries. The more 
heterogeneous elements a text or object are implicitly or explicitly able to align, the more it 
becomes part of the network. An algorithm is an actor because it can mobilise a network of 
heterogeneous allies to do things and exchange value. In an electronic trading system this 
network of allies is tightly sealed and it is hard to question the connections of those 
networks for an individual. 
 
The new financial legislation is a collection of black boxes. In its formation stage 
legislation is a contested set of competing sentences around which occasionally large 
alliances are built to influence their specific shape. During the legislative process they seem 
to be fluid and open. After implementing the legislation, contested sentences turn into a 
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black box, sealing all the elements. The stability of a black box is influenced by the costs of 
reopening it. This is not only determined by the social groups and procedures sealed into 
the black box, but also by the materials which are included. Algorithm software is 
constantly reopened and sealed again because of its fluidity and low production costs.  
 
This is the process of constantly questioning some elements of the box and trying to seal it 
again. "The more automatic and the blacker the box is, the more it has to be accompanied 
by people" (Latour, 1987, p.137). HFT as an actor can be seen as "any element, which 
bends space around itself, makes other elements dependent upon itself and translates their 
will into a language of its own" (Callon and Latour, 1981, p.286). ―Actor and network 
constantly redefine each other; one is dependent on the other‖ (Callon, 1987, p.93). Since 
there is no actor without a network, new networks emerge out of already existing ones. ―By 
translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and 
violence thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred to itself, 
authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or force‖ (Callon and Latour, 1981, 
p.279). 
 
Humans and non-humans as equal actors are tied together into networks, built and 
maintained in order to achieve a particular goal such as the development of HFT system. 
Competences are negotiated on a trial and error basis.  
 
Elements represented in the electronic trading systems act and do specific things. Outside 
Refco, the elements are actants, entities that have an independent reality. Inside the firm, 
they become actors, entities that do things, hopefully those things the texts were written for. 
A trading system can be seen as a network aligning heterogeneous elements, such as people 
and equipment. A black box contains a sealed network of people and things. A network 
mainly ties together two systems of alliances, namely people and things. Things enable 
people to be connected. People and things were interconnected within Refco constantly. 
However, Refco failed to support and interconnect people effectively. The size of a 
network depends on the number of actors it can align.  
 
Hedge funds wanted to use a reliable Refco electronic trading system or in other words an 
intermediary that passed the futures products between actors. Intermediaries are the 
language of the network. Through intermediaries actors communicated with one another 
 152 
and that is the way actors translated their intentions into other actors, including Refco‘s 
senior management.  
 
Networks allow actors to translate their objectives, be it conscious human choice. 
―By translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of 
persuasion and violence thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be 
conferred to itself, authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or force‖ 
(Callon and Latour, 1981, p.279). 
 
Networks emerge and are shaped by aligning more and more actors. The importance of an 
actor depends therefore on the number of actors within his/her/its networks which he/she/it 
can employ to a particular purpose. 
  
Refco failed to successfully translate others and therefore did not grow any more during the 
last few months before the collapse. The emergence and growth of the Refco network, was 
interrupted by the failure to recognise intermediaries that appeared. Those intermediaries‘ 
objective was to translate hedge funds‘ needs.  
 
A network can develop in two different directions, towards convergence or towards 
divergence of its actors. Adding new actors to a network at first increases their divergence. 
The processes of translation by which the will of one actor is transferred to another actor 
become initially more difficult because each new actor is already included in other 
networks that might have aligned him/her/it for different goals. Refco could not handle the 
new situation and failed to evaluate the hedge funds‘ and other HFT companies‘ 
expectations and needs. Translation is a process that is performed by one actor such as the 
IT employee working either for Refco or the hedge fund. Refco‘s senior management was 
not independent and already part of other networks such as the unregulated entity in the 
U.S. The stronger the coordination of the circulation is, the more the different elements are 
aligned, the more stable and predictable it becomes. Refco‘s network changed to a 
divergence point and towards disintegration in which it reversed its connections to the 
hedge fund world. 
 
Refco‘s network was not able to stabilise due to the lack of translation and ability to 
achieve a certain convergence. On the other hand, the HFT community as an actor-network 
stabilised and converted. The promotion of a network supports the actor's development.  
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It is important that the associations that actors form and the networks to which these 
associations bind them can be recognised. Whether an actor is seen as an empty vessel 
through which an intermediary passes, or whether it is an explicit concern in itself will vary 
according to standpoint. As described, society and technology are not ‗two ontologically 
distinct entities but more like phases of the same essential action‘ (Latour, 1991, p. 129).  
 
Hedge funds‘ demands associated with introducing a new technology and the re-
arrangement of work practices within Refco provided a platform for evaluating how 
priorities were set. Listening to explanations given from within a field site with respect to 
why a particular course of action should be taken opens out the question of priorities to 
analysis. Priorities were maintained even with the knowledge of potential self-destruction 
as we have seen in this case. Marex Financial Ltd., the successor to Refco, aimed to 
stabilise the network. Also, Marex aimed to achieve heterogeneity by having diverse 
interrelated elements. There is a positive correlation between the size and the heterogeneity 
of a network. This new actor-network is stable and resists competing translations. 
 
6.3.2 Enrolment and Translation 
 
Collective responsibility implies a joint working relationship. It should be highlighted that 
the performance being measured is the collective performance of the management group to 
achieve business objectives by investing in information systems.  
 
The attainment of business goals and ownership desires is the responsibility of the 
management. Specific activities with the aim to support organisational objectives are the 
managers‘ responsibility. The manager should use the electronic trading system to support 
the business objective. The head of department should be involved and ensure appropriate 
control and application of the information system. It should be his/her responsibility, as 
well, to decide how much money should be invested in IS. Ideally, the IS investment 
should be contributed by relevant managers and be part of the project authorisation. At the 
same time, a translation to these processes is required in order to have a meaningful 
evaluation activity.  
 
Various firms refer to management consultants when they want to assess their activities. 
They treat IS investment as an opportunity rather than a threat. Banks and insurance 
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companies also treat IS investment as part of their day-to-day lives and as something 
enabling them to add value compared to the competitor. Here, data processing is integrated 
into their primary operational activity. Other companies chose the learning-by-doing 
approach. 
 
6.3.3 Evaluation of IS 
 
The success rate of a HFAT system depends on the way exchanges provide data in terms of 
speed of transmission, network latency, information processing time, other related data 
such as margin requirements related to the number of open positions and risk management 
tools. Highly frequent information exchange is crucial within High-Frequency Algorithmic 
Trading (HFAT). Here, orders are triggered from an algorithm (CEO, U.S algorithm 
trading company based in London). Low latency in data updates is very important. Demand 
for highly specialised people with expert knowledge within exchanges such as Deutsche 
Börse is high.  
 
More and more firms had to cope with this new trend and spend money in HFAT trading 
infrastructure. Highly specialised HFAT clients demanded from Refco and also from 
exchanges to place their customers trading equipment physically close to them in order to 
reduce latency even more. New independent data centres accommodate clients‘ hardware as 
close as possible to the exchange, which is called co-location. Proximity trading has 
transformed the derivatives trading industry. New actors such as telecom companies are 
involved as well. It is very much IT driven and requires a lot of investment by all involved 
parties. 
 
Exchanges used to be controlled by their members before they were transformed into public 
ownership. According to Deutsche Börse AG, the company‘s shareholders are mostly UK 
and US based investors. Germans own less than a quarter. Exchanges have new competitors 
and the barriers to entry are much lower now for those new players. New service providers 
offer functions previously monopolised by local exchanges. Pit or floor trading has been 
replaced by electronic trading systems. 
 
The role of technology and the introduction of ‗Smart Order Management Systems‘ 
(SOMSs) have changed the way client orders are executed during the last three years. Large 
orders are executed in a different way, compared to a few years ago. They are split into 
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small portions and executed throughout the day with the aim not to reveal the initial large 
size.   
 
The quality and professionalism of the data processing managers that I met throughout the 
company was generally satisfying. However, no regional or global policy was available. It 
seemed, and has been confirmed later, that each office was more or less an independent 
isolated ―island‖, since they were all profit centres and had their own local agenda. Even 
within local offices, various departments competed with each other. After being aware of 
this fact, it was necessary to establish a personal relationship with managers from various 
areas. I found that a co-operative working relationship resulted in trust. It seemed to be 
helpful in working with a unique subset of people.  
 
Refco used established processes controlled by a small number of managers. Upon 
becoming alarmed at the size of the information systems investment budget, Refco 
implemented controls to one of the largest expenses, namely IT. Cost and efficiency 
measures were reflected in the request of data. The local organisation had its own local IS, 
generally not compatible to other offices‘ IS. This was a major problem in terms of 
efficiency and compliance. As an example, clients in Germany needed a different format of 
year-end statements, which needed to be submitted to the German Inland Revenue for tax 
purposes every year. These statements could only be delivered by Refco London European 
head office. However, the required IS was not in place and it was also not possible to link 
the German local IS system with the UK or US version. Instead, certain work had to be 
done manually, which was very time consuming. High error rates occurred due to manual 
work. 
 
Senior managers felt the increase in information systems budgets were negative for their 
own jobs and career prospects at the same time. Refco senior managers began to feel better 
about the information systems investment because of the newly available reports. However, 
as mentioned, this occurred only locally in the head office. On the other side, Refco senior 
management was searching for a way to understand and manage the information systems 
investments. Less powerful managers would have liked to increase investments in new 
areas but needed the budget approval from the office manager. The reports created a new 
form of communication about information systems investment at Refco, which was seen by 
many as a positive approach. 
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Various evaluation approaches introduced could be seen as attempts to close the gap 
between the theory and practice of IS evaluation. Particular stakeholders attempted to 
increase the awareness regarding the business contribution of IT. Evaluation contributed 
considerably to organisational learning and brought business and systems managers closer 
together. The proposed methodological approaches were supported by tools and techniques, 
which unfortunately had limited relevance to the needs of Refco managers. 
 
An attempt to integrate IS evaluation approaches within Refco can be seen as an incentive 
for organisational changes. Often, evaluation related changes are not considered in 
advance. Evaluation activities conducted by specified actors were changed from time to 
time. We witnessed gaps between the attempted evaluation approaches and their related 
context. The role of context was decisive to the degree of adoption of the evaluation 
approach and the preservation of the current status quo. 
 
The organisational integration of evaluation was largely the responsibility of a few. Their 
lack of success might have been due to the unclear definition of their tasks and authorities. 
Various issues experienced in the case study were related to various aspects of the 
evaluation roles such as authorities and tasks. 
 
The research findings emphasise two areas for the emergence of evaluation approaches, 
namely the dominant role of the context, and the definition of the evaluation roles. These 
areas are considered in more detail in this chapter. The analysis uses the principles of the 
research analysis proposed in Chapter Three and is utilised as a basis to examine the case 
study in Chapter Five. This chapter focuses on the relationship of evaluation and its 
context. 
 
6.3.4 Organisational Context of Information Systems Evaluation 
 
The internal and external contexts including Refco‘s culture and norms, strongly influenced 
the role that evaluation was expected to play. Four different orientations of IS evaluation 
can be identified, namely computation, judgment, inspiration and compromise. Authors 
such as Farbey et al. (1994) refer to the beliefs about causation such as means and 
processes and the setting of the objectives of the decision-making process. ‗Sense-making‘ 
evaluation dominates, if no clear objective or understanding has been crystallised. Sense-
making evaluation is often used when business managers try to negotiate a basis for IT 
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budget in certain areas. Control evaluation is used in areas where IS are used to automate 
well-defined processes. The expected outcomes of the investment are normally certain and 
the organisational context is relatively visible. It is useful as a financial control evaluation 
tool. Exploratory evaluation is needed when the social learning faces a lack of consensus in 
terms of the objectives. Its orientation does not exclude any other but complements it.  
 
Roles of the Evaluation Actors 
 
The definition and performance of the evaluation roles occur within the four mentioned 
orientations. In order to understand individuals‘ evaluation roles, the structural 
characteristics such as position and power and department play a major role. Cultural 
background, experience and motivation are also important to consider. 
 
Hirschheim et al. (1996) discuss in their ‗social action perspective‘ the four types of social 
action. This approach is built upon Habermas‘s (1987) ‗social action theory‘. Instrumental 
actions exist when actors attempt to achieve predefined ‗measurable‘ objectives such as 
financial costs and benefits, applying control to resources and constraints. Stakeholders‘ 
actions can be strategic when they try to achieve predefined objectives. Further examples 
include the manipulation of evaluation outcomes to promote personal or group interests, 
and the treatment of organisational power in evaluation. Communicative action focuses on 
achieving an agreement and common understanding with the aim to reach consensus 
among different actors. A discursive action is observed when issues and values are 
challenged.  
 
Evaluation as an Organisational Control Mechanism 
 
This section analyses the four orientations across the structures, processes and roles of 
individuals. It uses the orientations of IS evaluation as a basis to re-examine the evidence 
from the case studies.  
 
Evaluation is deliberate and plays an instrumental role to control organisational and human 
behaviour. Control evaluation is often used in case studies. Angell and Smithson (1991) 
highlight that the organisational control orientation of evaluation is common. Control 
evaluation is related to the issues of efficiency and effectiveness of IT investments. 
Organisations using control evaluation are able to monitor evaluation processes more 
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efficiently. Two ways of implementing control can be filtered, centralised and 
decentralised. Centralization created a bureaucratic and less attractive way of approving IS 
project proposals. It may be less attractive for those not working in the head office or in the 
same country, because real involvement in decision-making is less likely on an individual 
basis. Elements of ‗sense-making‘ seem to dominate for the organisation with less control. 
The aim is to achieve an evaluation consensus for IS investment. 
 
Evaluation as Social Learning  
 
Authors like Farbey et al. (1993) argue, that some reasons for IT failing to deliver benefits 
are related to learning. The reasons include the absence of clearly defined business goals 
and objectives and the inability of senior managers to align IS with business and IS 
evaluation with strategic thinking. The ability of an organisation to learn is likely to be a 
necessary precondition of an emergent and contingent approach to evaluation against a 
constantly changing context. One of the positive indirect deliverables of the formulation of 
IT investment appraisal methods is the definition of IS strategy. 
 
This thesis argues that a gap exists between evaluation concepts that appear in the academic 
literature and techniques applied in practice. However, the perceived need for change was 
low and thus the pace was slow. Control evaluation should be seen in the context of IS 
planning. It is also necessary to support formal communication channels. Control 
evaluation can be ineffective when power games prohibit individuals and rather promote 
individual interests.  
 
Changing organisations such as Refco is often difficult. To make the change sustainable, 
employees need to be supported by training. This thesis shows that evaluation does not only 
deal with the changes introduced by an information system but it should also consider the 
changes that it caused through Refco‘s integration, such as access to exchanges and related 
influence on IS performance. Evaluation changes are triggered by contextual turbulence 
such as new legislation or other external requirements. It seems critical for the involved 
stakeholders to understand that a paradigm change in evaluation is a cultural change, which 
requires consideration of the existing evaluation approach.  
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6.4 Enabling Technologies 
  
Advances in performance and cost-efficiency of three interrelated technologies, computer 
power, data storage and data transmission bandwidth, reduce the cost of collecting and 
processing information. Technology is responsible for the emergence of what is variously 
referred to as the new, information, digital or knowledge economy. Advances include the 
declining cost of computer processing power, data storage and data transmission 
bandwidth. 
  
These advances are causing lower cost of information, making the previously un-economic 
strategies efficient. Costs of information and matching orders are declining. At the same 
time, demand for direct exchange connectivity is rising. It is obvious that there is a 
correlation between advances in technology, declining cost of information and falling 
transaction costs. Employees have access to client information and are able to react fast. 
Refco was slow changing their corporate structure to facilitate new decision-making 
behaviour. New information flows can allow new organisation structures. A quantitative 
analysis of 273 large firms conducted by Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997) highlights a 
correlation between corporate investment in information technology systems and the 
decentralization of decision-making. Lower cost of connectivity enables companies to 
capture vast amounts of client data. Firms like Refco are often reluctant to restructure the 
organisation even if customers are demanding this. Exchanges seem to evolve, with 
information flowing from customer to broker and back to exchanges.  
 
Direct market access (DMA) and the internet lead to a threat to traditional brokerages; 
namely the proliferation of free financial data and a more balanced brokers‘ information 
advantage over clients. More and more brokers, such as Refco, were forced to provide 
online trading at low cost due to lower costs for the end user. We witness continued 
disintermediation and a reduced role for intermediaries. Direct exchange connections are 
reducing the round trip time of an order. In some markets, direct market access is capturing 
exchange traded derivatives volumes during the last five years. The challenge financial 
services firms faced recently and continue to face, was obvious in the Refco case. Insiders 
expect that more than 30% of volume will be conducted through algorithmic systems soon. 
Electronic intermediaries that provide information and match buyers and sellers, replace 
traditional sales intermediaries. We can introduce the notion ‗cybermediaries‘ and refer to 
the ‗new‘ actor. These new information intermediaries provide opportunities to reduce 
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price discrepancies. In 2011, DMA is a common term used within the financial services 
community. DMA enables the clients to conduct trades directly without a physical 
intermediary from brokers. In 2010, more than 90% of all trades originated in the U.S.A 
were matched through DMA (ISE, 2010). Orders can be sent to exchanges from almost any 
location in the world now.  
 
6.5 Black Box Trading Example 
 
Unprecedented growth in electronic trading and algorithmic trading is redefining system 
boundaries and accentuating the need for increased data transmission speeds. Brokers are 
using improved models for analysing market data for subsequent trade execution. New 
hedge funds, with heavy reliance on algorithmic trading, emphasise the need for speed. 
Optimising hardware, such as Titanium processors, and software, such as memory based 
matching, is essential in order to avoid bottlenecks to cater for smooth data flow and to 
avoid queues building up. Data signals are transmitted at about the speed of light. 
Bandwidth determines the number of parallel transmissions of signals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram was provided by Deutsche Börse AG, Frankfurt. 
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Black box trading is a simplified way of buying and selling products based on your own 
fair value. The black box that converts known inputs into programmed outputs could be 
seen as an actor. In other words, if you believe product ‗a‘ is cheaper related to product ‗b‘, 
you buy the cheaper and sell the more expensive one very quickly. The aim is to be faster 
than others. The following example illustrates details of such a product and the way it is 
evaluated (Higgins, Patel and Baygeldi, 1997): 
 
The Basis Relationship between Future Price and Cash Price 
 
Each contract has a face value of Euro 100.000, - with a notional coupon of 6% and time to 
maturity between 3.5 and 5 years to be deliverable into it. The Cheapest to Delivery (CTD) 
(OEZ2) is Deutsche Bundesrepublik (DBR) 6% 07/04/07 (price 108.93) and 
(OEZ2=108.33). 
 
In order to equate each of these securities to the futures price, the trader needs to separate 
conversion factor for each bond which is simply the price as a percentage of par at which 
each deliverable bond would yield the notional coupon (in this case 6 per cent) of the 
futures contract on the day of delivery. 
 
Euro Bund Future 110.75 RXZ2 Convergence 
    Yield C. Factor   Gross              Implied          Actual       Net Basis 
   Price         Basis  Repo%          Repo% 
1. DBR 5 07/04/11 103.835   4.461 .934161       .377  3.16        3.32        0.370 
2. DBR 5 01/04/12 103.815   4.486 .931496       .652  1.99        3.32        0.331 
3. DBR 5 07/04/12 103.900  4.497     .928434     1.076    .31        3.32           0.737  
 
Euro BOBL Future 108.33 OEZ2 Conv. 
    Yield C.Factor   Gross              Implied      Actual      Net Basis 
            Price      Basis             Repo%        Repo% 
1. DBR 6 07/04/0       108.930 3.917 .999571     .646       2.86        3.32     0.118 
2. OBL41/2 07 #140  102.355 3.945 .939135     .619  1.70        3.32         0.395 
3. DBR 51/4 01/08     105.875 3.993 .967937     1.018      0.74          3.32         0.658 
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Euro SHAZ Future 104.41 DUZ2 Conv. 
    Yield C.Factor   Gross             Implied       Actual      
 Net Basis 
Price      Basis               Repo%                  Repo% 
 
1. DBR 7 ½ 11/04 108.210    3.465 1.026310   1.053  2.58         3.32     1.93 
2. DBR 7 3/8 01/05 108.390   3.496 1.025856   1.280  1.57  3.32     0.462 
 
The implied repo rate is the annualised percentage return for buying the bond today and 
selling the bond for future delivery.  
____________________________________________________________ 
Net Basis= {(P1+A1) * (1+TN/360)} – (C * (1+TM/360))- ((F * CF) +A2) 
F   = Futures price; 
CF = Conversion Factor; 
P1 = Original price of the bond; 
C   = Coupon; 
A1 = Accrued interest on bond at purchase settlement date; 
A2 = Accrued interest on bond at delivery date; 
N   = Number of days between purchase and delivery date; 
M = Number of days between interim coupon and delivery date. 
 
Why is the net basis always positive and why does the cash bond always command a 
premium over the future? This is related to the risk of owning the future. The net basis can 
thus be interpreted as the value of the deliverability option that the person who has sold the 
futures contract holds. As the seller, he can choose which bond to deliver. Referring back to 
the net basis formula, we can see that if we assume T, N and M are identical for all 
deliverable bonds (in reality T may differ if a particular issue is trading special in the repo 
market), then the difference in net bases will be due to the price sensitivity of each bond. 
As duration is a measure of price sensitivity, if the yield falls below 6 per cent the bond 
with the shortest duration will experience the smallest price rise in relation to the final term 
of the equation, which, owing to the conversion factor, is derived using the price of the 
bond when yields are 6 per cent. In an environment where yields are less than the notional 
coupon of the future and the yield curve is flat, then the shortest-dated bond will generally 
be CTD. However, if the yield curve is steep enough to offset this effect (as with the 
current BOBL contract) or a particular issue has been squeezed, then this need not always 
be the case. In a 6 per cent yield environment, bonds with the longest duration are likely to 
be CTD.  
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Other reasons why we might purchase a bond and sell the future, even though a positive net 
basis exists, are that we might envisage a reduction in our funding costs either due to the 
bond becoming ―special‖ in the repo market or because we are anticipating an official 
interest rate cut. In this case our ―carry‖ would become more positive (or less negative) and 
we may eventually realise a profit on the trade.  
 
For a long position of Euro 100 million of OBL 140 (4 ½ 07) bond, the hedge ratio would 
be: 100/0.10 * CF bond = (100/0.10) * 0.999571  = 999.57   
 
The second method, duration hedging, overcomes this problem, but this time is reliant on a 
subsequent movement in the basis for a given move in the future, since we are assuming a 
parallel shift in the yield curve. As we have already seen, the relationship between CTD 
and the future is very close. In fact, the basis point value or BPV (i.e. the actual change in 
price for a given 1 basis point change in yield) of the future will be equal to the BPV of the 
CTD divided by the latter‘s conversion factor. The software or trader can quickly calculate 
the number of futures required to duration hedge our position: 
 
(100/0.10) * (BPV bond/ BPV future) = (100/0.10) * (3.62/4.30) = 337 
Market Rates       Official Rates 
US    Libor   = 1.8150    US Fed Funds = 1.75 
US overnight repo  = 1.75     US Prime        = 4.75 
Euro Libor   = 3.298    UK Repo         = 4.00 
£ Libor         = 4.40875 
Sterling 3m Dec. = 96.02 
Eurodollar Dec.  = 98.21 
 
Pricing of Fixed Income Futures Contracts 
The pricing of interest-rate futures closely correlates with the pricing on the corresponding 
cash markets. Those prices can change every millisecond during the trading hours between 
7:00 am and 09:00 p.m. GMT.  
 
Basis 
Over the term of an interest-rate futures contract, the price of this contract is usually 
different from that of the underlying cash instrument. The difference between the futures 
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price and the cash price is called the basis in futures terminology. The difference may be 
positive or negative.  
 
The basis is positive if       futures price < cash price  
The basis is negative if      futures price > cash price  
 
A distinction is made between the carry basis and the value basis, depending on the factors 
reflected in the basis.  
 
Carry Basis 
The so called cost of carry (net financing costs) has a dominating influence on the basis. 
The cost of carry refers to the costs of holding a cash position corresponding to the futures 
position. For example, if the trader plans to make actual physical delivery of federal bonds 
for a short position in BUND futures, the investor can already buy the securities at the 
current cash price plus accrued interest and refinance the costs of the position up to the 
maturity of the contract by means of a short-term credit. The cost of carry is then the 
balance (the ―net‖ amount) of the accrued interest earnings from the long-term federal 
bonds and the short-term financing costs. The cost of carry may be positive or negative, 
depending on whether the financing costs of the position (short-term) prove to be higher or 
lower than the interest income from the federal bonds (long-term). 
 
Futures Price < Premium Cash   Discount > Futures Price  
Negative cost of carry     Positive cost of carry 
Current yield < Short-term interest   Current yield > Short- term interest 
 
The basis will be positive or negative, depending on whether the money-market rate is 
higher or lower than the quotient of the coupon of the underlying instrument and its current 
market price (current yield) when the futures contract matures. 
 
If the short-term interest rate is lower than the current coupon of the bond, the interest 
earnings from the underlying instrument are higher than the financing costs. In this case, 
the cost of carry will be positive. Holding the bond will result in a net profit that is 
necessarily reflected in a discount of the futures price relative to the cash price. It will be 
reversed if the money market rate is higher than the current interest earned on the 
underlying instrument. In this case, the financing costs will exceed the income from the 
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bond. In other words, holding the bond will result in net costs that are reflected in a futures 
price that is higher than the cash price. The cost of carry is negative.  
 
Value Basis 
In addition to the cost of carry already described, other factors such as market participants‘ 
expectations, day-to-day events, structures of supply and demand and market liquidity also 
influence pricing. All of these factors, in which the advantages of a futures contract over a 
sale or purchase in the cash market are reflected, are summarised in the value basis (net 
basis, premium, value basis). It represents the information aspect of the financial futures 
markets. In some cases, the price distortions can be considerable and represent a genuine 
additional risk for a portfolio.  
 
Fair Value 
 
There is a balance between the cash market and the futures market if the basis corresponds 
exactly to the cost of carry. In other words, if no value basis exists, and the price of the 
interest-rate future assumes the so-called fair value. If this is not the case, namely if the 
basis is higher or lower than the cost of carry (plus any arbitrage transaction costs), i.e. if 
the futures contract is overvalued or undervalued relative to the underlying value (value 
basis) – then traders will in all likelihood try to take advantage of the price disparities by 
taking opposite positions in the futures and cash market. Profit oriented arbitrage of this 
kind, which can be ‗risk free‘, generally balances out the price and restores the equilibrium. 
 
Dominating Factors Influencing the Futures Price 
 
The theoretical price of an interest-rate future is higher: 
 the higher the cash price. 
 the lower the yield of the cash instrument. 
 the higher the financing costs of a cash position. 
 the longer the (remaining) term of the contract in the event of a positive cost of 
carry, or the shorter the (remaining) term in the event of a negative cost of carry. 
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Convergence of the Basis 
 
The size of the basis depends on the time of performance. The further away this point is in 
the future, the greater the influence will be on the above mentioned cost of carry. In other 
words, the amount of the basis will tend to decline over the course of time. When the 
contract matures, the cash price and futures price must be equal, as otherwise there would 
be opportunities for arbitrage ignoring transaction costs. 
 
    Delivery and Price Factors 
 
If the trader decides to make physical delivery in settlement of his short position, for 
example in the BUND future, he can deliver any Federal bond or debt security of the 
Treuhandanstalt with a remaining term of no less than 8.5 years but no more than 10.5 
years on the delivery day. The invoice amount, which the purchaser of a futures contract 
ultimately has to pay the seller, varies from one deliverable bond to another. It is based 
more specifically on the official Exchange Delivery Settlement Price (EDSP) on the last 
trading day of a contract, multiplied by a so-called price factor (conversion factor) 
calculated by Eurex for the respective bond delivered. In addition, the interest accruing on 
the bond up to the delivery day is taken fully into account, since it is still owed to the seller.  
 
The price factor is used to find a common yield denominator for the various residual 
maturities and coupons of the securities that are deliverable. With respect to the Eurex fixed 
interest rate futures, the conversion factor represents the price per EURO 1 nominal of a 
Federal bond, Federal debt obligation or Federal Treasury note or, as the case may be, of an 
exchange listed debt security of the Treuhandanstalt, with which the security would achieve 
a yield of 6 percent on the delivery day. Eurex calculates the price factor, the accrued 
interest and the invoice amount accounting to the following formulas: Price Factor (PF) = 
1,  
Accrued Interest = Days * coupon (%) * Euro 100.000 
                 ------------------------------------------ 
360 
All interest earning days, excluding the delivery day, are taken into account. A month is 
calculated as 30 days, a year as 360 days. 
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Invoice Amount  
 
Invoice amount = (EDSP * Price factor * Euro 1,000) + accrued interest 
Example: The trader or algo-machine is short in March 2007 BUND futures. He decides to 
deliver the 6 per cent Federal bond maturing on January 4, 2017. The remaining term of 9 
years, 9 months and 24 days is rounded of to 9 years, 9 months, to calculate the price 
factor. 
PF = Accrued interest = 66 * 0.06 * Euro 250.000 
             ------- -------------------------------- 
      360 
Assuming an EDSP of 102.63, the invoice amount is as follows: 
Invoice amount = (102.63 * 0.999674 * Euro 2.500) + Euro 2,750 = Euro 259.241.36 
PF= Price factor 
C = Coupon of the deliverable bond 
N = Number of years to maturity of the bond  
F= Number of full months until next coupon payment, divided by 12 
The EDSP is based only on DM 100 of the nominal value of the contract. Therefore, to calculate the invoice 
amount, the EDSP must be multiplied by Euro 2,500. 
C=6 
N=9 
F=9/12 
PF=0.999674 
Interest payment- January 4 (p.a.) 
Delivery day = March 10, 1997 
Interest payment days =66 
Coupon in percent =0.06 
Accrued interest = Euro 2, 750 
 
The „Cheapest –to –deliver‟ 
 
The paper with the highest implied repo rate is also the current CTD. ‗Cybermediaries‘ act 
as arbitrageurs between two or more different products in the marketplace. Some 
cybermediaries serve as market makers and gain more market power. The technology and 
algorithms used constantly aim to reduce price discrimination between similar products. 
 
An investment bank based in London has stated that every lost millisecond results in 
approximately $10m per annum in lost opportunities. Milliseconds count, and whether it is 
a buy side or a sell side firm, latency will affect its competitive position in an expanding 
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marketplace. According to Clark (2008) reducing the latency of transaction processing in 
order to gain a microsecond of improvement may cost around $250. If you aim to reduce 
latency by another 6 milliseconds it can cost up to $1.5 million.  
 
6.6  Summary 
 
Sustained improvement in the capability and cost of computing power, data storage and 
data transmission bandwidth are leading to declines in the cost of transaction. The growth 
of networks is simplifying information sharing and further accelerating the decline in 
transaction costs. Employees work in a social and political environment and do not 
generally report to their boss directly. Back-office employees, sales staff, project managers, 
vendors, programmers and clients can be seen as actors for the organisation but also as 
intermediaries between vendors and end-users. Various types of relationships and power 
exist.  
 
ANT‘s strength is that it is process-oriented, aiming at description rather than explanation 
of the phenomenon. It can answer the ‗how‘ questions about structure and power (Law, 
2001). Networks can be treated as individual actors. This is known as ‗punctualization‘ 
(Law, 2001). An actor-network stresses the means to enlarge the scope of a study in order 
to map the interrelation of an information system with its outer-context. The initial 
problematization and the parallel translation of different interests led to Refco‘s and other 
financial services firms‘ failure. ANT helps to analyse socio-political characteristics where 
the role of technology dominates. Refco illustrated that technology triggers changes. Not 
separating human and non-human actors in the analysis allows a comprehensive assessment 
of the role of technology and the behaviour of employees.  
 
The use of ANT in the above analysis gave insight into the position of IS evaluation within 
the complex network of electronic trading where large numbers of (trading) companies 
trade huge numbers of complex transactions through exchanges. This is an incredible 
challenge for all the actors, both human and non-human, in the network. This analysis 
demonstrated how the failure of the link between (some) Refco managers and Refco‘s 
information systems caused the demise of the company and its replacement by Marex. One 
network folded and another emerged successfully. However, Refco‘s link failure was not a 
technological failure but a failure of evaluation. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the thesis and outlines the theoretical, practical and 
methodological contributions made by this research.  The main contribution of this research 
is a descriptive in-depth understanding of the IT investment appraisal phenomenon, in the 
context of the wider and longstanding research field of IS evaluation. I hope that the 
contributions will help academics and practitioners to continue the debate in this field. The 
chapter also discusses the limitations, including those regarding generalisability of the 
chosen methodology and theory. This chapter also refers to future developments such as 
extending the theories developed in the analysis chapter and the findings gained from this 
research could be used in the process of theory building.  
 
The research question, how IS evaluation is socially constructed, entails an examination of 
the behaviour of the main actors in an evaluation context and their interpretation of the 
concepts of IT investment and its possible outcomes. From a review of the literature, it is 
arguable that these issues deserve further research, as they remain elusive and complex.  
 
It has been discussed that these concepts are socially constructed and thus a social science 
approach is needed. An understanding implies taking into account subjective, social and 
political factors. By using actor-network theory, the formation of the heterogeneous 
network involving the investment appraisal of one or more projects in a case study 
organisation has been examined. This approach, the social construction of IS evaluation, 
falls neatly into the tradition of interpretive evaluation research and represents a step 
forward into empirical research in the area, based on the ideas of writers such as Smithson 
and Tsiavos (2004). The case study organisation granted full access and no practical 
problems occurred during the collection of data. The further insight gained through 
carrying out the research could be of value to practitioners: ―The failure to understand IS 
evaluation, and adopt appropriate evaluation practices, can lead to misconceived decisions 
with deleterious consequences for users and developers alike.‖ (Smithson and Hirschheim, 
1998, p.171). It is argued that actors are embedded in the network. The way actors interact 
in society needs to be analysed further. The following sections outline the main 
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contributions of this thesis.  They also highlight limitations and ideas for potential future 
research.  
 
7.2 Summary of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One illuminated the background of the 
research topic by exemplifying the need and justification for this thesis. The aim of this 
chapter was to introduce the reader to the topic of IT investment development in the 
financial services industry and the consequences firms face if they do invest or decide not 
to invest in infrastructure in general and in HFT capabilities specifically. Some firms have 
lost various hedge funds and other clients due to a lack of state-of-the-art software and 
hardware availability within the firm, including a lack of ability to process conducted trades 
using STP. One of the reasons why companies struggle in the environment we live in is 
because clients‘ emphasis points towards technology and the demand for high level 
technology is still growing.  
 
The introduction outlines the transformation witnessed in the financial services industry 
globally and locally. This industry influences our life directly or indirectly regarding the 
way firms operate and are regulated. Therefore, even this very specific case should be seen 
as a trend in the market, which more and more politicians, researchers and regulators treat 
as a potential risk factor for the entire financial services industry. Other schools of thought 
are convinced that the increasing HFT driven by technology is good for all involved parties, 
leads to more transparency and is easy to manage from the regulators‘ point of view. 
 
Chapter Two delivered an insight into the literature on IS investment evaluation and 
outlined the development of IS investment evaluation. It presented the research domain 
and analysed the past and current research literature on evaluation of IT investment. It 
was discussed that one of the major issues is that the focus of most studies in relation to 
the evaluation of IS investment effectiveness is restricted to the use of quantitative data. 
Contextual issues are discussed in order to reflect the importance of this area. The basis 
for the thesis is a strong focus on context related activities. Without relating to specific 
context(s) the research would not have been conductible. 
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Chapter Three discusses the conceptual framework that has been chosen for this thesis. It is 
argued that an investment appraisal, like other evaluations, is socially constructed. It is not 
a mechanical application of accounting but is rather a social process based on human 
perceptions and interaction. It involves the interpretation of evaluation methods and 
accounting conventions. The use of ANT including the use of the moments of translation is 
discussed, in particular the enrolments and activities of the principal actors. Also, 
heterogeneous networks and the role they play in relation to HFT are analysed.  
 
Chapter Four covers the research approach, research method and design for this study and 
the main reasons for choosing an interpretative research approach are provided. The basic 
method is a case study but with strong elements of action research. Data gathering and 
access to the financial services firm case study are described. The author of this thesis 
acknowledges that much of the research took place between 2004 and 2006. The extensive 
engagement with the company was only possible due to the fact that the researcher worked 
for the company in both the U.K. and Germany. The employment was further extended 
with the new firm Marex from March 2006 until October 2006.  
 
Writing up the thesis was delayed due to various factors including the birth of my first child 
in 2008 and my second child in 2010. It was extremely helpful to work for both companies 
since the in-depth engagement and related data collection would not have been possible 
otherwise. The researcher is also convinced that various interviewees would not have 
revealed so many details without him being employed at Refco and Marex. At the same 
time the researcher would not have received access to various trading and back-office 
systems such as Patssystem, Sungard or Rolfe & Nolan.      
 
Chapter Five, the findings chapter, describes the selected financial services firm in depth by 
using the empirical data collected from the beginning of 2004 until October 2006. The 
collected data is essential to this thesis. It reflects the organisational context and the 
background of the case. The main part of this chapter describes the events regarding the 
employment of IT evaluation method(s) and the enormous growth of daily transactions on 
electronic exchanges. This chapter reflects the context in which various firms struggled and 
even collapsed. The role of senior management in the U.S. entity in particular was not 
obvious and difficult to evaluate. Various questions, such as why they acted in a specific 
way, remain unanswered. Additional research to answer any remaining questions would be 
useful. 
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The findings from the case study chapter are analysed in detail in Chapter Six using actor-
network theory. The empirical findings such as transaction growth supported by HFT are 
highlighted. Also, the processes of translation and enrolment are discussed. The roles of the 
new legislation in conjunction with cheap accessible technology are discussed in relation to 
the way Refco conducted short-term and medium-term business. Human and non-human 
actors are both essential parts of the network. Heterogeneous networks are either supported 
or rejected by individual actors during a specific context related action. Some HFT 
companies believe that speed-of-light trading is achievable. It needs to be seen how much 
firms like Refco need to transform in order to facilitate transactions from the operational 
point of view if they are conducted at such a speed.   
 
Chapter Seven finalises the thesis and contemplates the outcome and process of this 
research. Previous research has not covered translation processes and the creation of black 
boxes in depth within the financial services industry. It is demonstrated that the 
transformations triggered from the emergence of HFT in the financial services industry are 
likely to continue. Companies with HFT, including processes in operations, draw attention 
to the theoretical and practical contributions of this thesis. In addition to identifying these 
contributions, the researcher also highlights the limitations of the research, followed by 
suggestions for further research. It is recognised that much more research is needed in order 
to understand human actors‘ translation and enrolment into any new network.   
 
7.3 Practical Contributions 
 
Various points have been contributed by this study. As mentioned in Chapter Two, much 
has been written about the impact of evaluation of IT investment in general. However, 
evaluation of IT investment with a focus on ANT is not common (see Chapter Three). Due 
to accessibility to high technology in a relatively cheap way off the shelf, an explosion in 
transactions on exchanges and various other organisations has been witnessed. Even firms 
in other sectors, such as Amazon or E-bay, have experienced massive volume growth in 
transactions during the last few years. This research can contribute to the field because it 
aims to reflect on changes in this area.   
 
Three areas are worth highlighting in terms of contribution: the relationship between 
technology and humans; the emergence of networks; and the network stability.  
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Many ―side effects‖ such as network collapse have rarely been covered by the literature. 
The world has changed in terms of ‗processing‘ and we need more understanding of those 
new processes. This study contributes towards our understanding of these new ways in 
which products are processed in our new reality. The empirical findings show that 
transactions generated by institutional investors such as asset managers and hedge funds are 
very much technology driven and make huge demands on the IT infrastructure that have to 
be met if such markets are to continue to develop.  
 
This thesis makes a contribution for people who are interested in knowing more about HFT. 
It is an alternative way of understanding and evaluating HFT. Other findings from this 
dissertation suggest that operational issues are still very much underestimated in the entire 
industry. These issues include the back-end clearing of often complex transactions. 
 
An Executive Director of Goldman Sachs, London, mentioned during a meeting in 
December 2010:  
―We are bombarded with ever increasing numbers of new and existing contracts to 
be processed and cleared. We are concerned of not being able to fully or timely 
process those transactions. Almost all exchanges are launching and trading more 
and more products such as the recent launch of Korean Index Options (Kospi) on 
the Eurex platform. I am struggling to keep an overview of all those new products.‖ 
(an Executive Manager of Goldman Sachs, London, December 2010).  
 
It is obvious that end clients can easily move to other clearinghouses if they are not 
satisfied. A similar comment was made in November 2010 from a U.K. based commodity 
focused broker. Their aim is to offer existing and new clients access to most financial 
exchanges such as CME, Eurex and LIFFE. The global head of business development said:  
―We have selected exchange memberships and offer various trading platforms such 
as GL Trade and Patssystem to our end clients. Those end clients are based in 
various countries such as Asia, Russia, and Middle East. Clients would like to trade 
futures and options calendar spreads and we do not know how to process those. We 
have got no experience and need help. In case the front end trading system GL is 
down and the client calls us to enter and process the trade on behalf of the client we 
would struggle.‖ (U.K. based commodity broker, global head of business 
development, November 2010).    
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Larger investment banks, such as a Swiss based one, mentioned their struggle to cope and 
process all conducted client trades properly and timely as well. The head of flow execution 
desk, based in London, said in October 2010:  
―My team and I do not know how to input certain trades such as OTC flexible 
options into the system. If a hedge fund buys 12.000 lots in Stoxx 50 call, with 
maturity December 2017 and ask us to execute the trade and split the order into six 
different sub-accounts after the trade I would not know how to process or allocate 
it‖ (Head of a London based Flow Execution Desk, October 2010). 
 
These examples are common and reflect the industry‘s day-to-day problems. Only a few 
people in the industry know the answers. It is astonishing to find out that other senior 
people in American, German, French and Japanese Banks are struggling to cope with the 
ever-growing volume executed electronically. A senior banker at a Japanese Investment 
bank mentioned that they do not understand the way fees and margin calls are calculated. 
This applies for many banks. 
  
Operational issues are still very much underestimated in the financial services industry. 
This study demonstrates that the forces behind ever growing daily transactions influence 
attitudes toward technology even if they are multifaceted and more and more controlled by 
local regulators.  
 
The collapse of Refco and Lehman Brothers was also supported and potentially driven by 
the inability of using technology in an efficient and effective way.  The author of the thesis 
has spent two weeks in the former Lehman Brothers building in Canary Wharf, Bank 
Street, from the day it collapsed on 15
th
 September 2008. During this period of time he 
witnessed the lack of IT infrastructure as well as the lack of systems compatibility. Senior 
Lehman bankers, including the head of trading, head of operations, head of IT, head of 
clearing, risk department and the responsible administrator Price Waterhouse were not able 
to split and evaluate trades generated by clients and executed via leading exchanges in time 
before it collapsed. When I asked whether they knew what their client positions are they 
said: ‗No‘. Due to time limitations in this research the author suggests additional research.  
 
Technology has taken over daily transactions and there is a need to understand what really 
happens behind the scenes. The issues with a bigger impact on society will not be entirely 
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technological. However, we have seen that Refco and other financial services firms 
struggled to cope and incorporate both technological and social aspects.  
 
7.4 Contributions to Theory 
 
In Chapter Three it was mentioned that interpretative research is very flexible in terms of 
research direction. However, it needs to be supported by empirical findings. ANT was 
chosen because of its flexibility and usefulness to study IT investment evaluation. 
However, the empirical findings still support the idea that we understand very little. It 
should be highlighted that the gathered data here is very sensitive to context. Therefore, 
ANT‘s specific vocabulary is very useful. Various authors have argued that ANT has 
considerable weaknesses as well. One aim of this study was to contribute in terms of 
supporting those authors willing to see ANT‘s strength and usefulness in specific contexts.  
 
The case study showed the relatively unique opportunity to support ANT and potentially 
gather more information in order to continue additional research with those who are willing 
to be involved. The dissertation attempts to make a contribution more than supporting what 
researchers have said. The study researched on micro level actors‘ activities in specific 
contexts and the way networks are created within the framework we live in. As an example, 
financial services firms have the habit of moving in the same direction at the same time. 
They tend to ‗support‘ and drive each other. If this area is researched further, more 
information may be found that is related to the social construction of IT investment and 
other related areas.  
 
Another contribution of this thesis is to increase awareness related to a shift in the industry 
towards computer mediated trading with all its potential consequences and side effects. An 
additional contribution to theory is revealing each individual actor‘s actions within the 
heterogeneous network in terms of ‗transition points‘. We have seen what happened in the 
case study and aim to describe each action point by point until we are able to describe 
actors in a more sophisticated way.   
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7.5 Methodological Contributions 
 
The methods employed in this study aimed to use gathered data on social construction of IT 
investment appraisal. It is understandable that the methods used here are open to critique. It 
is the hope of the researcher that more and more researchers will support IS scholars using 
this methodology. The author of this thesis believes that filtering the underlying factors can 
potentially lead to misinterpretations of the phenomenon.  The aim was to contribute to 
theory and practice. These contributions are summarised as follows. Social construction of 
IT investment evaluation literature rarely uses in-depth industry case studies. It needs to 
include new actors as forces such as hedge funds and should continue highlighting 
technology‘s new evolving roles in transactions and processing. Also, a lack of experience 
and knowledge within the industry in terms of HFT needs to be admitted.  
 
A further contribution is that the study indirectly provides support for the use of action 
research combined with ANT. By its very nature, action research can lead to an emphasis 
on ‗action‘ rather than ‗research‘ while ANT is often considered to be the preserve of 
theoreticians. This study shows that the two seemingly disparate tools can be combined 
usefully. 
 
7.6 Limitations and Reflections 
 
I have contributed in certain areas and have also seen limitations that must be 
acknowledged. One of these limitations is the topic of generalisability. The data was drawn 
from one main case study. This obviously raises the questions about the generalisability of 
the Refco case study. At the same time it is obvious that the findings are applicable to 
certain financial services actors such as brokers and banks. One of the acknowledged 
limitations concerns the focus on international or global financial services firms. Local 
small players may have different actors involved. It is visible that a certain generalisability 
of the findings exists. This research was conducted with the focus on social construction of 
IT investment and social construction of HFT. The findings relate narrowly to actors 
involved in the specific context. Some may argue that the findings of this thesis are only 
applicable to HFT companies linked to exchanges via their brokers.  
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The limitation related to ANT as a theory should be researched further. ANT does not offer 
a solution to actors‘ roles in the network they are engaged in. In an ideal world, more 
financial services firms should have been used as case studies and analysed in depth. But 
this was not possible within the given framework. Various interviewed people were too 
anxious to be mentioned by name. However, the existing accessible pool of people in the 
industry is immense and can be used for follow-up research.  
 
A further limitation, due to the limitation in time, is the decision taken not to examine in 
depth, using ANT, the role of the regulators. As shown in Chapter Five, data was collected 
about the increasing activities of the FSA and other regulators. I had hoped to analyse this, 
as it represents a particularly interesting aspect of the network: the interaction between 
regulators, firms such as Refco and the underlying technological infrastructure. As shown 
in Chapter Five, the FSA have been active in ‗prosecuting‘ Credit Suisse for their 
transactional failings and this would have been an interesting aspect to examine and one 
that lends itself to ANT analysis. However, the involved effort was not trivial and I ran out 
of time.  
 
7.7 Recent Developments and their Potential for Future Research 
 
Global derivative trading volume rose significantly during the past few years. In particular 
interest rate options and futures saw a massive rise during the last ten years in terms of 
volume and open interest. Nominal value of more than 900 billion USD was outstanding 
during the peak at the end of fiscal year 2009. (Bank for International Settlement, BIS, 
2010). The financial crisis revealed various structural deficits related to market 
infrastructure of derivative products. New derivative products were created constantly 
during the last few years. At the same time those emerging new derivative products need 
different infrastructures related to front office and back office processing and transactions. 
Central Counterparty Clearing (CCP) emerged from a low profile status to a new important 
role within the financial services industry. Another newly created and tradable derivative 
product has an additional risk profile, which needs to be monitored and evaluated ideally. 
 
Those new products influence trading systems, operations and clearing, and risk 
management just to mention a few areas. Product liquidity and product price changes need 
to be ‗built in‘ to ANT. The derivative product itself has an important role with ANT and 
also within the network. The interrelation between the non-human derivative product and 
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the human actor has become crucial for the topic evaluation of IT investment. Hence, 
further research, leading on from the current study, should include these important products 
within the actor-network analysis. 
 
At this point it is important to highlight that derivative products are not only used by the 
financial services industry. According to International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA, 2009a) more than 90% of Fortune 500 companies use derivative products for 
hedging purposes. Most hedging with those products takes place in interest rates, 
commodities and foreign exchange.    
  
Recently, we witness a move towards more regulation and new regulatory bodies 
monitoring and implementation of new frame for those products. The question how new 
regulation can influence the way those products are traded and behave within the network 
needs to be answered when we get more updated data. 
 
On 7
th
 February 2011, chief executive Hector Sands updated the industry on progress made 
towards a new regulatory structure related to financial services firms. 
 
The government is aiming to replace the FSA by two new regulators. In his letter to CEO‘s 
Sands wrote: 
―The Prudential Regulation Authority (the PRA), which will be a subsidiary of the 
Bank of England, will be responsible for promoting the stable and prudent 
operation of the financial system through regulation of all deposit-taking 
institutions, insurers and investment banks. The Consumer Protection and Markets 
Authority (the CPMA) will be responsible for regulation of conduct of retail, as 
well as wholesale, financial markets and the infrastructure that supports those 
markets. The CPMA will also have responsibility for the prudential regulation of 
firms that do not fall under the PRA‘s scope. The government is currently 
consulting on including unsecured credit within the scope of the CPMA. To ensure 
a smooth transition we are making changes to our current management structure to 
help us evolve over the next two years from one unitary regulator into the proposed 
new structure. These changes will begin on 4 April 2011 when we replace our 
current Supervision and Risk business units with a Prudential Business Unit (PBU) 
and a Consumer & Markets Business Unit (CMBU). You may also be aware that 
the government has to introduce new legislation to allow for the formal transfer of 
 179 
power from the FSA to the new regulators‖ (Hector Sands, Chief Executive of FSA, 
7
th
 February 2011). 
 
Electronic trading systems are used for trading in financial markets, differing between types 
of trades and users, and between the various stages of the trading processes. Transactions 
conducted via electronic trading systems, between dealers and their customers are growing 
rapidly. Strong competition seems to have led brokers to promote new trading systems to 
their customers in order to expand.  
 
So far, volume generated via computers is not significant in the OTC derivatives market. 
Since Lehman‘s collapse, counter-party risk has become an important topic driving the 
OTC business in electronic market environment. Most trading systems such as CQG, TT, 
and Patssystems are not perfectly designed to be the platform of choice for traditional OTC 
business. Those systems need to be re-designed or a new generation of alternative trading 
systems need to be developed in order to be able to facilitate a new emerging 
heterogeneous network.  
 
On 24
th
 March 2011, Bloomberg‘s Nina Mehta wrote:  
―CBOE Holdings Inc. and NYSE Euronext may create venues for derivatives that 
now trade over the counter to capitalise on proposed rules designed to bring more 
transparency to the $583 trillion market. The exchange operators may form swap-
trading platforms for privately negotiated derivatives that the government plans to 
move onto regulated trading systems or exchanges that will provide public data 
about prices and transactions, according to interviews with company executives 
over the last week. Most of the contracts are now traded between broker-dealers 
over the phone or through private electronic systems. Congress last year ordered 
that most standardised OTC derivatives in the U.S. be guaranteed by clearinghouses 
and traded on exchange or swap-execution facilities, also known as SEFs, after a 
100-fold surge in trading of credit-default contracts over seven years made 
oversight of the financial system more difficult. Regulators are now writing rules 
for the swap platforms and the product that will be traded on them‖ (Nina Mehta, 
Bloomberg, 24
th
 March 2011). 
 
The role of voice broking and direct dealing between dealers is decreasing from year to 
year. Only less liquid and exotic markets are still relying on the brokers as voice brokers. 
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Intermediary trading is moving from bilateral OTC relationships towards a marketplace 
with more centralised price discovery. In principle, electronic trading execution costs tend 
to decrease in due course. But the development of IT infrastructure can be costly and also 
time consuming. Liquidity does not move easily from one venue or trading platform to 
another and actors will decide the location of choice. Trading systems provide the user with 
a full log of the transaction behaviour of the users but can affect the market‘s structure and 
its dynamics as well. They are also accessible without limitations to specific locations. In 
relation to open-outcry markets, electronic trading systems can be upgraded regularly and 
also tested via a simulation environment with the aim to handle more trades by increasing 
the capacity of the relevant computer network.  
 
There are a number of technological and economic factors that have no doubt led to the 
emergence of algorithmic trading. The three main factors that probably contributed to that 
are the increase of telecom performance in line with dropping costs as well as the evolution 
of office and exchange automation. High bandwidth, high accuracy, high network 
availability and reliability with low cost hardware support the emergence of computer 
driven electronic trading systems or in other words algorithmic trading.  
 
In February 2011, London School of Economics (LSE) and the Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) announced (http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-
work/projects/current-projects/computer-trading):  
―[… ] that advances in technology continue to transform how our financial markets 
operate. The volume of financial products traded through computer automated 
trading taking place at high speed and with little human involvement has increased 
dramatically in the past few years. For example, today, over one third of United 
Kingdom equity trading volume is generated through high frequency automated 
computer trading while in the US this figure is closer to three-quarters. This 
Foresight project … involves leading experts in this field and will explore how 
computer generated trading in financial markets might evolve in the next ten years 
or more, and how this will affect:  
 Financial stability;  
 Integrity of financial markets including price information and liquidity;  
 General competition;  
 Market efficiency for allocating capital;   
 Transaction costs on access to finance; and  
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 Future role and location of capital markets‖ (announcement of London School of 
Economics and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills, February 2011). 
 
Also, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed new rules on 
‗co-location and proximity hosting services‘ at the end of 2010. The new rules aim to allow 
all actors similar access to co-location facilities. If approved in 2011, equitable pricing for 
co-location will be mandatory. Exchanges and also vendors and other third party providers 
will be asked to provide their co-location services to any trader willing to pay and to be 
enrolled in the network. Latency information is very important to HFT firms and they 
check their latency every day. In future, CFTC expects that the information needs to be 
disclosed to all involved parties. They aim to implement ―latency transparency‖. Other 
guidelines will potentially shape the landscape and it is important that upcoming new 
legislations will be analysed and researched properly.  
 
Support for additional research in electronic trading systems can also be seen in the 
following case: On 6
th
 May 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Index (DJIA) collapsed 9.16% 
in less than 30 minutes. At the peak of the market downward move the market value 
dropped by more than $1 trillion. Market participants called the incident the ―Flash Crash‖ 
(reference: Bloomberg.com).  Analysing this leads to the following points: 
 
Remaining high frequency traders (HFTs) and firms stopped their algorithms when the 
volatility jumped. Actors simply left the heterogeneous network and it became unstable due 
to a lack of liquidity. Just before the ‗flash crash‘ occurred, two main U.S. exchanges had 
announced not to transfer their orders to the other one anymore. The advantage was that 
they did not need to be matched against a potential better price. Market makers increased 
their bid/offer price so massively that it was obvious that they did not want to be executed 
against client orders anymore.  
 
At the moment, the final answer to and the reason for this crash, triggered by machines, 
remains unknown. But it can be said that the heterogeneous network became instable. ANT 
helps to see, but not to understand. The researcher has some ideas about what needs to be 
done in order to continue the research. Academics are invited to participate in future 
research and to be involved. As an example, some U.S and European brokers do not use 
their pre-trade risk tools and risk solutions because it reduces latency. Erroneous trades will 
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be seen again. However, SEC has proposed a ban on these ‗naked sponsored electronic 
access‘ agreements between the broker and the HFT firm and hedge fund.   
 
Finally, the researcher would like to mention that HFT firms are concerned and ask how the 
financial markets will be restructured, driven mainly by technology and new legislation, in 
the near future. As an example, a relatively small American proprietary trading firm, based 
in Canary Wharf, London, restructured the firm in 2010 and made most individual 
traditional and experienced traders redundant in order to set up HFT. The reason why the 
organisations asked traders to leave the company was because the firm decided to change 
the business strategy at the end of 2009. The CEO decided to move into HFT as a new 
business idea. Also, he employed somebody with HFT experience.  In order to implement 
the new required IS and IT infrastructure from scratch, they needed to spend a lot of 
money, including buying raw historical data such as equity future tick data from 
Exchanges.  
 
The project manager of this firm mentioned during a meeting in his office in March 2011:  
―I am concerned that HFT increases further and kicks traditional proprietary traders 
out of the market, because HFT firms are trading against each other and the tick 
traders are to slow to react. Those HFT trading activities are dominating the U.S 
market now and I want to make sure that no more traditional traders are kicked out 
of the market because they cannot react within 10 milliseconds. I should not say 
this, but we need to make sure that the market participants do not continue to 
change towards algo only. I am interested in continuing to see traditional human 
beings as traders. It is not healthy if we continue loosing traders and increase the 
number of HFT. It is unclear how the market structure will change this year. We 
decided to employ a new HFT trader soon in order to increase our HFT exposure. I 
can see that normal human beings are not able to compete against a machine‖ 
(Project Manager of an American proprietary trading firm, London, March 2011). 
 
A concern for financial stability is that trading systems that function adequately in normal 
market conditions may cease to be effective in volatile markets. Liquidity can simply 
disappear if actors decide to halt market and limit orders due to increased uncertainty. In 
this case HFT firms need to switch their algorithms off instantly. The question is whether 
this would be realistic. 
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